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This work consists of an attempt to ground the rationality that is inherent to the theories of 
justice espoused by John Rawls and Robert Nozick; it does so by treating the foundational 
arguments for their principles of justice. The aim here is to contrast both of these foundations by 
first mapping the logic of Rawls' core arguments, which will then lead us to his basic political 
concepts: social justice, the principle of equality, rights and the distribution shares within a wider 
social contract. We will then contrast these concepts with those that Nozick introduces in his 
counter-argument.  By presenting and developing such a contrast, we will show that there exists 
fundamental ambiguities that underpin both liberal and libertarian theories; as a result, many of 
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Ce travail a pour but de formuler une base sur laquelle peut être établie la rationalité 
inhérente des théories de la justice proposé par John Rawls et Robert Nozick. Cette base sera donc 
construite à travers une analyse des arguments fondamentaux qui forment les deux théories 
respectives. L'objectif est d'établir un contraste entre ces fondements en présentant premièrement 
la logique qui structure l'argumentaire de Rawls; ceci va nous amener à présenter les concepts 
fondamentaux de sa théorie, comme la justice sociale, le principe d'égalité, le droit et la distribution 
de biens lors d'un contrat social. Dans un deuxième temps, on va pouvoir les opposer à ceux 
introduits par Nozick dans son contre-argument. En présentant l'opposition entre les deux théories, 
on va démontrer dans quelle mesure le Libéralisme et le Libertarisme sont constitués par des 
ambiguïtés fondamentales; finalement, ceci fera appel à une remise en questions des concepts 














La justice comme l’équité  
La distribution de la justice  
La théorie de la justice  
L’utilitarisme  
Le libertarisme  
Le libéralisme  
La théorie politique libérale  
Les principes de justice 
Les deux principes de justice  
Le principe d’utilité moyenne  
L’ordre lexical  
Le moins favorisé  
La règle de dichotomie  
La position initiale  
La voile d’ignorance  
Les principes pour les institutions  
La distribution des biens  
L’État  
L’idée du bien  
La moralité  
Les arguments positifs et négatifs  
La critique de Nozick des principes  
La durabilité des principes  










Acknowledgment ....................................................................................................................... xvii 
1.Fairnes.………………………………………………………………………………………….1      
1.1Intro……………...……………………………………………………………………………..1 
1.2 Justice……………………….……...………………………………………………………….2 
1.3 Contractarian Concept of Justice as Fairness ……………………….…………………….…..7 
1.4 Reflective Equilibrium……………………………………...………………………………..10  
1.5 Particularities of the Contract Theory as Fairness………….…………………….………….12 
2. Principles of Justice………………………………………………………………………….20  
2.1 Institutions……………………………………………………………………………….…..20 
2.2 Two Principles of Justice…………………………………………….……………………....25 
2.3 The Principle of Efficiency…………………………………………………………………..28 
2.4 Natural Assets and Arbitrariness………………………….………………………………. . 33  
2.5 The Positive Argument………………………………………………………………….…. .36 
2.6 The Negative Argument....................................................................................................…..40 
2.7 Primary Goods, Tendency to Equality and Principles for Individuals…..…………………..43 
3. Original Position…………………………………………………………….……..…..…….48 
3.1Justice…………………………………………………………….…………………………..48 
3.2 The Veil of Ignorance………………………………….…………………………………….51 
3.3 The Rationality of the Parties……………………………………………….……………….53 
3.4 The Reasoning Leading to the two Principles of Justice…………………………..…….….56 
3.5 Principles of Justice as End-Result Principles and Nozick’s Attempt at Formulating them 
Himself……………………………………………………………………………………….….62 
3.6 The Reasoning Leading to the Principle of Average Utility…………………………..…….66 
4. Equal Liberty....................................................................................................................…...71 
4.1 The Four-Stage Sequence………………………………………………………..…………..71 
4.2 Nozick’s Disagreement with the Theory of Justice as Fairness: The Grounding of Sustainable 
Justice……………………………..………………..........………………………………………76 
4.3 The Concept of Liberty……………….………...………………………………………..….79 
4.4 Liberty of Conscience……………………………..……………………….……………..…82 
4.5 The Constitution……………………………………………………….….…………………84 
4.6 Limitations on the Principle of Participation……………………….………………………..86 
4.7 The Rule of Law……………….…………………………………………………………….88 
4.8 The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness..........…………………………………..…93 
5. Distributive Shares (Second Principle)…………….……………………………………….98 
vii 
 
5.1 Justice in Political Economy.............................................................................................…...98 
5.2 Economic Systems………………………………………………...………………….…….100 
5.3 Background Institutions for Distributive Justice………………………………………..….107 


































The first intention of this research was to attempt a philosophical journey through the work 
of John Rawls, which, besides trying to understand the foundations of the principles of justice 
through his theory, would also allow me to also sketch possible pathways towards a more 
substantial (liberal) theory of justice. It is through such pathways that we can consequently 
determine whether or not it is possible for such a theory to be simultaneously enlarged in scope 
and deepened in context, for these are two necessary qualifications for the employability of such 
a theory in wider political contexts. To open new pathways inside of a systematic theory requires 
a particular type of operation due to the closed nature of such a system: the “opening” must thus 
come from inside. For this to happen, one must pay attention to the theory's internal ambiguities 
in order to then depart from them without having to depart from the entirety of the system. The 
location and delimitation of such ambiguities are the object of my second intention: Robert 
Nozick's (libertarian) critique of Rawls' difference principle will be the main ambiguity that I shall 
expose. The core substance of this research will be the exposition of the arguments and counter-
arguments that constitute this ambiguity. The reason for this is that, despite the fact that both 
thinkers start from a similar set of general premises that are endemic to liberal thought, the 
principles that they consequently establish are radically different. Both of these philosophical 
journeys will be analyzed in parallel, and we shall see that the authors' methodological choices are 
what allows for a growing differentiation to occur as their respective journeys progress. 
In order to map out such different trajectories, we must be able to recognize the institutions 
which both thinkers encounter during the elaboration of their respective theories of justice: 
confronting their productions with the objectivity of such institutions will allow for each thinker 
to be individuated within the context of a common world. For Rawls, Justice as Fairness (hereafter 
JF) aims to describe a just arrangement of the major political and social institutions of a liberal 
society: the political constitution, the legal system, the economy, the family, and so on.  
Consequently, issues of justice and efficiency will be discussed under circumstances that Rawls 
foresaw as imposed by the “background” of cultural heritage that grounds our social and political 
conceptions of governance. This “society-as-it-is-given” cannot be escaped it or changed entirely, 
but can be efficiently and justly arranged according to the precepts of a just society that regulates 
the principles of justice within a wider theory. As a theory, JF thus has its grounds in the objectivity 
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of the world: it is concerned with matters that are unanimously recognized by the political 
community in question and aims to provide answers to the common problems that simultaneously 
hold the community together and trace lines of division within it. Because of this, JF goes beyond 
mere differentiation (difference 'in itself') and aims at understanding the common ground on which 
this differentiation takes place. In this sense, differentiation itself can only arise out of a situation 
in which its actors share something in common; in Rawls' case, this commonality is represented 
by the shared institutions in which actors cooperate. These institutions are shared in the sense that 
the actors must be able to relate to themselves on some sort of equal footing; if not, there is no 
possibility of a common ground that transcends the differences that arise from it. Because JF 
recognizes the right of the opponent to be different, it then mobilizes this difference as a resource 
that is beneficial to cooperation. JF bases its valuations on the principle of cooperation, prosperity, 
good trust and a highly qualitative life in which it would be possible to pursue our own good within 
the constraints that just principles allow and guarantee; this guarantee is provided by a social 
distribution that is meant to ensure that certain commonly-occuring contingencies do not prevent 
our individual efforts from “paying off”. JF is not a theory that employs isolation or noncooperative 
schemes of communication as punishments for those who do not abide by its logic; on the other 
hand, it also refuses to abide by principles that arise from conditions of hatred and bigotry. It can 
do this by ensuring that the cooperation that occurs within its particular sphere is done from a 
position that abstracts from the conditions in which hate and bigotry can arise. For in order to be 
hateful or bigoted, once must direct himself towards the object of such hate: the other. In the 
original position, though, there is no other, as each actor possesses the same qualities; in this sense, 
equality is presupposed in order to ensure that any differentiation that arises from it does not 
destroy the soil from which it grew. 
In Rawls’s account of JF the relation between right and good is clear because Rawls is 
convinced that the right may differ from other precepts of the good. While the right and good are 
two different things that might not necessarily coexist, they are qualitatively differentiated even in 
contexts of perfect coexistence. As we will see later on, theories such as utilitarianism start with a 
differentiation between the right and the good, but then aim to establish a perfect coexistence 
between the two. Rawls innovation is found in the fact that his outright denial of the possibility of 
coexistence forces him to take a path that is wholly different from the rest of the tradition; instead 
of synthesis, he is looking for a balance. Robert Nozick once said that if JF as a theory is not 
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immediately accepted, then the discussion regarding how to refuse it as a theory will be long-
lasting; this is precisely due to Rawls' innovative path, as its refutation would require us to tread 
this new path with him. Discussions went to the extent as to insist in reinterpretation of the theory 
of justice since isn’t that what Rawls said for the principles of justice was wrong, but 
misunderstood and as consequence its criticism fundamentally mistaken (Pogge, 1989). 
Along this path, Rawls' conception of social justice becomes engineered into an 
autonomous system: he tries to firmly delineate the place of basic liberties and freedoms in such a 
system and then, through a constitutional agreement, assist in the formulation of just principles 
upon which common institutions will be founded on (and thus implying people’s duties and 
obligations to make sure that the systematic process is properly undertaken). As we will see, this 
aspect of his theory is what the first principle of justice will be concerned with. His theory is 
systematic in the sense that the second principle of justice will have to rationally satisfy the 
conditions of the first; both principles are thus balanced through the use of an ordering system that 
ties them together. Now that the second principle is grounded in its obligation to the precepts of 
the first, it can then regulate another sphere of society: the sphere of distribution. The role of the 
second principle in this sphere is the regulation of outcomes that may be influenced by arbitrary 
factors such as one's social status, inherent qualities, etc. Both of these principles can be tied 
together because Rawls considers cooperation as indivisible from other freedoms and rights, and 
for this reason principles that are to establish the basic structure of such a cooperation (the first 
principle) can be expanded in order to benefit the least privileged members of society (the second 
principle). Because the primary reason for the exchange of goods is our mutual benefit, in 
situations of extended cooperation the question of just distribution comes as off as secondary; by 
tying the foundation of cooperation (first principle) to the distribution of goods (second principle), 
Rawls aims to assure that mutual cooperation and just distribution arise from the same conditions 
and in consequence, balance each other in order to assure mutual stability. For example, in a 
corporation, the distribution of goods is not tied to the initial cooperation that has produced those 
goods, insofar as it is only a small fraction of the institution that determines that same distribution 
a postiori; in this sense, the outcome of the cooperation was not distributed via cooperation, but 
coercion. It is for this reason that Rawls’s JF awakened an interest in rethinking justice, its origin 
and foundations; this was necessary in the better understanding of the application and execution 
of rights and freedoms first, followed by laws. To what extent would it be possible that some 
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fundamental human rights will be protected from violation even when their protection entails 
possible risks to the system of justice itself (such as war)? What aspects of reason, moral or 
contractual, would guarantee that we will never come into such a conflict? And even if we happen 
to come into conflict, would it place agents in a position of possible criminality the moment they 
are set to respond to the reality of the conflict? In sum, what are the guarantees that liberal 
philosophy provides for the just resolution of the conflicts it might experience? Experience with 
the war in Kosovo and the legal  vulnerabilities associated with a period of post-war state 
rebuilding , the civil war in Syria, deaths of the innocent migrants in the Europe, and recent 
political developments during the elections in the USA and the outcome they produced, made me 
reconsider some issues of justice from the standpoint of their origins. For it is only by 
understanding the origins of principles of justice that we will be able to have a better chance at 
determining whether they will succeed in the face of unexpected contingencies. 
The goal of introducing Nozick's response to Rawls' project is to further expand the 
discussion of these origins; in other words, it will allow us to go deeper into the problem of reasons 
in regard to the formulation of principles of justice. Rawls' critique of Utilitarianism and Nozick's 
(Nozick, 1974) subsequent critique of Rawls open an arena where most of the possible reasons for 
principles of justice must be tried, and justifications thus are required for the lasting-power of the 
principles that are formed within this arena. This situation helps us figure out general ideas about 
justice and an overall overview of the notions and ideas of equality, right, justice and good, which 
often differ in content when analyzed separately and holistically; in other words, we will not 
properly conceive of these general ideas unless we relieve them of some of their generality via 
their mutual interconnection. Otherwise different theories with the same concepts and precepts of 
justice may have an almost completely different arrangement than other systems of justice. While 
Rawls describes the rights and justice of the distribution, Nozick explains how such a “patterned” 
distribution would violate basic liberties and rights, such as our basic freedom to endow anything. 
While we try to distinguish between the similarities and particularities of the conceptions and 
definitions of a theory of justice, we learn a lot about the idea of justice in general. At the same 
time, it gets difficult if one tries to compare them between themselves. For instance what I have 
considered as relevant in the conceptions of Rawls’s theory of justice are actually irrelevant in 
Nozick's context. This is because evaluations of justice are contingent upon the point of view that 
each theory has toward the basic foundations that it is grounded in. Such an example would be the 
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case of ownership. One explanation for this divergence is that Rawls is a contractarian 
conceptualist whereas Nozick is a libertarian who advocates for the minimal state. In consequence, 
in Nozick’s theory justice gets conceived in a “strange” way in comparison to Rawls. The 
libertarian principle says that each individual possesses rightful ownership of his person and 
whatever is related to that person (such as endowments). For instance, principles of justice are not 
relied on in this basic structure: on the contrary, the conditions under which this libertarian 
principle is conceived is outside the scope that Rawls has established for his own principles. While 
Rawls' principle excludes Nozick’s, the latter's principle offers a different platform of justice under 
which Rawls’s principle not only falls short, but would amount to a systematic injustice if it were 
ever applied. The main goal of this research is to mobilize such a tension in order to further explore 
the common ground in which such a differentiation can occur within the confines for liberal theory. 
In his book, Nozick develops a theory that would establish the minimal state from a state of nature. 
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick tries to prove how cooperation should not be part of 
distributive justice as conceived by Rawls. For Nozick, it is this Theory of Justice that creates the 
problem of cooperation in the first place. According to him, the problem of cooperation would be 
simply regulated by agencies that will control exchanges of our goods, and natural endowments in 
our benefits. This would lead to a reducing of the government’s influence to the bare minimum 
and the consequent flourishing of our holdings. So the only problem for Nozick is the actual 
creation of agencies which would take care of the exchanges and transactions; as matters 
theoretical matters have been “resolved”, the problem is now a practical one. The main way in 
which theory informs practice in this case is negative: these institutions cannot be allowed to 
partake in coordinated distribution of social wealth, as this would require the widespread seizure 
of the very extensions of one's body, and thus the possibilities inherently reserved to the particular 
person in question. However, this “stateless” theory of justice is not one that Nozick judges as 
being particularly “liveable”, and thus, he will have to transition from a state of nature to a minimal 
state. 
We do not want to stop at the question of “why” these theories are perceived as 
incommensurable, as this would force us to reify this condition of incommensurability as a 
“given”. Instead, we want to decompose the mechanisms employed by both theories in order to 
better understand how they coexist and contrast within a general liberal framework. Once this is 
known, the incommensurability between both thinkers is no longer “given” and thus, open to 
xiii 
 
reformulation. The real question is how JF would be formulated if someone in the Original Position 
shared Nozick's position. Would the difference principle still stand? For the holders of the 
incommensurability thesis, this question would seem preposterous at first: both thinkers depart 
from different grounds, and thus cannot cross paths in their respective journeys. Ironically, this 
question would be reasonable from Rawls perspective, precisely because the conditions of 
incommensurability are removed from his original position. From here, we can then make rational 
choices that will determine the rest of political life; contrast in the elaboration of these choices is 
expected, and it is why Rawls is so adamant on balancing them instead of having them cancel each 
other out. If these reasons can be balanced in a relative harmony, then they were never totally 
incommensurable in the first place. This is no mere theoretical play. Real circumstance bring forth 
the necessity of developing such a theory: as it stands, the perceived incommensurability between 
Rawls and Nozick damages the future prospects of both of their theories. For if JF becomes the 
only choice, then any other choice falls short because it cannot replace the principles that satisfy 
JF.  For this reason the arguments offered by JF, in its isolated state, shed light on arguments that 
would also lead to any utilitarian or perfectionist state. On the contrary, JF earns its recognition in 
its refusal to develop utilitarian and perfectionist principles; in other words, it does not want to 
reduce itself to the respect of a singular, overarching idea. In order to respect theory's internal 
dynamism, it is then paramount that we include conflicting reasons within the space of equality 
that it has erected. For if it doesn't do this, contract theory only pretends to solve the problem of 
social justice and instead leads to other problems in moral philosophy that have plagued the rest 
of the tradition. 
In a Theory of Justice, “Justice as Fairness” is supported by the duty and obligation that 
comes as the result of an agreed convention on the principles of justice; the modalities of this 
agreement are determined by human psychology. These elements make up the last part of the 
observations of the Theory of Justice and belong to Rawls' speculation regarding how virtue would 
be attained if people choose two principles of Justice. These two parts have been omitted from this 
research insofar as they are merely consequences of the choices that were made in the original 
position: thus, they could easily become irrelevant if different principles of Justice are selected 
from the original position. Conversely, also Nozick's theory and conceptions about ownership, 
since my aim is not to compare them as two different ideals with comparable value but instead as 
two theoretical precepts whose principles’ originate under the same social circumstances, albeit 
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from contradictory estimations regarding the origin and the source of justice. My intention is to 
study the anatomy of justice under a liberal theory that is challenged internally by contradictory 
and isolated cases that each present different inherent precepts and concepts of justice. 
This research is divided in five chapters, which are to comprise of the five elements which 
make up the congruency of the JF. The first chapter discusses the conceptualization and 
establishment of fairness through a regulation of social cooperation. While this process is not 
arbitrarily undertaken, there is a variety of considerations that must be taken on behalf of a theory 
of justice based on two principles of justice. This is done through a rationality whose reasons are 
balanced on a Reflective Equilibrium, from which Rawls will get directions on how to guide those 
reasons in the choice of principles. In this chapter, we will analyze these reasons and expose how 
they necessarily lead the actors in the original position to choice a pathway to justice that is wholly 
different from utilitarianism and intuitionism. 
The second chapter will explore the background institutions that will structure the 
procedures of justice. These institutions are important, as they play a part in the determination of 
the method that Rawls will employ in order to not only justify the chosen principles of justice, but 
also their respective priorities in his lexical order. This is important insofar as it allows us to 
understand just to what extent the principles themselves are rationally determined instead of being 
either arbitrary or determined by forces that reside outside of rationality itself. For example, Rawls’ 
difference principle is only possible after the principle of equality has been previously established 
and accepted: it is now our task to expose the relation between this first principle and the 
institutions in which it will either flourish or falter, in order to show how this first principle is 
grounded instead of being the product of decisionism. Afterwards, we can then demonstrate the 
link between the first and second principles of justice in Rawls’ theory, in order to complete the 
exposition of the systemic use of rationality in the latter.  We will then show that the second 
principle is also efficient in turning inherently unfair states into ones that are congruent with an 
overarching conception of fairness, for Rawls is afraid that a natural lottery might cause 
inefficiency and injustice in social cooperation. For this reason he will be pushed to give arguments 
which, from Nozick’s point of view, are inconsistent. The last section of this chapter will present 
Nozick’s positive and negative arguments against such a hierarchy of principles as proof of Rawls’ 
inability to nullify natural endowments and holdings. Finally, it will explore Rawls’ list of primary 
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goods as an answer to Nozick’s charge, in order to show to what extent Rawls’ conception of the 
right is different the naturalistic conception of rights that Nozick is defending. 
While the second chapter examines the concrete “background” in which principles of 
justice can arise, the third chapter examines the “moment” in which they are constituted: the 
original position. The goal of this chapter will be to examine how one arrives at the second 
principle of justice in the abstract “space” of the original position: the veil of ignorance. Finally, 
Nozick’s version of an “original position” is contrasted with Rawls’ in order to demonstrate how 
both theorists depart from the same concrete “background” towards similar abstract spaces, all 
while being able to arrive at the formulation of opposing principles of justice. 
Now that we have exposed the moment in which the principles of justice are formulated as 
well as the institutional background within which such a moment can occur, the 4th chapter will 
analyze the structure of Rawls’ reasons that arise within such a moment. Conversely, the reasoning 
in question will be contrasted with Nozick’s critique, which pertains to the sustainability of such a 
structure of reasoning; in order to better delineate the contrast, we will examine both authors’ 
conceptions of the basic freedoms and rights that underline their respective forms of reasoning. To 
do this, we first need to tie these basic conceptions to the institutions in which they can make sense; 
if not, the reasoning itself would have, despite its structured nature, arisen in arbitrary fashion.  For 
example, on one hand the institutional character of the constitution is paramount in guarantying a 
well ordered society and the rule of law in maintaining rights, freedoms and liberties; on the other 
hand, it determines and limits the possibilities of establishing a just system of social cooperation.   
Now that we have built up the set of institutional and theoretical conditions that lead to the 
formulation of Rawls’ second principle of justice, it is possible to focus exclusively on the 
difference principle itself and thus transition from the problems of political theory to those of 
political economy. It is here where Nozick’s main refutation of Rawls’ theory of justice will be 
exposed, as we have now sorted through some of the ambiguities found in the respective 
trajectories of these opposing theorists. In sum, Nozick is not convinced that someone’s worse 
endowed position is actually determinable, insofar as this would require some sort of a priori 
criteria for determining such a position. Unfortunately, such criteria can only be established in a 
posteriori fashion, as the determination of a worse position requires us to weigh it against the rest 
of the positions within a given society. As Rawls aims to solve this problem prior to the 
establishment of any institutions, this reveals an ambiguity within liberal theory in general. 
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Through an analysis of exchanges of holdings and the differences they contain in regard to natural 
endowments, we will be able to sketch a possible way of enlarging liberal theories of justice via 
this ambiguity without having to weaken the social-democratic or the libertarian precepts that are 
contained within them. This will be possible because both thinkers’ conceptions of “difference” 
can be finally properly exposed: while Nozick ties difference to that which arises from nature, 
Rawls treats difference from the moral standpoint. Both of these standpoints are a priori, but both 
simultaneously see the other as a posteriori. Their reconciliation is then of paramount importance, 
as liberal theory cannot simultaneously think of difference from these two opposing standpoints; 
if it does, its internal ambiguities are then cemented into place as structural deficiencies that are 




























Though it is not the first time I deal with these types of philosophical issues, I still feel their 
weight on my shoulders as go through them. I doubt that I am the only one who has this feeling.  
Adding to this weight is the fact that I am writing from a different social and economic 
circumstance; I do not know how this research would have turned out if I had engaged in it from 
circumstance other than my own. What I do know that this weight was partially alleviated by my 
supervisor Christian Nadeau, who I was able to consult when matters got “too heavy”, so to speak. 
As this is also the first time that I write in English and French, the weight on my shoulders 
was heavier than usual: in the midst of my battles with the language that this research is presented 
in, I sometimes had the urge to abandon the project. The reason this did not happen is because Mr. 
Nadeau was able to assist me with his thoughtful advice, valuable comments, and precious 
suggestions about corrections and improvements to my research. I am thankful to a few of my 
colleagues and friends who always found some time for comments and advice. My last thanks go 
to my wife, who for the smallest moment did not stop supporting me with her innumerous 
comments and readings of this paper, and my family, who though far from Montréal, continued to 
give me the same amount of love and support as they did back home. 













In order to better understand where Rawls is coming from, it is necessary to reframe Rawls’ 
project of a “moral engineering” of social cooperation in the context of the western philosophical 
tradition. While it might critically assess certain resources provided by the tradition, it is not place 
itself as a direct successor to any particular aspect of the tradition (including contractarianism, 
which he heavily modifies before even considering its adoption). Its relation to the western canon 
is more abstract: it originates from a general moral framework that is present within the tradition, 
but then develops itself in opposition to the majority of the systematic theories that have been 
produced within the confines of that same framework. This is because Rawls’ theory of justice 
came as a result of the urgent need to conceptualize citizenship as the only base for the maintenance 
and improvement of social cooperation: the re-construction of Europe and Asia after the Second 
World War was stricken by this very need. For cooperation cannot be effective if it does not abide 
by at least some pre-conceived principles of justice. But how does Rawls simultaneously originate 
these principles from the common ground of tradition without paying it lip service in the 
formulation of these principles? The answer is found in the fact that Rawls’ explanation of justice 
is abstracted from the same moral values that have also originated in the tradition; he does not 
consider religious, philosophical or moral doctrines that simply “take” their content from the form 
of the tradition. In essence, he wants to work within the form established by the tradition without 
having to needlessly consider the veracity of its content. 
A large content in the tradition is utilitarianism, which Rawls' will criticize in order to pave 
the way towards a possible formulation of fair principles of justice; utilitarianism is criticized 
because of its inability to provide adequate resources in the construction of a stable theory of 
justice. This criticism opens up a possible solution to the problem of social cooperation, as it would 
negate the possibility of sacrificing the happiness of a minority of citizens in order to maximize 
the happiness of the majority; instead, it would assure that each citizen would be treated equally, 
as an individual. Rawls thus individuates the subjects of his theory through an appeal to human 
conditions instead of the varied content that arises from them, such as moral and political doctrines. 
Utilitarianism, on the other hand, must always focus on this content, insofar as it requires it in the 
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formulation of the good it must maximize (and in consequence, sacrifice others for). The concern 
of the citizen whose liberty might be sacrificed for the larger benefit of society is followed by a 
concern for the return of liberal values (while Rawls does not believe that liberalism possesses its 
own conception of the good, it is of our opinion that the contrary is actually the case: because 
liberalism posits its values as regulative ideals, it subsequently blinds itself to their own 
contingency. As we will see, Nozick also shares this critique of Rawls (Nozick, 1974) under the 
form of a pluralistic and procedural theory of justice. It is these concerns that give Rawls the 
momentum to formulate a political conception of justice that remains under the rubric of liberal 
moral philosophy. Liberal values and their contractarian mode of realization are what tie Rawls to 
the western tradition, but measures taken by Rawls in the elaboration of a fair account of JF is an 
effort that puts him beyond the scope of traditional philosophizing in moral, religious and 
philosophical doctrines. As we will see, despite his initial efforts, Rawls remains within the 
doctrinal conception of justice in the Theory of Justice. Whereas, in the second try he attempts to 
formulate a plural conception of justice in the form of Political Liberalism (Rawls, 1996). Despite 
this, Rawls’ philosophy (and consequently, the place it occupies within the tradition) is highly 
original. Even Rawls himself admitted that what he attempted to do was to carry the traditional 
theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, (Locke, 1690), Rousseau, and Kant to a 
higher order of abstraction. With his theory, Rawls hopes that it can be developed so that it is no 
longer open to the more traditional objections that are often thought fatal to it. The path that Rawls 
follows in his Theory of Justice is essentially Kantian, while his conception of « Political 
Liberalism » diverges from this tradition because Rawls believed that Kantian constructivism 
could not go beyond the constraints of the doctrine itself; in the end, reasons that are established 
via this form of constructivism do not differ from the principles that originate from dogma. 
However, his overarching goal remained the same: to work out a theory of justice that is a viable 




Rawls defines justice as the highest virtue of any social institution and states that it can 
only be understood in a systematic way; while there are many different systems of thought that 
have developed their particular conceptions of justice, Rawls’ stresses the fact that these 
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conceptions of justice could have never flourished outside of systematic inquiry. In other words, 
while the content of these conceptions of justice might be different to the point of 
incommensurability, their systematic character is the common ground that allows them to be able 
to confront each other in the first place. Unlike the traditional theories, Rawls will not let this 
systematic character constrain the truth of the principles, but assure that the precepts themselves 
will determine the systematic character of his theory. In other words, we can only develop a system 
based on certain common precepts, and it is precisely these precepts which are ignored when 
different systems within the liberal tradition are deemed as incommensurable. Rawls believes that 
there exists a conception of justice that is common to all humans, as almost all humans are rational: 
when humans look for justice in instances that reside outside of themselves, they are missing their 
target insofar as it resides inside their own minds. Most of human history consists of cases where 
justice did not include all its members into its own system.  Moreover, even when it did, there were 
no instances of justice for each individual’s cooperation; instead, the particularities of individual 
life were rendered intelligible in conformity to the needs of the majority. For this reason, justice 
lost its weight as a term for the inclusion of all men. Fortunately, it still resides inside of each 
individual in the form of “common sense” (a common form of reasoning), with which men could 
employ in public deliberation; to this day, this remains our only hope for finding the common 
ground in which a shared conception of justice could arise. “Thus it seems natural to think of the 
concept of Justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being specified by the 
role which these different sets of principles, these different conceptions have in common” (Hart, 
1994, pp. 155-159). 
It is precisely due to the fact that justice resides in human reason that it is the highest virtue 
of any social institution, as the act of partaking in such a virtue would call to the highest power an 
individual can possess: the formulation of the truth. And apart from serving men as a vehicle for 
the advancement of their particular conceptions of the good, society is also a place which is marked 
by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests; in other words, the experiential content which 
occurs in society is not confined to the individual, but projected outwards at society itself.  For 
Rawls, there is an identity of interests because cooperation allows for each member of a given 
society to live better than they ever could if they simply worked at it alone. The conflict of interests 
appears when individuals are not indifferent to how the greater benefits produced by their 
collaboration are distributed, in the sense that they deem it possible to be given a larger share of 
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resources (at the expense of others) in the pursuance of their ends.  To counter this, Rawls proposes 
a set of principles that assist in the collective determination of all social arrangements. Those social 
arrangements determine the division of advantages and the conditions for writing an agreement on 
the proper distribution of shares. Furthermore, these principles must be principles of social Justice. 
Rawls defines the social justice in the sense that “…they provide a way of assigning rights and 
duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation” (Rawls, 1971, p 4). If this condition is fulfilled, then society is 
well-ordered in the sense that it is not only designed to advance the good of its members, but also 
effectively regulated by a public conception of justice: this appears only when everyone accepts 
and recognizes the same principles of justice and when the basic social institution satisfy and 
(generally) fulfill these principles. Then those who possess the same interests can assemble to 
advance them by creating their own associations, while those who possess completely different 
aims and purposes can still share a common conception of justice that establishes the bonds of 
civic friendship. So one may consider than this well-ordered society is an association that is 
constituted over the public conception of justice. Most well-ordered societies are supported by 
these principles, but what constitutes a right to be just and unjust may still be in dispute. However, 
citizens can consider institutions as just when no arbitrary distinctions are made within their 
confines. When there are no arbitrary distinctions, according to Rawls, it leaves open the 
possibility for individuals to each discuss their own principles of justice. This discussion may 
specify which similarities and distinctions among individuals are relevant in determining rights 
and duties. But this does not settle any question; it only reminds the citizenry of the role of the 
principles of justice. 
What characterizes justice is not only the fact that it is necessary for the constitution of any 
human community, but also for cooperation, efficiency and stability in regard to the mutual social 
ventures that take place within it. Thus, justice has another extensive role that guarantees the safety 
of those who enter in mutual cooperation: to a certain extent this is a sufficient criterion for Rawls, 
as it guarantees to other individuals who enter mutual ventures that their own personal conception 
of the good is not completely set-aside in the accomplishment of this venture. As Rawls notes, 
utilitarianism cannot guarantee this. The role of justice is not merely present for its own sake; it 
regulates itself precisely because that is the demand that its individual practitioners place on it. In 
this sense, regardless of who enters in social cooperation with the intention of realizing good or 
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bad ends and no matter how big the harm may be, justice must be able to restore and rearrange 
itself in order to distribute the other shares as well. In other words, its practitioners expect it to not 
get “caught up” with particular problems; it must always be working, and for that to be possible, 
it must be able regulate itself in relation with what it is constantly being confronted with.  Thus, 
Rawls’ system of justice cannot allow for results that prevent the system from recuperating from 
them: as it is a procedural system, it must always give itself the means to continue functioning for 
those are not touched by the negative results in question. If in a certain society it is not clear what 
is just and unjust, it is clearly more difficult for individuals to coordinate their plans efficiently in 
order to ensure that mutually beneficial arrangements are maintained. “So the role of justice cannot 
be assessed by its distributive role alone. It must take into account its wider connections; for even 
though justice has a certain priority, being the most important virtue of institutions, it is still true 
that, other things equal, one conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader 
consequences are more desirable” (Rawls, 1971, p. 6). 
The aspect of justice that Rawls is interested in is related to its basic, rational structure. 
Justice is a large and deep concept that may include very small and simple human interactions to 
complex international conflicts. Despite this, justice remains a “large” concern even when it occurs 
in basic human interaction; furthermore, it always remains deep and varied. It is large when it 
treats institutions in relation to these interactions, and it is for this reason that it often falls short of 
fully encapsulating even the smallest of social problematics. Finally, it is various in the sense that 
it proposes multiple ways of solving problems of cooperation, even when it seems like the outcome 
is fatal. 
So what is Rawls’ model then and how can it be aligned between the traditional ones?  In 
principle, Rawls’s model is not that foreign from those of the tradition, but differs from them via 
his own particular principles; and in consequence his model represents a more limited form of 
contractarianism, insofar as his interconnecting principles necessarily reduce the scope in which 
his theory can operate. In other words, unlike the theories of the tradition, Rawls' theory makes no 
attempt to reach totality. It doesn’t desire to reach totality, because the real-world problems it 
encounters are not one that can be resolved via totalization measures: these problems require 
specific tools and thus, specific principles for their regulation. Moreover, even after the most 
strenuous of attempts to include the sum of social cooperation into theories of justice, there will 
always be some types of social cooperation that resist this inclusion; in this sense, there is a pre-
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theoretical residue that persists after a total application of  a particular theory of justice. This is a 
fair enough basis for the rejection of any totalizing theory of justice, insofar as they cannot 
realistically keep their “absolutist” promises. This is why Rawls makes clear that his theory of 
justice is purely social, in the sense that it concerns only social justice. The “subject” of justice in 
Rawls’ theory is the basic structure of society (as is defined in “Justice as Fairness: a Restatement” 
(2001)), in which major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine 
the division of advantages in social cooperation. By major institutions, Rawls understands the 
political constitution and the structure of the principal economic and social arrangements. The 
legal protection of the liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of 
production, and the nuclear family are examples of major social institutions. Through these 
institutions, any form of cooperation must be determined according to values and merits; the 
institutions must actively construct and institute these values and merits, lest they want inequalities 
of first and second nature to infiltrate their system and consequently pass themselves off as 
deliberately-chosen (and conversely, “just” forms of inequality). The normal condition of society 
is one in which inequalities are presented as problems of merit and desert; they are thus naturalized, 
as whatever inequality that originates from society is deemed to be inherent to that particular form 
of social organization. This is indeed deceitful, as the only inequalities that are “just” on the 
structural level are the ones that were deliberately allowed by the system of justice itself; there 
must be established reasons for such an inequality, and they cannot come from anything that is 
outside of reason. This disqualifies any a-priori defense of natural, structural or even contingent 
inequalities; if any of these inequalities are to be accepted, they must first pass through the tribunal 
of reason. 
As Rawls examines the “subject” of justice, he narrows the scope of his analysis through a 
further delimitation of the meaning of “social justice” (and thus, the social realm itself). Once 
identifying the basic structure of society as a core for the distribution of justice, Rawls closes off 
this system with the aim of establishing the principles of justice within its very confines. These 
principles must function within the logic of this basic structure, and thus, their first aim is to 
establish and maintain a “well-ordered society”. While it is unlikely that these principles are 
perfectly general, in the sense that they can deal with all possible problems of cooperation in the 
social realm, Rawls stresses that they are still necessary: “The point to keep in mind is that a 
conception of justice for the basic structure is worth having for its own sake. It should not be 
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dismissed because its principle is not everywhere satisfactory” (Rawls, 1971, p. 9). A conception 
of social justice is to provide a standard through which the distributive aspects of the basic structure 
of society are to be assessed; while they might not respond perfectly to a particular problem of 
cooperation, they will steer us in the right direction when it comes to solving them in a just way. 
However, the standard of the basic structure and the principles for that basic structure are not to 
be confused: for while the principles might be different, they must conform to a basic standard in 
order to function properly together. These principles must fit within a certain standard, as a 
standard without precise principles is too abstract and thus beyond the scope of Rawls' theory of 
justice; conversely, principles without a standard become mired in problems endemic to 
intuitionism, which we will see later. For Rawls, principles and their standard must be mutually 
constructed for the establishment of a well-ordered society that can regulate most forms of conflict 
that originate in the social realm; this mutuality is the basis of any coherent theory of justice.   
 
1.3 Contractarian Concept of Justice as Fairness 
 
The coherence of Rawls theory stems from its contractual nature; it is thus constructed 
upon the traditional conception of contract found in Locke, Rousseau and Kant. With the concept 
of contract, Rawls does not mean the “deal” that is established between citizens in regard to the 
future society they will live in. As we previously stated, Rawls wants to take the contractarian 
tradition to a higher level of abstraction: he will then present the contract as the condition of 
possibility of any just agreement pertaining to the constitution of basic social institutions. His 
concept of the contract is thus transcendental in comparison to the rest of the tradition, as he is 
looking for the a priori basis on which traditional contracts can be established and upheld. It is for 
this precise reason that the original position is of such a high-level of abstraction: citizens have to 
be able to deliberate on the conditions of deliberation before any real deliberation has come to 
fruition. In contrast to the Hobbesian state of nature, the original position is based on the Lockean 
state of nature (Locke 1690, p. 269-278): in sum, we are all inherently equal in this state, as we've 
yet to determine our own life prospects due to the fact that they can only be rendered intelligible 
within the confines of a political society. In the original position men are equal as moral persons 
and rational beings and thus capable of collectively grasping the sense of justice regardless of 
social status and class; because of this, they can agree upon principles that they choose and then 
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assign rights and duties for the division of social benefits via rational choice.  When men gather to 
choose the principles that they will follow, they find each other in an initial position where they do 
not know anything about each other’s interest, knowledge, intelligence, aims and purposes; for 
this, they must abstract from the social background of each individual inside of the original 
position. Furthermore, men or parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their 
psychological propensities; in this sense, they are abstracted from their particular cultural 
background. Under the conditions where parties find themselves in the original position, they 
choose principles which would benefit their interest and enable each member to pursue their own 
good under the terms of freedom, equality and the norms of agreement that would guarantee to the 
parties the mutual respect of such principles. Rawls calls this “justice as fairness” (JF), since it 
conveys the idea of the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is necessarily 
fair to everyone; in this sense, justice arises out of fairness itself.  But just as the propositions are 
not the same as the axioms which they are deduced from, justice and fairness are not the same: 
fairness is a condition for justice, and thus has priority over it. 
The first principle that parties must agree on is what type of government and institutions 
that they will choose. This principle (which will be seen in the second chapter: The Principles of 
the Justice and the third chapter: Original Position) will contract parties under the conditions of 
freedom and equality for its members’ benefit and cooperation in their mutual ventures. The 
general recognition of this fact provides the basis for a possible public acceptance of the 
corresponding principles of justice, as the ideal of the Public has just been realized in the 
formulation of the first principle. Nobody enters a society voluntarily, but everyone finds 
themselves at some particular time in a particular society, which they enter by birth and leave by 
death.  Furthermore, nobody can choose to enter in an agreement with society or not, for society 
itself would not be possible without an initial agreement for its constitution that was made on some 
sort of common ground. Thus, according to Rawls, a society satisfying the principles of justice as 
fairness comes as close as possible to being a voluntary scheme that meets the principles which 
free and equal persons would agree to under fair circumstances. So this means that they are 
autonomous, in the sense that the obligations which they recognize are self-imposed. 
The most difficult question that stems from this is twofold: will the principles of justice be 
as fair as the conditions in which they were established and conversely, will they be rational? First 
of all, the choice of principles is rational insofar as rationality is what supports the choices of the 
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participating parties: it is hard to believe that parties who view themselves as equal would agree 
to a principle which may lessen the possible prospects for themselves in exchange for a greater 
sum of advantages enjoyed by others. It is also irrational to expect that someone will resign from 
the determination of his own good just to serve the greater net balance of satisfaction. This is what 
differentiates Rawls’s theory from utilitarianism. While both theories consider their actors as 
proponents of rational self-interest, Rawls sees it as irrational for actors to sacrifice themselves for 
the greater good: while utilitarianism can invoke coercion to force this sacrifice, Rawls’ theory 
cannot.  In sum, the principle of utility is incompatible with the conception of social cooperation 
among equals for mutual advantage and is inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity implicit in the 
notion of a well-ordered society. Because of this, the principles that Rawls will formulate must be 
different: “the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second 
holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are 
just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least 
advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 1971, p. 15). It is not fair when a certain group can 
prosper off of the fact that another group is worse off; in contrast, there is justice when the benefits 
of the privileged group is conditional on the improvement of the group that is worse off. 
Nevertheless, Rawls acknowledges the fact that this choice of principle is the most difficult part 
in the constitution of a just society. Apart from the fact that it may not be convincing to everyone, 
JF has another two problems. First, it would be difficult to accept the rational choice of principles 
and its initial position as Rawls suggested them. This is because doctrines such as utilitarianism 
and perfectionism are also founded on a structured process of rationality, and it would be thus 
required to usurp both doctrines’ claims to rationality on the basis of rationality itself. In sum, 
reason runs into the “no true Scotsman” dilemma, and it cannot defend its superiority by recourse 
to anything external to it.  Yet, Rawls is convinced that his contract theory prevails for two reasons. 
The first reason is that the principles are determined entirely on rational choice instead of 
substantive form of rationality (in other words, a rational doctrine), and that the rational choices 
of each individual become harmonized in the formulation of principles of justice: unlike 
utilitarianism there is no “antagonism” between rational actors that requires coercion to “correct”. 
Lastly, these principles will have to conform to fairness itself insofar as they are mutually 
constituted by rational actors via deliberation on fair grounds. In other words, actors are rational 
and they can exercise their rationality on a common ground, in order to ensure that deliberation on 
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principles does not turn into a deliberation on rationality itself: if actors were debating on uneven 
grounds, then the debate would eventually fall apart due to the “uneven” character of the reasons 
behind the principles. 
 
1.4 Reflective Equilibrium 
 
The even-ness of the rationality behind the principles must be arrived at in a proper way. 
For example utilitarianism will smoothen this unevenness by basing the principle of utility on the 
rationality of a single thinking subject. It will then reduce all forms of rationality to this one; in 
consequence, collective forms of reason such as deliberative rationality are erased in favor of the 
dominant conception of instrumental reason. The goal of the original position is to secure 
deliberative rationality in place via the institution of equality, in order for it to then modify itself 
throughout the deliberations without ever having to be reduced or replaced. Initially, the two 
principles of justice that are preferred over those of utility are derived from rational choice. In their 
initial condition behind the veil of the ignorance, none of the parties know the interests and ends 
of the opposing party. Thus, it seems widely agreeable that it should be impossible for the parties 
to tailor principles to the circumstances of their own case. For instance, if one knew he was 
wealthy, he might have found it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare 
measures are unjust; on the contrary, if he was poor, he would propose such a principle as being 
just. So, the original position suffices to abstract from an initial position, where all the parties are 
equal and can propose and deliberate on principles which may be accepted or rejected on the 
common ground of rational choice. It is sufficient enough that the limit of rationality is not based 
on the value of the principles which are proposed but rather on the sense of justice that men are 
capable of. On the other hand, rationality by its nature rectifies the margins of the principles and 
their effects on reflection. In sum, the principles and the reasons behind them are constituted via a 
reciprocal relation. Thus, according to Rawls it would be nonsensical for the parties to find rational 
discrimination and religious intolerance as just, as these principles would either exclude 
sophisticated reasons or sophisticated reasons would exclude these principles. These convictions 
and many others are historical contingencies: they are provisionally fixed points which we presume 
any conception of justice must fit. Thus, it is hard to determine the just distribution of wealth and 
authority once-and-for-all, as these points are subject to change over time. In order to find the best 
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reasons behind a particular judgement, Rawls suggests that it must be debated and argued from 
both ends until they find premises that would allow uniform principles of justice; in order to 
conform to the uniformity of the principles, historically contingent beliefs must thus be excluded 
due to their very nature. On the other hand, the nature of the contract itself is what bonds parties 
to each other, in the sense that it is the highest form of assurance to parties that everyone will 
respect the conditions of cooperation (which they have agreed upon by mutual interest). But there 
now resides a problem: while the long tradition of contract theory might give us the impression 
that any contract is stable by nature, Rawls' criticizes the tradition because this pretension of 
stability is nothing without a commitment to fairness. The question is: what does Rawls propose 
as a mechanism of stability once fairness has been established? Fairness is a precept, not a 
mechanism, and thus we have to look further. 
The state of affairs where principles of justice are balanced and adjusted called reflective 
equilibrium. “It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is 
reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises or their 
derivation” (Rawls, 1971, p. 20).  The equilibrium, adds Rawls, is not necessarily stable; it might 
happen that we need to revise our judgments. This is what justifies the original position, for this 
also assures that even if the argument of the original position is not practically convincing, it is as 
least philosophically consistent. But does this mean that the truth of the principles is variable? Or 
do they consist of any truth at all? If they do, of what truth do they consist? Rawls does not claim 
that the principles of justice are necessary truths or derivable from such truths. “A conception of 
justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its 
justification is the matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting 
together into one coherent view” (Rawls, 1971, p. 21). Certain principles of justice are justified 
because they would be agreed to in an initial situation of equality; in this sense, equality and 
coherence are intimately tied together as concepts, insofar as the coherence of principles can only 








1.5 Particularities of the Contract Theory as Fairness 
 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice is constructed in contrast to utilitarianism, perfectionism and 
intuitionism. While he spends some time on the refutation of the two latter doctrines, it is 
utilitarianism that serves as his primary target, largely due to its prominence in moral and political 
theory. Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is the representative of utilitarian theory that Rawls criticizes, as 
he deems it to be the most cogent representative of the utilitarian doctrine: “The main idea is that 
society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to 
achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it” 
(Sidgwick, 1877). At first glance, this conception may seem to present utilitarianism as rational 
when it comes to the definition of justice: after all, utilitarian thinking is the basis for setting up 
rational connections between means and ends. But while this might be rational for individuals, 
things become more complicated when utilitarianism is conceived on a social scale. This is because 
certain ends conflict with others, and thus, utilitarianism must decide which ends to honor before 
establishing a coherent system of means. Utilitarianism “solves” this problem by reducing society 
to the status of a single rational individual: the “end” of this individual is an amalgamation of all 
of the ends that can be properly harmonized into a singular end. This is why the ends it decides to 
honor are the ones that “achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the 
individuals belonging to it”.  Utilitarianism’s notion of the good is thus contingent upon the type 
of ends that can be harmonized in society; what is “good” is what benefits the largest possible sum 
of its members. Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good 
shared by others. Any conception of the good that cannot be harmonized in this way is thus rejected 
by utilitarian theory. As we’ve previously stated, this is precisely what Rawls is trying to counter, 
as the exclusion of certain conceptions of the good in favor of others is unjust if there isn’t an “a 
priori” justification for the exclusion that is conducted in a state of pure equality. While 
utilitarianism does make a distinction between the right and the good, it falters once the good is 
attained, as that good remains “isolated”: it becomes an abstract notion to which our sole 
responsibility as citizens is the formulation of the most efficient means to attain it.  Because this 
conception of the Good is arrived at via a reduction of the multiple ends of in society to a single 
one, the goods of the society in question are not regulated by any value criteria which arranges 
them according to their weight, but estimates them as general goods; it is the “most general” good 
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that then becomes the Good which society must arrange itself to attain. As a general value, this 
good is then distributed in society as any other good, which then makes it lose its value in the 
concrete life of individuals; because of this, it becomes an abstract good and is thus independent 
from the right. The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good; for which 
Rawls claims that the concept of a morally worthy person is derived from them. In a Theory of 
Justice, the question of good is impartial to the question of right. Rawls interconnects the utilitarian 
conception of justice with his interpretation of teleological theories. “The clarity and simplicity of 
classical teleological theories derives largely from the fact that they factor our moral judgments 
into two classes, the one being characterized separately while the other is then connected with it 
by a maximizing principle” (Rawls, 1971, p. 25). Teleological doctrines differ according to how 
their conception of the good is specified. If it is taken, remarks Rawls, as the realization of human 
excellence in the various forms of culture, we have what may be called perfectionism; this notion 
was present in Aristotle and Nietzsche, among others. If the good is defined as pleasure, then we 
have hedonism; if as happiness, eudaimonism and etc. Whereas, for utilitarianism the good is 
defined as the satisfaction of desire, or better, as the satisfaction of rational desire: in this sense, 
desire is rational if and only if it can be properly subsumed into a means-ends system. 
In the contrasting of his theory of justice and utilitarianism, Rawls focuses on a few key 
points. The first is that, for JF, equality of rights and the welfare of society are of equal importance 
only after they have been established in a lexical order within the original position. But for the 
welfare of society to be possible, we must first establish the equality of rights; this is precisely 
what utilitarianism does not do, as it does employ a lexical ordering of its principles. While 
utilitarianism aims to maximize the Good, JF prioritizes the right since the equality of rights 
guarantees the integrity of each individual and in consequence, their capacity to fulfill their 
particular conception of the good. By according particular importance to the rights of individuals, 
the notion of the good becomes a consequence that is based upon those rights. Despite 
utilitarianism’s claim to being the proper form of justice for an individualistic society, it fails 
insofar as it erroneously reduces society to the status of a single individual. In other words, its 
support for the individual is superficial as long as it doesn’t prioritize individual rights over an 
individualistic conception of the good. In the original position, society could never be reduced to 
a single impartial spectator, insofar as this would require each individual to possess an a priori 
conception of the good that will necessarily be harmonized with those of others. On the contrary, 
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they would agree only for the principle of equal rights and social and economic inequalities which 
are to each person’s interest: they can thus only discuss foundations for the establishment of a 
plurality of life projects which, despite not being completely harmonious, can co-exist without 
coming into conflict. In sum, each individual’s life prospect and their rational good must be 
pursued within the limits of other’s basic rights. 
The second contrast that Rawls mentions is that utilitarianism is a teleological theory, 
whereas JF is not. By definition, then JF is a deontological theory. There are two types of 
deontological theories, which can often overlap:  the first type does not specify the good 
independently from the right and the second type does not interpret the right as maximizing the 
good. Deontological theories are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize 
the rightness of institutions and act independently of their consequences. All ethical doctrines must 
take consequences into account in judging rightness: those who don’t would simply be irrational. 
Therefore, JF is a deontological theory of the second type. If it is assumed that the persons in the 
original position would choose a principle of equal liberty and restrict economic and social 
inequalities to those that pertain to everyone’s interests, there is no reason to think that just 
institutions will maximize the good. For example, one might defend extreme tax cuts for the rich 
as a maximization of economic growth, which would be perceived by some (crude) utilitarian as 
conception of the Good that applies to the entirety of society. But to do this would necessarily 
diminish the prospects of the poor when it comes to their individual pursuits; thus, it would be 
unjust to sacrifice these prospects for the purported maximization of a social Good. Thus, if for 
utilitarianism the good is defined as the satisfaction of rational desire, then for JF the question of 
the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises, as the maximization principle is not used at 
all: it is in this sense that JF and Utilitarianism employ different forms of rationality, as it can 
simultaneously be rational to maximize a good as well as refuse any maximizing principle for 
precise ethical reasons. Thus, the conflict between Rawls and the utilitarianism is not a conflict of 
reason, but a conflict of procedure; while procedures are supposed to be rational, not all of them 
are just. 
The problem of choosing principles is rooted in the problem of intuitionism. Rawls presents 
intuitionism as an irreducible family of first principles, in which there is a balance that pits each 
principle against each other in the attempt to find a standard that would then best fit the principle 
of justice in the “family”. But when we think of intuitionism in general, there is still a dispute in 
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the general theory regarding which first principle will the one that all the others must conform to. 
To say it crudely, intuitionism is mired by the problem of determining a family “patriarch”. As a 
consequence of this, intuitionist theories encounter a “fork in the road”, so to speak: Either the 
principles collide with each other and give contrary directives in particular cases (and in 
consequence, impair our ability to make the right choice), or they include no specific method and 
we are forced to strike a balance by intuition.  Or, adds Rawls, if there are any prioritized principles, 
they are thought of relatively trivial, in the sense that there could be multiple reasons for choosing 
other principles over others; in other words, the problem of the contingency of a hierarchy of 
principles plagues the intuitionist regardless of the direction he decides to take. 
Even if concepts of justice and right are associated with intuitionism and are thus 
unanalyzable, when they are suitably formulated they express self-evident propositions for moral 
claims. What each moral claim may entail in itself is a matter of moral epistemology; in other 
words, what these claims may entail is contingent upon how moral facts are constituted within 
different systems of morality, which does not concern Rawls here at this stage. What does concern 
him is the requisite for the priority of principles in general. By aligning himself to this discussion, 
Rawls is more interested in finding the priority of his principle within a general theory of pluralist 
intuitionism. To some extent, every problem that we choose to discuss in everyday life as well as 
even the most fully-developed philosophical theories that we could use to answer such questions 
are intuitionist in essence, in the sense that the principles they constitute and/or confront derive 
from the intuition itself. To make it simpler, Rawls uses the example of social welfare.  The point 
of this example is to demonstrate to what degree every theory requires a certain group of 
unquestioned precepts in order to then establish its principles on the foundation that they provide. 
For instance, a group precept would offer a principle for a fair wage, another for taxation, another 
for punishment, and so on. To arrive at the notion of fair wage, it must be somehow balanced upon 
various competing criteria such as skills, training, responsibility and workplace hazard. In sum, 
none of these percepts would be able to decide alone: a kind of compromise must be struck. Even 
existing institutions represent a particular weighting of these claims when they determinate wage; 
different social interests and relative positions of power and influence normally determine this 
weighting. As a result of this, it may not conform to any one’s conception of fair wage: individuals 
with different interests are likely to stress the criteria that serve their ends. But how can we reach 
a compromise that would go beyond mere competing of interests, and with that, reach an 
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agreement that would suffice to determine the founding principle justice or, at least, the balancing 
of its precepts?  This is problematic, as justice is required for the regulation of different social 
ends. If we give more importance to the equality of wages, then it requires a higher demand on 
education, skills as well as a different type of tax policy. Along with this, we can fashion other 
problems of need in a different manner, or we can leave them to be regulated by another principle. 
This depends completely on the principles that we chose to regulate those ends of social policy. 
Moreover, those principles, whether are teleological or deontological, in principle can be 
intuitionist. Then again, whether they must succeed and fit together in a balanced manner is a 
completely different question that Rawls elaborates and resolves under the question of priority. 
In order to show that the utilitarian principle of maximization (and the concept of equality that 
derives from it) is essentially intuitionist, Rawls discusses the aggregative-distributive dichotomy 
and explains it via indifference curves. This dichotomy has two principles: first regards the basic 
structure of society that is designed to produce the most good in the sense of the greatest net 
balance of satisfaction, and second regards the distribution of individual satisfactions that flow 
from the first principle in an egalitarian manner. Both principles have of course, ceteris paribus 
clauses. “The first principle, the principle of utility, acts in this case as a standard of efficiency, 
urging us to produce as large a total as we can, other things equal, whereas the second principle 
serves as a standard of justice constraining the pursuit of aggregate well-being and evening out of 
the distribution of advantages” (Rawls, 1971, p. 37). As distinct principles of utility, these two 
principles miss the chance of balancing themselves, as their intuitionist character does not provide 
a guarantee against their eventual collision. But a collision would be impossible as long as there 
rules the principle of indifference curves. This principle would guarantee that both of these 
principles of utility (maximization of the good and maximization of equality) can function 
independently of each other; in this sense, the indifference curve assures that the good and the right 
are kept separate, all while being able to maximize their respective goods. The indifference curve 
will then allow us to maximize the good without having to minimize equality, as both operate 
independently of each other. For utilitarian, this impartial decision works as a general principle 
that guarantees the coherence between justice and utility: the principles would then be able to 
respectively attain their most desirable outcome by respecting the boundaries set by the 
indifference curve. Yet no matter which one comes first, they are all intuitionistic and thus without 
priority. If somehow equality is starts to lag behind the issue of welfare due to the fact that society 
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cannot prioritize these principles, there is no principle which will force society to focus only on 
welfare after the issue of equality has been repaired to a certain extent. Rawls' answer to this 
problem goes in the opposite direction. Rawls thinks that such a situation would allow different 
people to give different weights to the same conception, insofar as they will produce different 
intuitions in relation to the same moral dilemma. While they might share these intuitions, the 
question of their ordering will be totally arbitrary and thus, what were once shared intuitions 
become pieces of different hierarchical moral systems. For example, those who prioritize the 
common Good will give more weight to the overall welfare of society, while those who prioritize 
other principles will not. It is now clear that for intuitionists, principles do not have any hierarchical 
value; while Rawls claims that it may be true that these principles have no such value inherently, 
the demands of justice require their prioritization in order to assure coherence between these very 
principles. For a lack of inherent hierarchal value is acceptable, but not a lack of structured 
coherence between the principles. So if there are no distinctively ethical principles, then how can 
we formulate principles that will reliably serve a system of justice? Almost all of them represent a 
conception of justice that is, at its base, intuitionist; but none of them can actually act as 
representatives of equality and in consequence, serve a Rawls’ theory of justice in a reliable way. 
In sum, intuitionism denies the possibility of any useful and explicit solution to the priority 
problem; he must thus reject it on these grounds, insofar as he is required to establish a priority 
between principles of justice. 
JF limits the role of intuition in several ways. The first limitation is concerned with the fact 
that the principles of justice are chosen, first and foremost, in the original position. Being rational, 
individuals in the original position recognize that they should consider the priority of these 
principles; for if they didn't, there would be no way of ensuring that significant principles are not 
hindered in the fulfillment of less significant ones. To establish agreed standards for adjudicating 
their claims onto each other, they will need principles for assigning weight to these very claims. 
The problem is that the claimants cannot assume that their intuitive judgments of priority will 
coincide; on the contrary, given their different positions in society, they surely will not.  Therefore 
Rawls supposes that the original position will have to be the place in which parties can reach an 
agreement on how the principles of justice will be balanced. Now part of the value in choosing 
principles is found in the reasons that underlie the adoption of these principles in the first place; 
seeing as we are dealing with reasons, we must necessarily deal with “weights” insofar as some 
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reasons, ceteris paribus, are more valuable than others. “Since in justice as fairness the principles 
of justice are not thought as self-evident, but have their justification in the fact that they would be 
chosen, we may find in the grounds for their acceptance some guidance or limitation as to how 
they are to be balanced” (Rawls, 1971, p. 42). So, it is the nature of the original position itself that 
clears up the problem of “why” and “what” principle are preferable to others, and for much the 
same reasons that principles are derived in the first place: it structures rationality. Intuitionism can 
only structure the rationality of its principles in a posteriori fashion, as we can only organize what 
we have first intuited. The strength of the original position is found in the fact that it allows us to 
choose principles by relying on rational choice in an a priori fashion; this a priori rationality gives 
us the tools to possibly order these principles in conformity with it. As the a priori nature of this 
rationality implies that it is shared by each actor in the original position, we can possibly guarantee 
that this ordering will be accepted by all.  Let us now turn to the problem of structuring rational 
choices. 
One way of solving this problem is to structure principles by putting them in a lexical or 
serial order.  This is an order which requires the satisfaction of its first principle before moving on 
to the second, and so on and so on. In this sense, a serial ordering avoids having to balance 
principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight with respect to later ones and 
thus hold without exception. Such a ranking can be regarded as analogous to a sequence of 
constrained maximum principles. For example, within a lexical order maximization can finally be 
tied to equality as long as the maximization principle satisfies the egalitarian principles that 
precede it. This ranking system strengthens the case for Rawls’ theory of justice, as he has finally 
found a way to transform equality into a true first principle, instead of trying to deduce it from 
other principles (and thus limit its scope by tying to something effectively “other”). This means 
that the basic structure is to regulate the inequalities of wealth and authority in ways that are fully 
consistent with the equal liberties required by the first principle. At the moment, the order is still 
not 100% convincing, as we still haven’t determined a way to assure that the other principles that 
come after equality are properly ranked.  But if the principle of utility were prioritized first, it 
would weaken all subsequent criteria. Thus, it is not that the principle of JF is prioritized in 
arbitrary fashion; the second principle can only be satisfied if every attempt to satisfy it responds 
to the principle that came before it. 
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The solution of the lexical order, however, is not without its problems: unfortunately for 
Rawls, it might even come close to experiencing the priority problem again. We must remember 
that intuitionism isn’t problematic in essence, as all principles are partially derived from intuition. 
But problems accrue and things get more complicated when principles of utility are chosen 
intuitively and then required to satisfy criteria of maximization. For one who thinks in terms of 
intuitionism when trying to maximizing good may become slowed down by the complexity of the 
various principles that he must perfectly order. Furthermore, the reason why Rawls rejects 
intuitionism is because the aggregate-distributive dichotomy is unmanageable when it comes to 
the problems of justice. It neglects many small social “particles” that constitute justice, and is thus 
problematic in the scope of a theory of justice, insofar as that theory must originate from these 
very social “particles”, as small as they may be. Unlike utilitarians, Rawls’ cannot be a conscious 
reductionist. Conversely, if there is one thing that Rawls must reduce, it is the hold that the faculty 
of intuition has on the formulation of principles; in this sense, his “reduction” is a limitation instead 
of a simplification: it is a limitation because Rawls does not want to eliminate them, but simply 
limit them as much as he reasonably can. These two solutions to the priority problem are the only 
rational alternatives in the formulation of the principles that will structure society and its 
institutions. The problem for Rawls is not to cope with the complexity of unalterable moral facts, 
but to formulate reasonable and generally acceptable proposals for bringing about the desired 
agreement in collective judgments. The complexity of moral facts is relevant to the social justice, 
and thus, a proper theory of justice must do more than merely “cope” with them. Thus, the problem 
is now centered upon the question of “how” complicated we need our moral facts to be. The lexical 
order is a good tool to help us weigh this complexity, insofar as we can now test these moral facts 
by seeing what happens when they are determined by others or vice versa. Most moral theories are 
single-principled and intuitionistic conceptions and thus, a lexical order cannot offer a solution to 
the problem of priority as the theories become confused once we depart from that first principle; 
the goal of Rawls' theory of justice is to counter this aspect of the tradition, and it will do so by 
creating a form of moral reasoning that allows for these principles to conform to each other more 
effectively through their lexical ordering. 
What must be extracted from this is the fact that Rawls' theory retains its rationality all 
while refusing to become a doctrine. While it is deontological, it acquires its principles from reason 
itself, instead of a reasonable appeal to principles that were externally formulated. By doing this, 
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it founds itself on the rationally-derived obligations that we share amongst each other: in this sense, 
we can establish our duties without the assistance of any particular doctrine. And this is why Rawls 
has made it clear that he does conceive of justice as a something that can be modeled off of 
doctrines such as perfectionism, intuitionism and most importantly, utilitarianism: the “entrance” 
for his theory of justice is opened when the aforementioned doctrines fail to achieve a certain 
degree of rational consistency. As we have seen above, it was utilitarianism's inability to connect 
justice to something other than a monolithic conception of the good that pushed Rawls to develop 
a theory of justice that was not bound by teleology. For if it were, it would be forced to conceive 
justice as a mere means for achieving such an unquestionable end; this would inevitably lead to 
issues of rational consistency, insofar as it is very possible that the only feasible means towards 
such an end enter in direct contradiction with it. In other words, to present justice as something 
which merely responds to transcending demands is a mistake: the “transcendental” element must 
be rationally established within the confines of justice, or else it might eventually come into 
contradiction with the very means through which it is meant to be actualized. 
Be that as it may, doesn't simply consider justice to be an end in itself: for if this were the 
case, the corresponding absolution of its principles would make it difficult to properly weight the 
means with which they will be attained. Rawls' way out of this dichotomy is to learn from 
utilitarianism's mistake and construct his theory of justice as a theory of truth. It must be 
understood that the goal of this construction is not to discover anything new, but to merely establish 
the general epistemic conditions from which the formulation of a consistent theory of justice arise. 
Before going any further, we must remind ourselves that its rationality is not substantive: in other 
words, it is not meant to extract a conception of the Good from the truth that it aims to establish. 
On the contrary, it is merely procedural: Rawls aims to establish the conditions in which a proper 
procedure of justice can arise, regardless of the different ends that it will inevitably encounter. It 
is in this sense that “discoveries” such as our inherent equality as citizens are nothing “new”: as 
such truths have been derived before, Rawls is simply employing them as practical necessities in 
the larger procedure of justice that he aims to establish. For example, the principle of inherent 
equality can adjust itself to many “ends” that we would consider as incommensurable.  As such a 
claim is not derived via doctrine, it is not difficult to understand it in its generality: moreover, at 
this stage in Rawls' procedure we are not even sure if such a principle will even be able to 
determine the principles that will be derived from it. But one thing is for sure: it if were not for the 
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general acceptability of the first principle's neutrality in regards to divergent ends, there would 
never be a second possibility to restate the first principle in stronger fashion via its “importation” 
into subsequent principles that are rationally consistent with it.  As Rawls is not concerned with 
the Good, his choice of principles is made with the general success of the procedure in mind. As 
we have seen, this is where previous doctrines failed: we will now see how Rawls formulates his 
own principles of justice in order to prevent such a failure from occurring. Rawls is convinced that 
his theory’s outcome will justify arguments for his “rational theory” and it would, if it wasn’t for 



























Rawls theory of justice can be divided into two parts. The first part concerns the choice of 
principles and the situation in which these choices are made. The second part concerns the 
elaboration of an institutional infrastructure in which these principles will be embodied. The 
second principle is maybe the most indicative manner according to Nozick that JF first principle 
doesn’t send to conclude the second one and not necessarily whatever distribution that comes from 
the second principle will be conform and justify the first principle. Not especially Rawls 
conceptions on the assessment of political assets over natural assets will solve this problem either. 
This Nozick’s example that gets developed as a counter to Rawls theory of endowments will be 
brought for you under the heading of 2.4 (Natural Assets and Arbitrariness) when natural assets 
are first discussed.    
Institutions provide a link between abstract principles (such as those which are collectively 
decided in the original position) and the regulations which will ensure their actualization and 
normalization. Whether an institution is grounded on a basic structure or not, its essential 
characteristic is found in the fact that those who enter an institution are doing so on the assumption 
that its actors have access to a certain pool of shared knowledge, and are thus acting in relation to 
a common “milieu”. This guarantees that the members of an institution can expect a certain type 
of agency and behavior from their peers, as they are always supposed to be acting in conformity 
with norms that were established on the basis of shared, over-arching principles. Rawls remarks 
that principles applied to institutions should not be confused with those that are applied to 
individuals; while norms allow for principles to apply for individuals, institutions themselves 
cannot follow norms, but only embody those principles through the imposition of norms on its 
individual members. By an “institution”, Rawls understands a public system of rules which defines 
offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules 
specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden, and they provide for certain 
penalties and defenses if violations occur. What institutions have in common is their establishment 
of various rights, duties, strategies and maxims for how to best take advantage of the resources 
they provide. Those strategies and plans help us when it comes to deciding what is permissible 
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according to the common interests that we agreed upon while formulating the institutions guiding 
principles. In sum, these principles serve as ends for institutions while serving as regulations for 
the means that individuals will employ to achieve those ends: it is in this sense that regulations are 
the bridge between abstract principles and the individual endeavors that are undertaken to actualize 
them. 
For Rawls, proper liberal institutions allow for individuals to follow their rationally-
derived ends in a way that is harmonious with the general principles of the institution, insofar as 
those general principles are meant to assure that individuals don't “walk over each other” on their 
individual paths to the Good. In other words, these institutions are meant to coordinate free 
enterprise without having to coerce its members, or its members having to coerce each other. 
Bentham named this coordination the “artificial identification of interest”, while Adam Smith 
called it the “invisible hand”; in both cases, artificiality and invisibility are synonyms for a type of 
“spontaneous order” that does not require direct coercion to be achieved. Examples of liberal 
institutions are parliaments, markets and systems of property. Rawls divides them into two 
categories: abstract and realized institutions.  Institutions are abstract when their only link to 
practical activity is the constellation of general rules that they provide; they are realized when 
those rules become particular via their collective “ingraining” in the thoughts of actors. In this 
sense, an institution is realized when is functional instead of merely “representative”.  Abstract 
institutions cannot be judged unless they were realized, and thus, our judgement of these 
institutions pertains not only to their ends, but their means of actualization and maintenance; in 
other words, an institution can be just in the abstract and simultaneously unjust in its realized form 
if the means with which it was realized were not in conformity to the principles that made it just 
in the abstract sense.  In an institution that is structured by a coherent relationship between its 
abstract principles and means of realization, justice becomes the highest form of virtue in the 
attainment of the institutionally-derived ends that its members engage in; this is because only 
justice allows us to preserve this coherent relationship, which then provides contextual meaning 
to the endeavors that are undertaken within the institution. In institutions that don't possess this 
coherence, its actors are given the impression that their shared ends and respective means are 
arbitrarily-derived and contingent upon factors that reside outside the institution: all of this serves 
to weaken the institution over time. Conversely, it is this contextual meaning that provides the 
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basis for a shared sense of belonging to an institution; this sense of belonging is necessary in the 
internal maintenance and external protection of the institution. 
Difficulties start to appear when groups of different institutions must agree to cooperate 
with the institutions which do not share the same precepts of values. Liberalism's solution to this 
problem is to establish itself as an abstract institution which is founded on the idea that, in order 
to pursue their own interests, individuals must be willing to agree for fair social justice practices 
to be enforced via over-arching rules that govern the relations between these institutions. This is 
why liberalism itself can only be realized when the relations between these institutions function 
according to this principle. The condition that this realization leads to is plurality: different (and 
often incommensurable) groups function together on the basis of fair terms of cooperation, 
regardless of (institutionally-derived) ends. This increases the need for high standing institutions 
and judges who work to implement principles of justice, depending on how strong and effective 
the institutions will be. In order for society to be just, its institutions must represent principles of 
justice as a system, in accordance with which each individual’s behavior will be adjusted. For 
Rawls, just social cooperation is only secure when parties will have more reason to believe in the 
respect for equality as the very first principle of institutions. This is because institutions themselves 
can only function in tandem if there is a common base which they are all tasked with representing. 
But how is this common base possible if institutions themselves possess the autonomy to formulate 
and realize their own particular (and possibly irreconcilable) principles? To answer simply, if an 
institution grants itself such an autonomy, than it can only do so because it recognizes the right to 
self-determination as an a priori principle for institutions in general; if it didn't, it would necessarily 
defer to other institutions in order to determine its own general principles. Under a proper system 
of justice, the only “moment” of deference to other institutions is the recognition of this common 
ground, as the institution must first realize that other institutions are autonomous before it can start 
“acting” in an autonomous fashion. It is in this sense that a common ground leads to a basic 
structure: when principles are just and belong to this basic structure, the outcome of the institutions 
will provide a formal type of justice that guarantees that each member will benefit from fair 
cooperation. Fair cooperation will create reciprocal beliefs between parties and members, which 
will then strengthen this common ground via the substantiality of what was once considered to be 
“formal” justice.  JF is thus a totalizing system, insofar as the feedback loop described above serves 
to strengthen and expand the scope of justice; on the other hand, it is not totalitarian, insofar as its 
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founding principles renders it impossible for institutions to all defer to a “master” institution (such 
as the Nazi party or Catholic Church) and thus lose their autonomy. It is only through this non-
totalitarian form of totalization that justice and fairness can actively take hold on the world that it 
is meant to regulate. 
 
2.2 Two Principles of Justice 
 
The two chosen principles that will constitute JF can be described as follows: the first 
principle states that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty that is 
compatible with a similar liberty for others, while the second principle states that social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to 
everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. These principles apply 
to the basic structure of society: they are to govern the assignment of rights and duties and to 
regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages. As their formulation suggests, these 
principles presuppose that the social structure can be divided into two more or less distinct levels, 
the first principle applying to the one the second to the other. The level that is regulated by the first 
principle pertains to the formal rights that are granted to each member of society, while the second 
level pertains to the actual economic infrastructure of the given society. The basic liberties of 
citizens are: political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with 
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience, and freedom of thought, freedom of the 
person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law. Let us not forget the necessity of lexically 
ordering both principles: The first principle requires these rights to be evenly distributed, for if 
they weren't, it would be impossible to apply the principle that we will now turn to. 
The second principle applies to the distribution of wealth and income and to the design of 
the organizations that represent different levels of responsibility and authority. “While the 
distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to everyone’s advantage, and at 
the same time, positions of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all” (Rawls, 
1971, p. 61). As well as ensuring the just distribution of wealth, the application of the second 
principle grants us equal access to positions that become subject to constraint, such as public 
offices and bureaucratic positions. The second principle is contingent on the first, insofar as a fair 
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distribution of wealth and access to public offices can only be possible if the citizenry is conceived 
of on equal footing; for the Greek polis might have been a community of equals, but this 
community was founded on the exclusion of the majority of the population. In this sense, we cannot 
hope to achieve a fair distribution of wealth and power if wealth and power are only reserved to a 
subset of the population. In Rawls' theory, all social values - liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth and bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of 
any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage. As a result, while economic inequality is 
permitted, inequalities of injustice are not.  Equality and equal liberties must be expanded to certain 
minimum in order to ensure that the realization of each person’s rational plan to pursue the good 
is preserved. Let us imagine that there exists a society in which the basic social structure equally 
distributes shared values. These basic values would be necessary primary goods in the 
advancement of society’s social and economic goals, insofar as they need to be realized in order 
for us formulate just means in the attainment of these goals. To tie the equality of liberty and the 
equal distribution of basic goods is to push the concept of equality to the forefront of these primary 
goods. In this sense, the second principle can never come to a conclusion in regard to what 
inequalities are permissible, because these very inequalities are constantly being negotiated; once 
an inequality no longer delivers equal benefit to the rest of society, it can be deemed unjust and 
countered through the establishment of new laws. While the objects of the second principle are in 
a state of constant negotiation, the objects of the first are strictly non-negotiable; if they were, the 
second principle would be undermined in its entirety due to the loss of a “ground” on which these 
negotiations can take place. As a consequence to this, it is thus impossible for the objects of the 
first principle to be exchanged for the second: in this sense, trading one's freedom for economic 
advantage (or, the modern iteration of slavery) would be unfeasible in Rawls' system insofar as it 
would contradict the serial ordering of both principles: “When this preference is rational so 
likewise is the choice of these principles in this order” (Rawls, 1971, p. 63). 
Instead of understanding justice through its general conceptions, Rawls understands it by 
analyzing the two principles of justice in their serial order; there is now a connection between 
justice and rationality that Rawls' theory can no longer depart with. While it seems difficult to find 
any reason that would support sustenance of the second principle as consecutive to the first 
principle at first glance, Rawls shows us how both principles can be ordered in a common-sense 
manner.  While both principles are concerned with different things – the first being concerned with 
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abstract goods and the second being concerned with tangible goods – they find their unification 
within the institutions themselves; as we specified above, institutions allow for abstract and 
tangible goods to be linked together via normalized behavior and shared regulations. Thus, 
institutions can realize the second principle of justice while embodying the first: only by admitting 
equality as an institutional norm can social and economic inequalities be distributed equally. In 
other words, social and economic inequalities are not to be defined via another set of norms (such 
efficiency, piety or patriotism); this forces those to be conceived in relation to the first principle, 
as thus weighed on that scale alone (Audard, 2007; Lovett, 2011; Maffettone, 2011). 
When further examining the second principle, we can see how the relation between both 
principles (crystallized in our shared institutions) comes full circle. The second part of the second 
principle states that any seat within a public institution is open to all; in this sense, institutions not 
only enforce the principle of equality, but are wholly constituted by it. Finally, all parties in society 
benefit from this type of equality, as it allows for institutions to select talent from the largest 
possible pool of candidates. By rewarding the types of members that are representative of the 
principles that govern the basic structure of society, the rest of society is encouraged to cooperate 
on the basis of these principles.  It is for reasons such as these that JF would not allow itself to 
accept principles such as utility – which maximizes the sum of expectations of representative men 
– and then compensate for the losses of some by re-distributing the gains of others, for this would 
force us to regulate our institutions on this basis. If this was the case, we might elect representatives 
on their productive basis instead of their ability to embody principles; this would lower the 
confidence of the rest of society in its institutions, as it tacitly understands that the criteria of 
selection reflects qualities that are not inherent to just forms of social cooperation. By ensuring 
that everyone can benefit from economic and social inequalities, public confidence in institutions 
can resist their common utilitarian and populist threats: for the existence of efficient institutional 
measures and an elite class of functionaries to aid in their realization are both predicated on the 
fact that they benefit society more than they harm it.  When equality is the benchmark, society can 
benefit from its principles and goods in an equal manner. But whether it can do this in an efficient 






2.3 The Principle of Efficiency    
 
Because the two parts of the second principle of justice contains the (rather ambiguous) 
clauses “everyone’s advantage” and “equally open to all”, the principle of efficiency can be 
interpreted in many different ways. One interpretation associates equality with natural liberty and 
thus refers to a state of natural aristocracy, while the second associates equality with liberal equality 
and consequently refers to democratic equality. As Rawls rejects natural rights in favor of political 
rights, he will start by accepting the second interpretation of efficiency. But even if this basic 
conception is accepted, Rawls must distinguish this concept in relation to the principles that it is 
accompanying; efficiency in regard to the first principle is not the same thing as efficiency in 
regard to the second, insofar as the former applies to rights and liberties while the latter applies to 
the distribution of economic goods. Though Rawls’ distinction is weaker than we think. In both 
interpretations, however, the economy is conceived as free market, and this is because the latter is 
the only economic institution that coincides with the first principle. Natural liberty can thus be 
considered as a viable option, since the basic structure of society satisfies the principle of efficiency 
in which positions are open to those that are able and willing to strive. Assigning rights and duties 
in this way is thought to be fair, whatever the allocation turns out to be. As all interpretations of 
the efficiency principle contain an element of procedural justice, it equally applies to natural liberty 
and political liberty. 
Efficiency is a term that originated in economics and initially served as a particular form 
of arrangement for the distribution of goods between consumers and modes of production; because 
of this, it was never meant to be employed in the study of non-market institutions, such as political 
and legal ones. But it is not difficult to export such a concept, insofar as it can be applied whenever 
things are being distributed. As the institutions in question not only pertain to the distribution of 
economic goods, but also of public offices and political power; in this sense, we can speak of 
“efficiency” without having to modify its meaning beyond repair. In other words, even in non-
market cases, the concept of efficiency can still be applied in a similar way to its application in 
economics; it possesses its own internal criteria, so it doesn’t have to adopt the internal criteria of 
the institution we apply it to, but merely adjust itself to it. When adjusted to the principles of the 
social institutions that Rawls’ is referring to in his theory, the principle of efficiency states that an 
arrangement is efficient if changing it would make at least one person worse off than before. For 
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instance, Rawls explains that a distribution of a stock of commodities among certain individuals 
is efficient if there is no redistribution of these goods that improves the circumstances of at least 
one of these individuals without disadvantaging another. If we were to bring this slightly modified 
principle of efficiency back to economics, it would imply that production of X is efficient if any 
further production reduces the production of Y or Z. Thus, if we could produce more of one good 
without having to give up some of another, the larger stock of goods could be used to better the 
circumstances of some people without reducing the circumstances of any other person. Conversely, 
institutions are inefficient when there are still ways in which one can do better without having to 
make anyone else worse off. Rawls assumes that this principle will be agreed upon in the original 
position, insofar as it functions in perfect conformity to the two principles of justice. 
Despite this, Rawls treats the question of efficiency in a separate manner, insofar as it can 
be relativized and thus procure a different meaning depending on the context in which it is applied. 
This relativity can lead to incoherence if the “relative” aspects of the principle are assumed as 
being essential to it. Using the two diagrams that are presented in figures 3 and 4 (Rawls, 1971, 
pp. 68-9), Rawls explains how index curves vary between those who can do better without having 
to make others worse off, and those who are parallel to  them but cannot do better without making 
others worse off. Parties A and B possess the same fixed starting point: O. initially, they are equally 
distanced, but as they progress, one might surpass the other in relation to O. For example, B might 
be in a higher position than A. But we can then have points Z, D and F in which Z is inferior to D 
in relation to O and F is superior to both in relation to O. In this sense, F' superiority only has 
something to do with the inferiority of D and Z, but not necessarily A and B. There are many kinds 
of efficiency, but none of them can be judged as being good or bad the only thing that can be stated 
with confidence is that some are better than others. In other words, efficiency cannot employ its 
internal criteria to determine whether it is just or not, as the question of justice is qualitatively 
different than the question of efficiency. The only way that an “efficient” arrangement can be just 
or not is whether it conforms itself to principles of justice; as we’ve just seen, this is exactly what 
Rawls is trying to accomplish. As efficiency is relative to the institution that we are applying its 
criteria to, Rawls needs to make this principle conform to a single maxim, or else it will apply 
differently to each institution. For example, imagine if each party that is somehow in relation with 
other party will follow its own maxim and stick with it during negotiations. Between parties A and 
B, B’s principle of efficiency will be respected, while between Z and D, it will be D’s principle 
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that is accepted. As B and D’s principles of efficiency might be incommensurable due to differing 
internal criteria, it is necessary to create a Principle of efficiency that, regardless of the institution’s 
internal criteria, will regulate all matters of efficiency between cooperating parties. In 
consequence, Rawls concludes that the basic institutional structure must provide a general 
principle of efficiency when parties get together to decide and choose the types of principles that 
their future society will be modeled upon. This is a way of ensuring that the relative utilitarian 
consideration so each institution will not affect the way in which others operate. In sum, we can 
say that an arrangement of rights and duties in the basic structure is efficient if, and only if, it is 
impossible to redefine the scheme of rights and duties in order to raise the expectations of any 
member without, at the same time, lowering the expectations of at least one other member. In this 
way, efficiency is made to be consistent with the other principles of justice: when it modifies the 
basic structure, it is not permitted to violate the principle of equal liberty or the requirement of 
public positions that are opened to all. According to Rawls, all that can be modified is the 
distribution of income, wealth and the way in which organizational powers and various other forms 
of authority regulate cooperation. Allocation of these primary goods may be adjusted to modify 
the expectations of individuals, but they must always be consistent with the constraints of liberty 
and accessibility. 
What all of this entails is that, for JF, equality comes before efficiency: nothing can be 
judged in matters of efficiency before it was judged (and accepted) in matters of equality. This is 
necessary, as an un-mediated conception of efficiency derives from the state of nature, which is 
precisely what the actors inside of the original position are trying to move out of. Whatever form 
of justice the principle of efficiency will conform to is contingent upon the debates that take place 
within the original position. When we ask ourselves (inside the original position) which are the 
types of institutions that ensure the just distribution of social goods, we are questioning and 
developing a working conception of justice. With the theory of natural rights, justice is achieved 
by the arrangements implicit in the conception of careers that are open to talents (which might or 
might not be the results of natural assets; either way, the theory doesn't care). These arrangements 
presuppose a background of equal liberty (one that is different than the equality found in Rawls' 
first principle) and a free market economy. They require a formal equality of opportunity, in which 
each member possesses the same right of access to all advantaged social positions as any other 
member. But since there is no effort to preserve such equality (or social conditions in general) 
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unless its weakening directly threatens the structure of our social institutions, the initial distribution 
of assets is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies. “The existing distribution of 
income and wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural assets–that is, 
natural talents and abilities–as these have been developed or left unrealized, and their use favored 
or disfavored over time by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and 
good fortune. Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits 
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of 
view” (Rawls, 1971, p. 72). This interpretation resembles the concept of natural equality but differs 
in one aspect from natural liberty, for it accepts that an equality of opportunity in regard to public 
office must be instituted in order to counter-balance the arbitrariness of the natural talents that 
might influence such opportunities. For Rawls, the problem with natural liberty is that it can 
possibly hinder equality right as it promotes or preserves itself. Social laws will only preserve the 
equality of opportunity for those who possess a minimum of talent, as those who do not have such 
talent will be arbitrarily disqualified from the equal distribution of the social goods in a free market.  
If this is the case, then natural endowments will determine the efficiency of our cooperation. It is 
social justice that must balance this unequal yet natural diversity of skills, abilities and talents;  this 
is why a liberal theory of justice is forced to possess something akin to Rawls’ second principle of 
justice, as it is the only way of regulating these types of natural inequalities without having to 
penalize others for not possessing them. Natural rights, on the other hand, not only opposes this 
by accepting the moral validity of a “natural lottery”, but goes even further by selecting this natural 
lottery as one of its main mechanisms of social justice. In other words, the acceptance of the 
priority of natural abilities over social equality overrides equality in the sense that it is impossible 
to lexically order both principles without having to undermine one or the other.   
Now that natural rights have been rejected, the path to establishing democracy becomes 
clearer: it is the only form of political organization that can go beyond the principle of equality in 
the formulation of a just procedure of cooperation inside of the public sphere. In this sense, 
establishing democracy is the only in the second principle of justice can be actualized. Fair equality 
of opportunity and the difference principle can be harmonized quite effectively in a democratic 
society. This harmonization is necessary in order to arrange institutions on the principle that the 
higher expectations of the luckier members of society are just if, and only if, they work as part of 
a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society. Just as the 
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minority who voted for a losing party would be crossed if the winning party disadvantaged them 
in retaliation, the unluckiest members of society would not accept a system where progress is won 
on their very backs. In this sense, the principle of efficiency now benefits these lower classes 
instead of harming them (as it does in most capitalist and communist systems); the “efficient” part 
of this equation is found in the fact that it finally encourages the lower classes to participate in 
such progress, insofar as they know that they will be the first ones to benefit from it. Just as the 
principle of efficiency found in the state of nature acts as if the productive classes are the only ones 
that exist, this modified principle of efficiency acts as if the lower classes were the only ones to 
exist; this is how they can be rewarded first in the distribution of goods, regardless of their 
contribution to it. Rawls’ theory of Justice does not need to ask itself how to improve the living 
conditions of those who are already better off, as these individuals seem to be able to adequately 
accomplish this on their own. The lower classes, however, are in this predicament because of the 
difficulty involved in improving one’s condition at this level; in order to efficiently distribute 
justice, the institutions must thus focus on this social strata, as it is where justice is lacking the 
most. As both parties can raise their expectations without having to lower those of the other, there 
is little reason or class conflict, insofar as this would damage both parties’ prospects. For Rawls, 
this is justice, as it finally solves the problem of turning social cooperation into a zero sum game 
(with its obligatory winners and losers). 
While this is the de facto condition of justice’s realization, it is by no means enough to 
conclude that the outcomes produced by this society will be just. It is not enough to say that, by 
only implying fair principles, the outcome of the game will be just: on the contrary, it must be also 
played in a fair way, least one wants to delegitimize the principles of justice immediately after the 
start of the game. Even that is not enough: fair play must be normalized in order for it to be repeated 
without direct intervention on the part of the referees. In order for the difference principle to be 
applied, it must be secured by a procedure of justice; in sum, it must be repeatable on a consistent 
basis. This allows us to make sure that equality was applied and will be applied according to the 
requisites of justice: for the attainment of justice is not a finally stage of history, but a continuous 
process of negotiation. The reason for this is simple: while the conditions of negotiation might be 
set in stone, they do not exhaust all of the possible contingencies associated with the distribution 
of social positions and goods. Even in possession of the most just and efficient institutions known 
to man, if these contingencies are not consciously dealt with via procedure, then both justice and 
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efficiency fail. For Rawls, this is the point of efficiency: to ensure that justice does not suffer from 
entropy throughout the repetitive procedures that we employ to keep it actualized. 
To some extent, Rawls accepts that justice is efficient in general, even while he is aware 
that too much of connection between justice and efficiency might bring his position closer to that 
of utilitarianism. But as far as this connection might go, it hits a wall before becoming utilitarian. 
This is because, as we’ve mentioned earlier, the principle of efficiency is always contingent upon 
the two principles of justice that it is meant to serve. This is because efficiency alone cannot predict 
just outcomes unless it is given its criteria by the basic structure of society, which, as an 
embodiment of the principles of justice, creates the mechanisms that the efficiency principle will 
regulate. It is according to rules and laws that efficiency is constituted as a criteria for justice, and 
not the way around (Audard, 2007). 
 
2.4 Natural Assets and Arbitrariness 
 
As we could see in the previous section, this is the first time that Rawls treats the issue of 
entitlements in his theory. For him, the theory of natural rights is not the proper way of treating 
this issue, as it allows for certain social goods (such as the ones produced by natural endowments) 
to be distributed in an arbitrary, and thus morally invalid, manner.  This is inherent in the concept 
of a natural lottery itself: as we have no choice over our natural endowments, the logic states that 
we shouldn’t have a choice over the distribution of the goods that flow from these endowments. 
Robert Nozick has a problem with this: after all, why doesn’t Rawls ask whether people have 
actually chosen to develop their own natural assets? Why this questions is left out? Is it because 
beings are still considered to be products of forces that remain out of their control, and thus, the 
choice of whether to develop these endowments is as arbitrary assigned as the endowments 
themselves? The idea that it is in Man’s character to cultivate his particular endowments is a bit 
problematic for Rawls, mainly because he considers that the character of one’s achievements 
depends largely upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which we, as individuals, can 
claim no credit. Coupled with the arbitrary distribution of natural endowments, Rawls gives us the 
impression that there are many factors to our success that elude us entirely; to argue against this is 
not necessarily the result of greed, but of a lack of awareness. But the problem goes further: to a 
certain degree, many of the rational choices we make can be the results of these natural 
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endowments. For example, to be able to truly weigh multiple complex considerations and 
outcomes when making a rational choice is itself an endowment that many people do not possess; 
in this sense, how can they rationally decide to develop something that they are not even aware 
that they are lacking? The flipside of this very example is that the better endowed are more likely, 
ceteris paribus, to strive conscientiously; this is possible because there is a higher chance that they 
have been endowed with the capacity to properly reflect on their own achievements and all of the 
factors that have contributed to them. However, for Nozick this argument is not satisfying as he 
believes that Rawls is only blocking the possibility of personal autonomy being the deciding factor 
in the outcomes of individual endeavors; by doing this, he is according primacy to external factors 
in the constitution of one’s destiny (Nozick, 1974, p. 214). 
 In sum, Nozick’s problem with Rawls’ treatment of natural endowments is the fact that 
latter’s theory, which prizes the autonomy of rational individuals in the constitution of something 
far greater than their individual endeavors (the construction and maintenance of a just society), 
will simultaneously downplay such autonomy when it comes to endeavors that are much more 
“controllable” than the one mentioned above. 
Before we attempt to examine Rawls’s reasons for the rejection of natural liberties, Nozick 
states that “we should first examine the situation of those in the original position” (Nozick, 1974, 
p. 214), insofar as it is the ground from which Rawls’ reasons will flourish into a systematic set of 
prescriptions. This is not a rhetorical ploy; on the contrary, it is a brilliant move on Nozick’s part, 
insofar as the original position is the moment in which different forms of liberalism first start to 
distinguish themselves via their means of treating the problem of justice. This initial lack of 
distinction can be seen in a few of Rawls propositions: to a certain extent, the second principle of 
justice seems to be Rawls’ interpretation of natural rights, insofar as it presupposes the principle 
of equality as a quasi-transcendental entity.  The problem for Nozick is that Rawls did not make 
clear whether the parties in the original position choose among all the various interpretations of 
this principle, thought this may be the perfect conception of the principle for those who have yet 
to formulate their own. Regardless of the answer to the above question, Rawls is still in trouble: 
for if we answer yes, it means that he is being disingenuous by automatically excluding 
interpretations that might contradict the rest of his principles; if the answer is no, then it implies 
that his veil of ignorance is too strong, insofar as it prevents its wearers from exhausting the 
possible interpretations of certain ambiguous principles. In essence, Rawls faux pas is that he does 
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not give explanations for why the parties reject natural liberties in the original position (Nozick, 
1974, p. 215). It is unlikely that their rejection of natural rights is predicated on the idea that the 
distribution of goods is morally arbitrary if founded on the arbitrariness of a “natural lottery”, as 
there is nothing more “morally arbitrary” than the difference principle itself! For Nozick, the 
problem is that rational individuals inside the original position would never accept Rawls’ stance 
on the problem of entitlements and endowments. As a consequence of this, Nozick criticizes Rawls 
for designing the original position in such a way that it would evaluate any natural endowment as 
negative. This is of major importance to Nozick, as it is this precise design decision that structures 
the rest of Rawls’ theory, as the demarcating line between what is possible and what is impossible 
to conceive in the original position has a direct effect on what principles of justice can be rationally 
chosen in the first place. Perhaps it is not that the inheritors of natural endowments will choose 
differently if placed in Rawls’s original position, but rather that, Rawls would disagree that the 
principles of justice that govern their mutual relations were fixed by what they would choose in 
the original position. For instance, Rawls claims that the demand for the egalitarian principle does 
not come from envy, but from the principles of justice via their resentment of injustice. But this 
argument cannot stand according to Nozick, as the very consideration that men have envy is makes 
them gather around an “initial situation in an original position” to bargain in regard to their future. 
Thus, in principle, envy underlies the principles of justice: Rawls’s criticism of the (libertarian) 
principle of entitlements/endowments is based on a type of envy that negatively yields two 
principles of justice, which are then geared to nullify differences in social circumstances and in 
natural assets (Nozick, 1974, pp. 215-216). But why should holdings not depend partially on the 
natural endowments of their holders? Rawls’s reply is simply “no”, since natural endowments and 
assets are “arbitrary from a moral point of view:” as we can see, this is hardly satisfying. 
To Nozick’s advantage, Rawls’ reply leaves open the possibility that distributive effects of natural 
differences might be nullified (which Nozick labels as a set of positive arguments) and at the same 
time , leaves open the possibility for the distributive effects of natural differences to not be nullified 
(which Nozick labels as a set of negative arguments). Let’s now to turn to how Nozick presents 






2.5 The Positive Argument 
 
The first argument that Nozick analyzes is related to the positive arguments. These 
arguments simply state that natural endowments should have no effect over the determination of 
their holders’ lives insofar as they are arbitrary from a moral point of view: as a consequence, they 
should be nullified. 
1. If we put in the way that Rawls states it, it would sound like people can only keep 
holdings that they deserve and for this reason, must lose the holdings that they do not 
deserve. 
2. People do not deserve their natural assets. 
3. If a person’s X partially determines his Y, and his X is underserved then so is his Y. 
Therefore, Rawls comes to distributive justice and concludes: 
4. People’s holdings should not be partially determined by their natural assets. 
This argument is problematic for Nozick, as it means that Rawls is explicitly against 
distribution according to moral desert because of the fact that men would not agree to distribute 
income and wealth according to natural assets in the original position. In regard to the first 
premises of the argument sketched above, Nozick states that Rawls could not allow for the 
possession of holdings while neglecting the very holdings that flow from natural assets. 
Furthermore, by insisting to pattern a distribution that is based on such a neglect of particular types 
of holdings, Rawls is structuring his entire distributive scheme from a morally arbitrary position; 
if the distinction between just and unjust holdings is morally arbitrary (as Nozick believes), then 
the rest of the pattern of distribution is also morally arbitrary. In sum, if we reject the first premise 
of Rawls’ argument, then the rest of it cannot possibly hold nor be developed further. Nevertheless, 
Rawls’s arguments follow. Let us consider his second argument: 
1. Holdings ought to be distributed according to a pattern that is not arbitrary from a moral 
point of view. 
2. Inherent differences that stem from uneven natural assets is arbitrary from a moral point 
of view. 
3. Holdings ought not to be distributed according to natural assets. 
Nozick’s problem with this line of argumentation is that natural assets are not always 
related to differences that are arbitrary from a moral point of view. There are cases when natural 
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assets are of some moral relevance to distributional questions; for example, Friedrich Hayek 
(Hayek, 1960) has argued that, under capitalism, distribution generally occurs in accordance with 
the goods’ perceived service to others. Thus, the goods that flow from natural assets can be of 
much importance to other members of a given society, and it would then be immoral to block these 
goods from being exchanged. If this is so, then the ability to serve others will depend on such 
natural assets; differences in distribution must thus be correlated with differences in natural assets. 
For the proponents of this type of argument (such as Nozick), the  regulative principle of this 
system of distribution is not “distribution in accordance with natural assets”; on the contrary, 
differences in natural assets will lead to differences in holdings under a system whose principle is 
distribution according to the perceived service to others. If this is the case, then any pattern that 
aims to regulate the relation between natural assets and the distribution of social goods is not only 
morally arbitrary, but possibly immoral altogether. While Rawls considers this type of argument 
to be too strong, Nozick is arriving at a crucial conclusion: not only must we prevent the 
distribution of social goods that come from natural assets from being enacted via a morally 
arbitrary pattern, but there is a very good chance that any of these patterns is morally arbitrary. Let 
us now look at the third argument: 
1. The pattern that is to regulate the distribution of holdings should not be arbitrary from 
a moral point of view. 
2. The possession of natural assets is arbitrary from a moral point of view. 
3. If (part of) the explanation of why a pattern contains differences in holdings is that 
other differences in persons’ natural assets give rise to these differences in holdings, 
then , taking proposition #2 into account, the pattern is also arbitrary from a moral point 
of view.    
Therefore, 
4. Differences in natural assets should not give rise to differences in holdings among 
persons. 
In the 3rd premise, Rawls is trying to remind us that natural assets are inherently arbitrary; 
consequently, any distributive pattern that results from them will also be arbitrary. However for 
Nozick, the problem has nothing to do with arbitrariness, as any pattern has the possibility of being 
arbitrary. “The problem is rather that the difference principle gives some people larger distributive 
shares than others; the question of who will receive these larger shares will depend on differences 
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between these persons and others” (Nozick, 1974, p. 219). These differences are morally arbitrary, 
for some people with special natural assets will be offered larger shares as an incentive to use these 
assets in certain ways; as the distribution of these incentives is morally arbitrary, then so is the 
distribution of goods that naturally flow from them. As we’ve seen, this is why a distributive 
pattern is necessary for Rawls’ theory of justice. Nozick is asking himself why we should use a 
pattern to distribute these goods in the first place, if there are other ways of distributing them that 
do not rely on patterns whatsoever. If things were to be given as if they fell from heaven, then 
perhaps there might be a more compelling reason to search for a pattern and subsequently establish 
it. But since these assets come into being as already “held” (or with agreements already made about 
how they are to be held), there is no need to search for a pattern  that distributes un-held assets; in 
consequence, the process in which holdings actually come into being (or are shaped), does not 
need to be modeled upon such a pattern. Thus, there is no reason to expect any pattern to result in 
a just distribution of goods, insofar as justice doesn’t apply to this issue in the way that Rawls 
thinks it does. As nothing simply falls from heaven in the real world, in the sense that everything 
that is useful to us is also mediated by even a minimum of production, there should not be any 
pattern of distribution for these types of goods, as “given” goods don’t even exist. Nozick’s 
argument relies on the idea that patterned exchanges between men can be transformed into 
voluntary exchanges of holdings. Despite the fact that every exchange can be transformed or 
subsumed into a pattern, there are always patterns that are incommensurable with others by design, 
insofar as this incommensurability might be established in a voluntary fashion by those who are 
freely engaged in such an exchange. As a result, Nozick thinks that it is important to not neglect 
the fact that people are in these conditions because of their choice to not disturb the patterns that 
are generally admitted by all; though it is their fault that they do not react these patterns, insofar 
as these patterns have also granted them their holdings. 
By the last positive argument, Nozick states that Rawls' conclusion that distributive shares 
should not depend upon natural assets is due to the idea that the distribution of natural assets is 
morally arbitrary. Because of this, Rawls calls for the establishment of equality, and it is precisely 
at this moment that the difference principle must be mobilized in order to complete the 
establishment of such a type of equality; for if we didn't mobilize the difference principle, then 
Rawls' first principle would fall victim to the conception of equality that is inherent in natural 
rights. For Rawls, differences between persons are arbitrary from a moral point of view if there is 
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no moral argument for the idea that there ought to be differences. From the premises of this 
argument, Rawls concludes that differences in natural assets are unacceptable if they enable 
differences in holdings, otherwise holdings ought to be equal unless there is some other principle 
that says differently. But why, asks Nozick, should people’s holdings be equal because of the 
absence of a special moral reason to deviate from equality? Why should deviation from equality 
only be determined by moral forces? Nozick’s problem is that most of the arguments assert that 
differences between persons are arbitrary and must be justified. But why the need to justify 
differences in the first place?  For example, should my choice of which local corner store I prefer 
to go to be justified to the public? Nozick doesn’t think so, for our personal reason for choosing 
one over the other is enough of a justification. “Treating everyone according to a same template is 
something that contemporary governments do” (Nozick, 1974, p. 223) and this does not allow their 
citizens to freely choose on the basis of their wishes and whims. Improving someone’s position 
without making someone else worse off is sometimes impossible when we consider to what extent 
the relation between them is distant. They may not want to cooperate with each other under these 
terms and as a consequence, both become worse off. The problem derives from the fact that 
equality, according to Rawls, is reduced to equal holdings; for Nozick, this is the core problem of 
his theory insofar as it violates some of the most basic freedoms in the name of equality. By 
restricting freedom of natural assets, Rawls weakens our ability to differentiate holdings; by 
restricting holdings, he then restricts other freedoms and liberties as well. By only focusing on 
what people have the right to possess, Rawls forgets that there are also people who seem to be 
acting upon their natural right to freely employ their natural assets and endow their holdings with 
the benefits that flow from these assets. Why should our freedom be restricted in the domain of 
natural assets and holdings, then? 
Nozick isn’t satisfied by Rawls’ explanation of the right to equal holdings because such a 
right becomes a restriction on a multitude of other liberties. Furthermore, the only reason Rawls 
can get away with it is because he effectively traded the conception of natural rights for that of 
social rights; in other words, if he would have still accepted natural rights, his second principle 
would be inconsistent. It is in this sense that Nozick sees Rawls position as being unfair, insofar 
as it goes at considerable lengths to determine something that wasn't even our choice in the first 
place. On the other hand, Rawls could not have selected any other principle to replace his second 
one, as it would necessarily weaken the first principle's commitment to a conception of social 
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rights instead of natural ones; this is a necessity for Rawls, as we have seen that he views natural 
rights to be morally arbitrary. But if this is the case, why would one then expect to sacrifice her 
natural endowments in exchange for just social cooperation when she is not even guaranteed to 
benefit from it. This problem worsens when we consider that Rawls' assurance that second 
principle will be chosen on the grounds of its rationality isn't actually consistent with the very real 
possibility that other principles are chosen for reasons that are considered to be just as rational. In 
other words, Nozick sees the second principle as essentially limiting insofar as it presupposes that 
the actors within the original position will choose to think of rights in a social manner instead of a 
natural one: in this case, it is limiting the freedom to share concepts for political purposes. It is for 
this reason that Nozick views the second principle as arbitrary, and in consequence, views its 
derivation from the first principle as irrelevant. 
 
2.6 The Negative Argument 
 
As Nozick is currently unsuccessful in his attempt to connect the claim that people do not 
deserve their natural assets with the conclusion that differences in holdings ought not to be based 
upon differences in natural assets, he will now turn to what he calls “the negative argument”. Let 
us consider the following counter-argument to the last argument sketched in the previous section: 
1. People deserve their natural assets. 
2. If people deserve X, they deserve any F that flows from X. 
3. People’s holdings flow from their natural assets. 
Therefore, 
4. People deserve their holdings. 
5. If people deserve something, then they ought to have it (and this overrides any 
presumption of equality that there may be about that specific thing). 
Nozick says that Rawls would rebut this counterargument by denying its first premise, 
namely the idea that people do not deserve their natural assets.  As we have seen, this is because 
Rawls views the initial distribution of these assets as arbitrary. Let us now examine Nozick’s 
modified counter-argument to this: 
1. If people have X, and their having X lets us leave aside whether they deserve to have 
it or not; does not violate anyone else’s right or entitlement to X; and that Y flows from 
41 
 
or arises out of X by a process that does not itself violate anyone’s rights or 
entitlements, then the person is entitled to Y. 
Therefore, 
2. People’s natural assets do not violate anyone else’s entitlements or rights.   
This means that people are entitled to the products of their work, to what they receive from 
others and exchange with others. Thus, according to Nozick, it cannot be true that a person earns 
Y (a right to be praised for writing a book, for example) only if they have earned (or otherwise 
deserves) whatever they used in the process of earning Y, including natural assets. Some of the 
things that they used to write that book (such as their intelligence or ability to understand deep 
emotional states) are natural assets that they simply have, and having them is not illegitimate. Not 
all foundations that cause desert are themselves fully deserved. 
To make it clearer, Nozick parallels the statement about desert with one about entitlements. He 
now describes people as entitled to their natural assets even if we cannot say that they deserve 
them; because of this,  then every case of the word “deserve” in the 5th argument is replaced with 
“are entitled to”. Let us now examine the outcome of this modification: 
Argument seven: 
1. People are entitled to their natural assets. 
2. If people are entitled to something, they are entitled to whatever flows from it. 
3. People’s holdings flow from their natural assets. 
Therefore, 
4. People are entitled to their holdings. 
5. If people are entitled to something, then they ought to have it. (This overrides any 
presumption of equality that there may be about holdings). 
“Whether or not people’s natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are still 
entitled to them and thus, what flows from them” (Nozick, 1974, p. 226). Furthermore, Nozick 
believed that if Rawls had accepted entitlements in regard to natural assets, he would no longer 
need to formulate something akin to the difference principle in the first place. Rawls knew this 
quite well, which is why he incorporated the difference principle into his system. By doing this, 
he could then avoid the problem of determining whether entitlements are deserved or not, insofar 
as the difference principle’s lexical ordering also allows it to reinforce the first principle that it 
flows from. Without the difference principle, the equality principle is ambiguous in relation to 
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entitlements regarding natural assets. For Nozick, this is why Rawls could not start with the 
difference principle: he needed it to come second in order to establish a logical connection between 
equality and the imperative of ensuring that any form of inequality will necessarily benefit the 
most precarious members of a given society. 
Nozick has himself stated that one could not find a cogent argument in order to establish 
that differences in holdings that arise from differences in natural assets should be minimized or 
eliminated. Can the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of natural assets be determined in the 
original position?  Surely, the answer would be “yes” for Rawls. But even if the structure of the 
original position itself forces its participants to formulate a principle that would nullify differences 
in holdings that flow from natural assets, there would be no possible argument to defend it. In this 
sense, the structure of the original position is more coercive on our capacity to reason that we 
originally thought; otherwise, it would have not been necessary for Nozick’s counter 
argumentation to be developed any further. To summarize, what Nozick is stating is that the 
structural exclusion of knowledge pertaining to natural assets is what forces the participants inside 
the original position to (by performance ) adopt the viewpoint that the distribution of natural assets 
is morally arbitrary, all without having to actually argue about it; the problem with this is that this 
viewpoint should be arrived at through the means of rational argumentation within the original 
position itself instead of being posited as “prior” to any argumentation whatsoever. It is for this 
exact reason that we cannot find a rational argument in favor of this viewpoint in the original 
position, and not because the distribution of natural assets is actually morally arbitrary. 
The question is: why should knowledge of natural assets be excluded from the original 
position in the first place? Nozick construes Rawls response as follows: this knowledge should be 
excluded because its moral arbitrariness makes it of no use for moral reasoning itself. But this is 
not all that the original position excludes people from, as it may also exclude them from knowing 
anything about themselves, their features, and their rationality, ability to make choices, life span, 
and memory and so on. What we could do in this case? Asks Nozick. It is not our fault that our 
genetic makeup is not that of muskrats or trees, and that fact itself is arbitrary from a moral point 






2.7 Primary Goods, Tendency to Equality and Principles for Individuals   
 
The idea of primary goods stands to simultaneously enrich and balance the concept of 
efficiency and its function within the original position. This is because, in Rawls' view, a society 
in which natural endowments and assets are arbitrary would not only hinder the less-endowed, but 
also the well-endowed and well situated. In this sense, the right to holdings that stem from natural 
assets is not even beneficial to those who possess them, insofar as their endeavors can always be 
hindered by someone who possesses even more natural assets than they do.  First of all, it will 
nullify the social effects of various talents by forcing them inside of a very limited expressive and 
creative space, and as a consequence, will either atrophy the existence of genius on a large scale 
or force citizens to abide by the logic of a genetic lottery. For Rawls, freedom consists of the 
coherence between large-scale social cooperation and the distinct ends of the individuals who 
engage in it; this coherence is possible because there are primary liberties that are transformed into 
norms and laws by social institutions. Nozick, on the other hand, thinks of freedom first (and thus, 
as a self-contained principle) and then arranges social cooperation on the basis of any principle 
that would allow this self-contained conception of freedom to flourish in economic cooperation 
only; contrary to Rawls, Nozick does not want all social cooperation to be modeled upon the same 
pattern. In this sense, Nozick is assuring that the moral issues that derive from other types of social 
cooperation do not “pollute” moral considerations within the sphere of economic exchange. Rawls 
softened the differences in natural assets so everyone could benefit from cooperation (and in 
consequence, have moral justification to nullify considerations of natural rights), since he knew 
that if natural assets are not to be rendered neutral as they currently stand, it is better to nullify 
them instead. For Nozick, on the other hand, our skills are what make us. Because of this, he is in 
favor of the freedom of individuals to use their skills as they see fit; if this involves demanding 
more in an exchange due to the particularity of the skills in question, “then so be it”. Rawls thinks 
that the risk of injustice is too large, as it implies that it is possible to leverage these rare skills to 
such an advantage that any exchange that flows from it would be too lopsided to be considered 
fair. In this sense, we must minimize the leverage that can be accrued by natural assets, insofar as 
their arbitrary distribution means that there the surplus of social power that eludes the scales of 
justice is too high. 
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Primary goods lay the basis for the minimal conditions of justice to be met. Liberty, 
equality, authority, power, income and wealth are primary goods insofar as those formulating the 
principles of justice inside the original position must consider them before moving onto anything 
else. This list of primary goods has been subjected to criticism that mainly revolves around the 
notion that such a list is simply an arbitrary nomination of goods that serve the interests of the 
dominant party. For instance, if the poor are the dominant group in society (under a dictatorship of 
the proletariat), then institutions will prioritize goods that pertain to them specifically (such as 
equality and income) while downplaying goods that pertain to other opposing groups (such as 
liberty and wealth in the case of the bourgeoisie). Rawls, however, puts it in a different way: 
primary goods serve as the minimal conditions in which justice can be achieved. While reasons 
such as these demonstrate the “external” scope of primary goods, we must also remember that they 
also possess an “internal” function: they also make up the minimum requirement for an individual’s 
realization of their particular conception of the Good Life. 
The ability of citizens to determine their own conception of the Good Life and their 
respective means to achieve it is honored as the first right from which the others will be deduced; 
from this first right will then come the second, which guarantees that each member of a given 
society is given equal opportunity to fulfill their particular conceptions of the Good life. These two 
rights are, in essence, the two principles of justice that will ground future forms of social 
cooperation. The ordering of such principles is rationally derived, insofar as the first principle 
serves as the precept which the second principle will weigh itself in accordance to; to reverse the 
hierarchy of both principles is impossible insofar as the second principle derives its content from 
the first. The content of the outcomes produced by the second principle is of no concern to justice; 
as we've seen above, this content is to be determined solely by the individuals engaged in social 
cooperation. As the content of these outcomes is of no concern, justice is rather interested by the 
form of these outcomes; it is for this reason that the second principle assures that regardless of 
what is produced, it will be to the benefit to the most precarious members of society. For even the 
most banal inequalities are just if they are to the benefit of society's most precarious members. If 
they weren't, then no one inside the original position would feel secure in the society they are about 
to enter, as they might be in the position of precariousness.  
The second principle thus serves as a guarantee that it is possible to achieve your 
conception of the good life, and it does this by assuring a just distribution of primary goods such 
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as freedom, equality, wealth and power; even if you are given the least amount of these goods in 
the process of justice, any re-configuration of such a distributive pattern would make you worse 
off. In this sense, we must not think of primary goods as more abstract forms of capital, but of 
conditions that guarantee the fruition of particular outcomes; they are not to be traded, but 
maintained and extended. 
The position of the least advanced member of society is not equal to that of the poorest 
man or the worse off; someone is only “least advanced” in relation to someone who isn’t. For 
instance, B is only the least advanced if there is A to be compared with; because of this, A alone 
without B is just worse off as B alone without A. It is for this reason that Rawls claims that justice’s 
minimal realization requires the least advanced member of society to benefit from anything that 
increases the lot of more advanced members. While we cannot conclude that the least privileged 
member of society has been put in that position by the existence of more privileged members, we 
can ensure that the existence of the better members (and that which flows from it) improves the 
least advanced member’s attempts to fulfill his goals. If social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged in that way, then there is no that someone will get worse off due to the distribution of 
primary goods; for if they did, it would not be a failure on the part of the class of more advanced 
members, but the system of justice (and its corresponding institutions) in its entirety. This 
conception of justice is thus opposed to aristocracy and meritocracy, insofar as the former sees 
privilege as a natural right and the latter allows for natural assets to have a disproportionate stake 
in the distribution of rewards. The problem with meritocracy is that what the judges consider as 
merit can also be the result of natural assets (and thus an arbitrary winning of the natural lottery). 
For Rawls, the need for fair cooperation must come from both parties equally; for the conception 
of “fairness” of a single party might not coincide with that of the other party. As fairness must be 
built by both parties, whatever will come out of the production process will have to be acceptable 
for each of them. 
As we can start to see, one of the by-products of building justice in the original position is 
the development of a basic fraternity that will be represented (and eventually normalized) by social 
institutions. While actors are particularized once they exit the original position, the type of 
institutions that they decided on in the original position bears the mark of this initial state of 
fraternity. Rawls claims that once we understand fraternity in the sense of family, it is easier to 
understand many of the secondary effects of his theory: as the family is the only institution where 
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justice can be experienced when its members share and honor each other with the highest forms of 
respect, fairness and solidarity.  Because of this, JF views democracy as the only political system 
which would easily accord itself to these principles. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity are indeed the 
three values that are in full concordance with the two principles of justice: liberty (as identical 
between members) accords itself with the first principle, equality accords itself with the second 
principle and fraternity is the by-product of the lexical ordering of both of these principles. 
Principles that concern the basic structure of society are different than those which concern 
individuals. Fairness is the principle that applies to individuals and comes into play whenever 
mutual cooperation takes place. As Rawls previously mentioned, fairness is not what characterizes 
the rules of the game but what characterizes its players: a game has its own rules, but whether the 
players are playing fairly or not cannot be effected by changes in those rules.  If everyone plays 
their part fairly within the team, the whole game will be fair regardless of the content of the rules. 
In other words, the reason players play fairly is for love of the game, not the rules: to play fairly is 
a duty towards the game, which is simply the structured fair-play between groups of individuals. 
This duty towards the game thus becomes a duty towards others, and it is in this sense that the idea 
of reciprocity is fundamental to any form of fairness. For individuals that either run for public 
office or have already attained it, fairness is a duty: as representatives of institutions founded on 
fairness, they have a larger obligation to be fair than anyone else. If they don’t fulfill this 
obligation, they are undermining the very fairness that allowed them to reach that position of power 
in the first place. To illustrate this, Rawls draws a parallel with the act of marriage, as such a mutual 
venture is only possible on the ground of certain shared duties and moral obligations. 
In this conception of justice, the morality of sacrifice and heroism does not have a proper 
place except when the act is committed in the name of a just war. Even so, justice does not oblige 
anyone to commit such an act, since nobodies’ freedom, equality and fraternity is less important 
than anyone else’s. Rawls is aware that, regardless of the theory of justice, it is impossible to settle 
all disputes in society nor encompass all issues of distribution and cooperation. What can be 
expected though is that JF offers enough moral facts that parties would agree on during their 
formulation of principles of justice within the original position. Rawls does not see this as being 
either problematic or impossible, especially when the conditions in which these discussions take 
place effectively promote liberty, equality and fraternity. Furthermore, Rawls deems it to be 
philosophically sustainable, insofar as the structure in which this process takes place is just as 
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rational as its actors are. We shall now further examine this structure in order to determine whether 




























3. The Original Position 
 
3.1 Justice (Theory of Justice, § 20). 
 
The original position is the cornerstone of Rawls' philosophical argument, as it provides 
the minimum conditions for rational debate about the principles of justice that will ground the 
institutions of a given society. It is part where Rawls felt the most comfortable to ground principles 
of justice since was convinced that under these conditions though under the minimal ones original 
position would be self-sufficient enough to yield a “similar” outcome acceptable for all human 
reason the same. But, as it may catch on surprise one, such an example was undertaken by Nozick 
himself and proved completely the opposite what Rawls stated and believed to prove. However 
Nozick attempt will be briefed in succession of this chapter where we would get familiar with 
closely. 
The conditions for original position are minimal insofar as they are meant to apply to the 
least informed members of society; in this sense, once these conditions are met, it is not possible 
to exclude anyone from such a debate. This is more or less the main feature of the original position; 
by limiting what it is possible to know about yourself in society, every participant is transformed 
into a moral person of equal weight within such a debate.  As these arguments contain moral facts, 
it is plausible to use philosophical arguments to make deductions and logical connections between 
those facts: these arguments can be sustained due to the rational structure of the original position, 
as it allows any one of its members to interject and present conjectures from a footing that is equal 
to that of the others. For Rawls, equal footing can occur because the principles of justice that are 
discussed within the original position relate directly to the establishment of such a footing; the fact 
principles derive the same ground as the arguments themselves is what lends to the overall 
coherence of the debate inside of the original position. In this sense, there is a philosophical 
momentum that starts to build up the very moment that two parties gather to discuss the principles 
of justice. The fact that parties know almost nothing about themselves is what allows for this 
momentum to build, as the discussion is concerned with the establishment of the conditions in 




This momentum cannot be mired by self-interested motivations, precisely because the 
''self'' that appears inside the original position is so minimal in the first place; because of this, 
parties cannot establish principles of justice that will benefit themselves at the behest of others. 
What this assures that is that reason that this minimal self-possess is employed in a constructive 
manner, and that what is to be constructed will benefit each and every ''self'' that contributed to its 
establishment. While this might not remove the total conditions of injustice, it will at least make 
sure that these new conditions will allow for less injustice in general. This is why we can say that 
the procedure undertaken within the original position is rational: the coherence between the 
rationality of the structure and that of the actors is what ensures that what is produced within the 
structure isn't arbitrary, but carefully constructed. This is why Rawls can guarantee that any 
discussion within the original position will result in a more just distribution of goods in society. 
The two principles discussed within the original position are requisites for moral persons of equal 
stature, insofar as they are themselves deduced from this equal stature. As principles of justice, 
they question the general ethical issues of morality. The two principles of justice must be 
considered as a charter of rights and duties for the regulation of a fair, just and well-ordered society, 
all without determining what particular rules or laws are morally correct. What forms justice is an 
overall inclusion of individual entities into a system. The two principles of justice are not chosen 
because they determine the rightness of the regulated forms of cooperation, but because they allow 
us to grasp common ethical issues in a rational fashion; for the determination of what is ''right'' is 
a component of any principle within a given theory of justice. By doing this, each individual entity 
within the original position departs from these common issues in order to partake in the building 
of a system that is meant to answer them in a way that suits each and every entity within it.  All 
theories are equally responsible for what constitutes just human conduct, but they do not all share 
the same definitions. There are theories and systems that might be better than the one that Rawls 
presents, but we cannot say that they are less just, unless they have been constructed in an irrational 
manner. For if they were, they would not be able to deliver justice in a systematic fashion, and 
would then be patently unable to apply justice to the largest possible amount of ethical dilemmas. 
In sum, the pursuit of justice must be totalizing; it would be impossible to achieve this via irrational 
principles, as this would destroy the very momentum that was mentioned above. While justice for 
Rawls is invisible, its truth can be discovered via rational means since it is in the nature of laws 
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and principles to be understood as a consequence of reason and the ability of humans to employ it 
in the pursuit of justice. 
Another feature of JF is that the nature of the contract can be agreed upon between parties 
in the original position.  Contract theory orders parties in an equal manner due to the fact that the 
contract represents obligations and duties that must be respected in equal manner. It is for this 
reason that Rawls believes that the contract is the only way to ensure the legacy of justice over 
multiple generations; while newer generations are further removed from the contract in the 
chronological sense, the duties and obligations contained within the contract apply to their lives 
just as much as they applied to the lives of their forefathers. When parties choose and agree for 
principles of justice in the act of erecting a contract, they indirectly involve a third person that does 
not take part in the present discussion, but must be considered as a future guarantor of the contract's 
legacy and legitimacy. By representing future generations as equal to the current one in the 
establishment of the contract, intergenerational equality is assured; furthermore, this is what allows 
for different generations to share common values in the first place. While the contract represents a 
certain tradition in this sense, it is a tradition that is meant to outlast most others due to its rational 
nature; in other words, it is a tradition that vies for the (practical) status of a historical invariant, 
despite its constructed nature. The parties are aware of the contract's transcendental nature, as there 
are a few legal and juridical constraints which make people consider principles within this original 
position. The first constraint pertains to the generality and inclusivity of the principles: a general 
principle must include all moral persons regardless of their differences and belongings. What this 
entails is that in order to be applicable, a general principle must be universal; this universality is a 
constraint insofar as it prevents the principles from becoming too particular (and in consequence, 
too determinate). Principles are functional only when they meet these two conditions. If a principle 
considers all men in equal manner and is applicable universally, it then meets the minimal 
conditions of justice. Furthermore, there are other principles that can be deduced from the two 
principles of justice that are formulated in the original position, though each following principle 
must be stronger (or, more determinate) than the last one; what this means is that there must be a 
fine balance between the conditions of generality and universality on one hand and the particularity 
and determinability of a principle on the other. The last constraint is that these principles must be 
accepted publicly, as there must be a situation where parties observe the truth of the principles and 
agree upon those truths as they appear in public, to a common audience. In other words, parties 
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cannot accept the same principle all while possessing different interpretations of it; the principle 
that is accepted must be accepted in its common form. The agreement for a principle is thus 
predicated on agreement in regard to how it is to be interpreted; for if this condition isn't fulfilled, 
then there will be ambiguity in regards to the parties' shared obligations towards such a principle. 
This common interpretation is possible due to Rawls' adoption of the Kantian conception of 
“public reason”, which is the ground for intersubjective exchange within a public sphere. For Kant, 
public reason consists of a “court” in which ideas are judged on the basis of the “common sense” 
that allows for intersubjective exchange to be possible in the first place. In other words, ideas are 
subjected to the form of reasoning that we share when we communicate on a daily basis. Once a 
statement or principle has been approved by public reason, it immediately becomes norm that will 
slowly make its way into “common sense”, eventually taking a part in its very constitution. It is 
for this reason that public reason enables justice to achieve general social solutions, for such 
solutions are founded on the compromise between varying beliefs that appear in a public setting. 
As a consequence to this, public reason becomes a source of authority insofar as it becomes the 
condition of intersubjective exchange: ideas must seek its approval if they want to be exchanged 
between the members of a discerning public. 
In conclusion, the constraints mentioned above are the justifications for the original 
position as the basis for the fairness and reasonability of justice, as they permit us to rid ourselves 
of (most, if not) all doubts over the nature of the principles that parties bid for. Once this nature is 
firmly grasped, parties will reject any principles that are formulate on egotistical bases. Secondly, 
since no one is willing to derive principles of cooperation in this way, it guarantees to the parties 
in the original position that whatever principles are formulated will be respected in a reciprocal 
manner.  This is important, insofar as it assures that each actor inside the original position will 
possess a common tie to the others through the medium of what they are constructing together. 
 
3.2 The Veil of Ignorance (Theory of Justice, §24) 
 
The role of the original position is to set up a fair procedure in which parties can reach an 
agreement (Lovett, 2011).  But since parties do not know each other’s social position, the good, 
their generation and their knowledge, the only mechanism that remains in their possession is their 
ability to reason in common. This limitation of knowledge actually makes it easier to choose 
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general principles, as there are less possible determinations that can influence their choice; because 
of this, reasoning together is also easier. If these choices were based on more determinate 
knowledge, they would further constrain our ability to reason in public insofar as imbalances in 
information would then make for imbalances in the substance of such reasoning. It is far better to 
establish principles in this way than on the basis of other determinations, such as social class. 
Furthermore, any union or coalition is not allowed since it would imply that there are imbalances 
and inequalities between the actors in the original position that must be harmonized via artificial 
means. Despite these epistemic limitations, parties possess information about the concepts of 
justice, society and economic efficiency that would then allow them to agree upon principles of 
social cooperation. Parties may not have information about each other’s rational plan for the good 
and the generation they belong to, but when they discuss issues such as intergenerational wealth 
transfers, it becomes a question of social justice insofar as it incites parties to think of justice 
between generations. In an original position parties may decide to not pass their wealth to their 
successors in the same way that they received it in the past, simply because they do not think they 
are obliged towards those who are to come and instead want to benefit in the present time. This 
may be considered as something which has been decided in the past and in consequence, is 
something that we cannot do much about. While there are no guarantees that the parties in the 
original position will come up with truly just principles, there is a guarantee that public reason and 
its limiting conditions will allow for the parties to understand what is at stake during the 
formulation of such principles. For example, while parties might agree to nullify intergenerational 
wealth transfers, their lack of knowledge pertaining to which generation they belong to will at least 
force them to consider the position of someone who is placed at the tail end of that scale in this 
sense, these constraints force them to consider the problems of justice contained within these issues 
regardless of what will be determined afterward. 
This is not to say that the establishment of unjust principles within the veil of ignorance is 
unproblematic. Rawls elaborates his answer to the problem in the second part of “A Theory of 
Justice” (Rawls, 1971) and “Political Liberalism” (Rawls, 1996). Besides that, Rawls does not 
negate parties' lack information: on the contrary, the kind of information that parties possess in the 
original position is social and economic knowledge, which is indispensable in the formulation of 
just principles. But men also possess the idea of justice, the question of which is brought up in 
their daily lives. According to Rawls, the original position should not be understood as a situation 
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that involves everyone in the present, nor a situation that lasts forever and thus incorporates each 
possible actor at the same time: such a thing does not exist! It is rather a tool for those who can see 
themselves from a perspective where everyone is an equally moral person; in other words, it is a 
tool for those who possess the ability to abstract from their own particular viewpoint in order to 
consider general viewpoints from the position of others. As everyone within the original position 
must be able to reason in such a way, this abstract viewpoint is meant to be the same for everybody: 
it is a product of transcendental subjectivity, as it derives from the formal structure of subjectivity 
that allows us to reason together in a public setting. “The veil of ignorance is a key condition in 
meeting this requirement. It insures not only that the information available is relevant, but that it 
is at all times the same” (Rawls, 1971, p. 139). So even if parties want to know about each other, 
they will not be able to find what others may think of their aims and ends, as they themselves are 
not aware of their own ends. As they do not know about each other’s plans, it is harder to tailor 
and choose principles that will benefit only a particular party in question or deprive others from 
their ends. In sum, the epistemic limitations incurred by the application of the veil of ignorance 
are productive limitations, insofar as they force its members to establish general principles that 
apply to all instead of simply extending the knowledge of determinations that might influence such 
principles. For example, instead of being able to collect more information that might influence the 
formulation of a principle, they are forced to work through the problems that occur when this 
principle is generalized and subsequently improve that principle on those grounds alone.   
 
3.3 The Rationality of the Parties (Theory of Justice, §25). 
 
Due to the epistemic limitations incurred by the veil of ignorance, the rationality of the 
parties in the original position differs from the rationality of everyday life. Rationality in the 
original position is characterized by the position from which justice is conceived, since parties 
have an opportunity to rationalize the principles they want to choose. It must be accepted that 
parties would like to derive the most amount of benefits from the principles they establish: in this 
sense, their reasoning is utilitarian. If everybody's rational plan is to achieve their particular ends 
in a maximal setting, then it would be unacceptable to unequally distribute the primary goods that 
allow for such a maximization. While some might reject utilitarian thinking on moral or religious 
grounds, it is assumed that the majority would at least consider utilitarian reasons when 
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establishing a coherence between their ends and the means to achieve them. Yet this type of 
thinking runs into a limitation: In the context of moral psychology, it is irrational to formulate 
principles based on expected ends, as we are not actually if those ends will manifest themselves in 
the way that we think they will. Because of the fact that actors are not sure about how their rational 
plan will turn out, it would be foolish to reason as if its accomplishment were a certainty. In this 
sense, it is admissible to think that parties can agree on principles that will actually harm them in 
the future, as their expectations of the future can be completely erroneous; because of this, the 
utilitarian aspect of moral reasoning is limited. This is why the veil of ignorance specifically states 
that parties will not know anything about the future; for if it didn't, parties might assume that their 
expectations of the future are correct and consequently formulate principles that are harmful in the 
long run. Moral reasoning must thus be privileged over utilitarian reasoning; the limitations of the 
veil of ignorance will hinder utilitarian reasoning, but will strengthen moral reasoning by forcing 
its subjects to think in a more abstract and general fashion. It is for this reason that parties are not 
interested in the aims of others; it is not because they don't matter, but because a party cannot make 
accurate judgements about them. This is a fundamental factor in the accomplishment of JF, as it is 
the basis for non-interference in the ends of other parties. Using the example of a game, one can 
be assured that it will be fairly played if each players tries to score the highest amount of points 
without breaking the rules to interfere with the strategies of others. The fact that we do not know 
the strategies of others thus gives us less of an incentive to break the rules. As a result of this lack 
of knowledge, envy is now eliminated from the original position. Since the persons in the original 
positions are assumed to take no interest in the interests of others (although they may have a 
concern for third parties), it may be thought that JF is itself an egoistic theory. While it is not one 
of the three forms of egoism mentioned earlier, some may think (as Schopenhauer thought of 
Kant’s doctrine), that it is egoistic nonetheless. Rawls sees this as a misconception, as the veil of 
ignorance is meant to assure that those who debate within the original position do not possess 
enough knowledge about themselves to even possess an “ego”. One must remember that despite 
this, the two principles of justice require us to consider the rights and claims of others. 
Furthermore, the sense of justice is found in the obligation to comply with the restrictions that 
prevent one from interfering with the goals of others. The motivation of those in the original 
position must not be confused with the motivation of persons in everyday life: in practical affairs 
an individual does have a knowledge of her situation and she can, if she wishes, exploit 
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contingencies to her advantage. “Should his [her] sense of justice move [her] to act on the 
principles of right that would be adopted in the original position, [her] desires and aims are surely 
not egoistic” (Rawls, 1971, p. 148). 
Rawls supports this conclusion for other reasons, too. Once we consider the idea of a 
contract theory, says Rawls, it is tempting to think that it will not yield the principles we want 
unless the parties are (to some degree) moved by benevolence, or an interest in one another’s 
interests. For instance, Perry thinks of the right standards and decisions as those that will promote 
the ends reached by reflective agreement under circumstances of impartiality and goodwill. In 
Rawls' case, on the other hand, the mutual disinterest incurred by the veil of ignorance provides 
the same effect as benevolence, for it requires its participants to treat the ends of others as if they 
were their own; as we've seen before, this is possible if one is just as ignorant of his own ends than 
the he is in regard to the ends of others. In JF the effects of good will are brought about by several 
conditions working jointly and thus, the idea that this conception of justice is egoistic is an illusion 
fostered by a single-minded focus on a single one of these conditions. The conditions of the veil 
of ignorance are more effective than the combination of knowledge and benevolence; for 
quantitative increases in knowledge and benevolence does not determine the way in which they 
will interact. Furthermore, the relation between knowledge and benevolence is too complex to be 
used in the formulation of general principles, insofar as this relation is up for interpretation; as we 
might never possess enough knowledge to properly interpret such a relation, it is thus too arbitrary 
to be used as a general methodological principle. Not only are the complications caused by so 
much information insurmountable, but the motivational assumption requires clarification. To be 
brief, the combination of mutual disinterest plus the veil of ignorance has the merits of simplicity 
and clarity while at the same time ensuring the effects of the moral assumptions that seem the most 
attractive at first; whether they remain attractive or not is up to the reasoning at play, and not the 
vast knowledge that it can mobilize. It is for reasons such as these that benevolence should not be 
included within the veil of ignorance. Moreover, it would defeat the purpose of grounding the 
theory of justice on weak stipulations; this would then make it incongruous with the circumstances 
of justice. 
With this in mind, we can now understand how parties that employ utilitarian thinking will 
also have the incentive to respect the aims of other parties regardless of the relation to their own, 
for any principle that harms another party might harm them in the long run. While the formulation 
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of discriminatory principles might be justified in the establishment of criteria for certain public 
offices, they cannot be formulated in general. Furthermore, each of these discriminatory principles 
is an affront to the liberty of anyone inside the original position, so in this sense, they cannot be 
established without a reason that is accepted by all. It is because of this that such principles can 
never be ordered as “first principles”, as the injustice inherent in it will then be passed on through 
the other principles that derive from it. It is then inevitable that racial and sexual discrimination is 
excluded from the original position, and this is not only because of the fact that such forms of 
discrimination are unjust: under the veil of ignorance, these forms of discrimination are entirely 
irrational. 
 
3.4 The Reasoning Leading to the two Principles of Justice (Theory of Justice, §26). 
 
The goal of this section is to clarify and define the idea of a reasonable choice within the 
original position; after this has been achieved, we can then move on towards understanding why a 
reasonable person would opt for Rawls’ principles of justice over any others. As this choice 
employs moral reasoning instead of utilitarian calculation, Rawls presents the argument for his 
two principles of justice in qualitative fashion. To remind ourselves of the idea of JF: primary 
goods must be distributed on the basis of equality, unless the inequality of a certain distribution 
will benefit the least-privileged members of society. As no restrictions are placed on the exchanges 
of the goods, it is therefore an attempt to maximize liberty and equality without having one 
overstep into the boundaries of the other.  Now that persons in the original position will be deciding 
on these principles, they cannot know whether particular principles will disadvantage them or not; 
they are thus encouraged to formulate these principles in a way that takes into account the 
possibility of ending up in the lowest “rank” in a given society. Since there is no possible reasoning 
for the unequal distribution of social goods in this case, it would be irrational to accept anything 
less than equality. It is for this reason that the person is encouraged to establish equality as the first 
principle of justice. 
By abiding by the first principle, the people within the original position must now establish 
the equal distribution of goods and opportunities for public offices. But why should equality be 
the “end” of this society? If there are cases where certain inequalities make everyone better off in 
the long run, it would be counter-productive to nullify them on the basis of equality. This issue 
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cannot be resolved by stressing peoples’ natural predisposition to help others or consider their 
interests, as this information is omitted from the original position via the veil of ignorance. For the 
parties, acceptance of inequality is the acceptance of the relations in which men stand in the 
circumstances of justice. They have no ground for complaining about each other’s motives, for 
they are conceding the justice of these inequalities under the veil of ignorance. To search for a 
principle that will regulate these inequalities is to accept one that would view these inequalities 
from the standpoint of the least advantaged member of society; inequalities are consequently 
accepted when they maximize the long-term expectations of this least-fortunate member. But this 
does not determine which inequalities are accepted for the basic structure of society; as it currently 
stands, the first principle still forbids any exchange between liberties and economic benefits.  In 
this case, parties assume that their liberties will be preserved when gaining economic advantages: 
unless a suppression of liberties will protect liberty in the long run (a particular military draft, for 
instance), it is unacceptable to exchange liberties for things that are exterior to it. Thus, by agreeing 
to the serial order in the original position, parties know that they admit to the effective realization 
of equal liberties, regardless of (most) circumstances. Serial ordering is reasonable if it follows 
this method. 
While serial ordering is one of the foundations of the rational structure of argumentation in 
the original position, it is not its sole guarantee. On the contrary, some might want to argue in favor 
of certain principles in a more systematic manner. That can be done in a few ways. One way to do 
this would be to observe the outcomes of the principles of justice and then weigh them in 
comparison to the general precepts that lay behind the principles; the arguments that will follow 
such a comparison will be much more decisive, insofar as they treat directly with the temporal 
conditions underlying the process of justice. In order to better understand how this is achieved, we 
must first think of principles as maxi-min solutions for the problems of justice. The maximin rule 
ranks alternatives according to their worst possible outcomes, by which we are to adopt an 
alternative if its worse outcome is better than those of the others it is being weighed against. This 
is possible in the original position because one cannot be malevolent while under the veil of 
ignorance; for to be malevolent would require one to know more about himself and his society 
than the veil will allow. But the veil does not simply protect against anti-social dispositions such 
as malevolence. It also ensures that the parties can agree on a principle’s worst outcome in the first 
place; the worst outcome of the difference principle can be different if a liberal or conservative is 
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asked to identify it. Under these conditions, Rawls states that the maximin rule can be a good case 
for the principles of justice since it uses their features to the fullest possible degree; because of 
this, it is much easier to entertain these principles via philosophical argument. 
Through the use of a gain-and-loss table Rawls is able to better determine the results of the 
maximin method. Let us use the example of a game: we enter it alone, our choices do not determine 
who wins or loses and it does not require us to compete against anyone in order to win. Our points 
are scored depending on the choice of the ranked outcome of possible gains under certain 
circumstances of possible loss; gains and losses are represented in dollars. There are three 
decisions and each decision undergoes three separate circumstances. In the first circumstance of 
the first decision, we can lose 700$, but maybe gain 800$ under the second circumstance and gain 
another 1200$ under the third. In the second decision, we might lose 800$ under the first 
circumstance or maybe gain 700$ under the second circumstance and gain 1400$ under the third 
one. The third decision that the maximin rules requires is that the worst that can happen is to gain 
500, which is better than the losses in the other decisions. By adopting this choice of the maximin 
rule, we earn +500$ but under other circumstances might win 700$ and 800$. The maximin term 
means the maximum minimorum, and under the maximin rule we are meant to evaluate gains and 
losses on the basis of the lowest possible loss. 
For Rawls, the maximin rule is plausible due to its three main features. The first feature is 
that if each possible choice is re-coded as monetary gain, it would push each individual to think of 
a few scenarios based on the likelihood of certain common circumstances. In the light of these 
outcomes, we will then choose one in which the maximin rules applies to all of its circumstances, 
in the sense that under the worse circumstances it will still have the least-damaging outcome. This 
lowers the ambition of individuals who would choose principles that are disproportionate to reality; 
as we have previously mentioned, this method cannot be misused by malevolent individuals due 
to the epistemic limitations of the veil of ignorance. It would thus be irrational for parties to 
consider principles without first consideration their relation to their own interests, which in this 
case is to gain +500$; in the second one +600 but loosing -800$ and -700; and in the third gaining 
+800$ but loosing -1200$ and 1400$. Parties will consider it as rational to compute as many 
possibilities as they can and in every case select the one with the least-damaging negative outcome. 
The second feature of the maximin rule is it takes advantage of a particular disposition that we 
possess in relation to our own conceptions of the good: once we achieve this conception minimally, 
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we are given less incentive to expect anything above that established minimum. For if one were to 
risk this minimum in the attempt to attain a marginally better outcome and lose, they will always 
be losing more than what they were purported to gain. This minimum acts as a threshold; once 
passed, marginal benefits start to decline at a steady rate. This last provision alludes to the third 
feature of the maximin rule, which states that parties will not accept outcomes that they find 
intolerable. The choice of principles then becomes a matter of combinations: the maximin rule is 
working correctly when all three of these features are maximized. Rawls states that this rule does 
not apply gradually, nor is it self-evident; rather it is a rule that comes into its own in special 
circumstances. Its application depends upon the qualitative structure of the possible gains and 
losses in relation to one’s conception of the good, which is the background where choices are 
reasonably estimated. Furthermore, examples of the gain and losses are represented via a monetary 
amount instead of utility because utility itself derives its content from a particular conception of 
the good, which the parties are not aware of. It is for this reason that the parties cannot agree upon 
any principle unless it includes a minimal list of things that are accepted by everyone. This 
“minimal list” contains all primary goods and the parties will thus make their choices accordingly. 
Now, we must remember that parties in the original position are in a situation in which they do not 
know what kind of direction their society will take. Since they do not possess such information, 
parties might become weary towards the outcomes of the possible choices. While the game of 
monetary losses and gains is a suitable analogy for the maximin rule, Rawls is aware of the fact 
that these decisions will take place in much darker circumstances; in this sense, the consequences 
will be much graver. It is for this reason that Rawls formulates his two principles of justice with 
the problem of the minimum in mind; for while minimums have their value in the abstract, their 
value in reality is of a wholly different level of importance as it might determine the difference 
between historical cases of justice and injustice. With this in mind, Rawls writes “if we can 
maintain that these principles provide a workable theory of social justice, and that they are 
compatible with reasonable demands of efficiency, then this conception guarantees a satisfactory 
minimum” (Rawls, 1971, p. 156). This is why the parties will choose equal liberties and lexical 
ordering in the original position: they realize that these minimums ensure that, under a tradeoff 
between economic equality and personal liberty, the least amount of one will be traded for the 
other and vice-versa. It is for this reason that the parties will not want to jeopardize this rule, for if 
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they did, they might end up losing a lot more than they bargained for in the attainment of 
marginally better outcomes. 
Finally, the third feature states that conceptions of justice that are ignorant of this rule might 
lead to the establishment of institutions that the parties might find intolerable. For example, while 
utilitarian conceptions of justice might not lead directly to serfdom or slavery, they might lead to 
concessions between liberty and economic benefits that are totally unjust. While this method 
cannot entirely rule out conceptions of justice, Rawls states that this isn’t the goal; on the contrary, 
the point of this method is to show how a respect for minimums allows us to disqualify certain 
conceptions of justice that seemed to generally applicable. The maximin rule is not meant to 
determine the argument for Rawls’ two principles of justice, as they are too substantial to be treated 
solely via methodological principles. What the rule is supposed to do is clarify the rational structure 
in which these choices are debated on by providing a qualitative anatomy to the argumentation 
itself. 
This is not to say that the use of such a method is a form of “technical progress” in the 
neutral sense. On the contrary, it is contestable on moral grounds: “The objection is that since we 
are to maximize (subject to the usual constraints) the long-term prospects of the least advantaged, 
it seems that the justice of large increases or decreases in the expectations of the more advantaged 
may depend upon small changes in the prospects of those worst off” (Rawls, 1971, p. 157). While 
the most extreme disparities in wealth and income are allowed if the expectations of the least 
fortunate are raised in the slightest degree, the inequalities favoring the more advantaged are 
forbidden when those in the worst position lose by the slightest amount. In the most extreme case, 
the moral character of a million dollar gain (and in consequence, its legality) is predicated on 
whether it will increase or decrease the lot of the poor by a mere penny. This objection is analogous 
to the following difficulty with the maximin rule. In order to explain further, Rawls invites us to 
go back to the example of gain-and-loss tables: 
0    n 
1/n   1 
N represents all natural numbers. Even if for a smaller number it is reasonable to select the second 
row, there is surely another point later in the sequence where it is irrational not to choose the first 
row (which is contrary to the rule). We must remember that the difference principle is not intended 
to apply to such abstract possibilities. Furthermore, the problem of social justice is not the 
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quantitative allocation of a certain good, be it money, pleasure, property, etc. For expectations are 
not made of a substance that can be shuffled from one person to another in all possible 
combinations; their qualitative differences prevent this from being possible. The possibilities that 
the objection considers cannot arise in real cases; the feasible set is restricted to the point that these 
possibilities are excluded. For Rawls, the reason for this is because the principles of justice are 
connected to a single form of equal liberty, one which prevents such contingencies from occurring. 
As the expectations of the better off are improved, those of the worst off improve with them. The 
advantaged ones can spend in order to train and prepare those who are to come into the given 
society, and the latter can thus use their skills and talents to contribute to this society. The latter 
group is incentivized to do this because any mutual enterprise that they engage in will necessarily 
incur economic benefits, even if there is inequality at play. Social and economic equality is only 
meant to render equal whatever endowment, nature and skills are made unequal when they are 
exchanged. A combination of unequal differences that is shared equally among each individual 
would not only be just, but also advantageous for everyone. 
The difference principle presupposes a certain theory of social institutions. Rawls accords 
more detail to this in chapter V of “A Theory of Justice”. In particular, it relies on the idea that in 
a competitive economy, with or without private ownership of the means of production, excessive 
inequalities will not be the rule. What must be stressed at this point is that Rawls sees no problem 
in basing the formulation of these principles of generally accepted facts in economics and 
psychology. This might sound like a contradiction, as parties in the original position are not 
supposed to possess such general facts about the society they live in; this is because the use of such 
facts in the formulation process would make the principles relative to these very facts. For instance, 
Rawls has repeatedly stated that utilitarianism can allow for certain forms of slavery and serfdom: 
whether the existence of these institutions is justified depends on whether the calculations behind 
them yield a higher balance of happiness. The utilitarians will defend this by stating that such 
calculations are a fundamental aspect of human nature, and such, if the institutions are justified by 
such calculations, it is because they conform to our nature (to a certain degree). This goes to show 
that even utilitarians have a standard set of assumptions that underpin their claims of equality and 
liberty: for example, each person has equal utility which can function in the diminishing of 
marginal utility. Let’s say that there is a fixed amount of income that must be shared equally, and 
after being shared equally between those who have accumulated a lot of after a certain amount of 
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time, it can then be transferred to those who have less of it. Rawls has nothing against such a 
procedure, provided that the assumptions are sound and based on the principles of justice. But 
unfortunately, it is very possible that they may not. We must keep in mind that the parties in the 
original position do not have to choose principles that will regulate their social and economic 
assumptions; instead, they must choose principles that will regulate cooperation within the 
capacities of their knowledge under conditions of their veil of ignorance. The parties do not have 
the capacity to know the principles and assumptions of other parties, and they themselves know 
nothing more than the content of the first principle of justice: equal liberty. 
So far, we can see what arguments enable Rawls to solve the problem of rational choice in 
regard to the formulation of the principles of justice. If all things are to be considered, the parties 
will select advantages which have better long-term outcomes than any other possible choice. We 
are not sure whether the choice reached in this way will represent the voice of each member in a 
unanimous fashion. For Nozick, Rawls’ confidence in his own arguments about the choice of 
principles and his assurance in the arguments’ accuracy speak more of the gaps in Rawls’ reasoning 
more than anything else. Nozick uses the same arguments as Rawls, in the sense that he too will 
enter the original position as it was intended by the latter; despite this, he will not arrive at the 
same principles that Rawls’ has. I do not think that it must be a matter of who we trust more. On 
the contrary, what matters for both thinkers is the question of cooperation; they simply order their 
priorities in a different fashion. Despite Rawls’s arguments in favor of fairness represented as duty 
and obligation, Nozick’s arguments are unfolded in favor of individual rights. Nozick thinks that 
Rawls mistake consist in the fact that he was trying to install end-result principles as entities that 
can be derived from a historical tradition; what he did not realize is the fact that freedom is a 
condition in which its bearer is burdened by the lowest possible amount of constraints. In this 
sense, Rawls’ conception of justice not only does a disservice to free individuals, but to freedom 
itself; it limits freedom as a whole, and this for Nozick is unjust. 
 
3.5 Principles of Justice as End-Result Principles and Nozick’s Attempt at Formulating them 
Himself 
 
Nozick’s problem with Rawls’ attempt at formulating such principles is that it assumes that 
the principles selected by the least-privileged members of society will be fair. Nozick asks us to 
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imagine a pie that no one has a claim to the pie itself or any of its infinitesimal portions but also 
requires unanimous agreement on how it is to be divided. Let’s imagine that an equal distribution 
of its portions was agreed upon in a fair manner. “Now imagine if the size of the pie were not fixed, 
and that its claimants came to the realization that such a distribution would make the size of the 
pie smaller; they might well agree to an unequal distribution which also raises the size of the pie 
(and thus, even its smallest portion)” (Nozick, 1974, p. 198). But doesn’t this raise questions about 
differential claims on parts of the pie? Or rather, who would be the one to make the pie larger if 
given a larger share, but not if given an equal share under the scheme of equal distribution? 
Incentives are to be given to someone, but they must also be bonuses that take the form of long-
term returns. If the pie were to be a good that no one was originally entitled to, it was as if it fell 
from the sky. But if it did, things like entitlements or freedom would be meaningless, as they are 
relative to things that have no original claimant. The problem with Rawls' reasoning is that the 
latter seems to treat goods that have been produced (and thus given value by a specific producer) 
as goods that have simply fallen from the sky; in this sense, it is easy for Rawls to talk about these 
goods as a single pie to be split, despite the fact that the value of its slices have been determined 
by specific actors, way before it was ever to be split in the first place. By agreeing to split the pie 
in equal ways, Rawls is engaging in a form of distribution that would have made the pie much 
smaller in the first place; this problem is present precisely because Rawls' reasoning considers the 
value of the pie “as it is”, and not “as it has come to be”.   
As we can see, this is a procedure that takes place between people who have found their 
guiding principles within their rationality, but do not have access to much empirical content outside 
of rationality itself; their rationality guarantees that the principles found within it will be 
transformed into fundamental principles for the regulation of major social institutions. While 
Nozick does consider that historical principles of justice might have been erected in order to protect 
the innocent from being punished, he questions whether Rawls' method can arrive at principles of 
justice that are not merely historical, but applicable to future generations as well. In other words, 
Nozick's question is whether such a procedure will always arrive at the same conclusions; as we've 
seen in the example of the pie, the veil of ignorance seems to enforce a certain outcome insofar as 
it prevents the actors from knowing who contributed more to its overall size. The problem is that 
such a procedure might enforce certain principles of justice that are indeed historically contingent 
because the actors' lack of historical knowledge makes us assume that they selected the principles 
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of a basis of pure reason; in consequence, what is necessary for justice is actually contingent, and 
it is Rawls' very own procedure that gives us this impression. 
Let us put this another way, with help from another one of Nozick's examples. Suppose 
that there is a group of students who have studied for a year, taken an examination and, 
unbeknownst to them, received grades between 0 and 100. Still having no idea of their own grades, 
they are gathered together and they are asked by their instructors to put together all the grades in 
order to make a total sum. First, let us suppose that they are to decide on a particular distribution 
of grades, and thus, they are to give a particular grade to everyone that is present in the meeting 
(including themselves). In order to restrict conflict and unequal shares, Rawls' reasoning would 
lead to an agreement between students in which each one is given the average grade. Yet Nozick 
is not convinced: he believes that this particular distribution will still not be agreed upon, even by 
those who did poorly (Nozick, 1974, p. 199). This is because being given the average grade doesn't 
actually help the poor-performing student in any way, as it misrepresents his weaknesses to the 
point that the instructor no longer has a proper idea of how he's progressing. While Rawls' 
reasoning avoids conflict, it is not in tune with the reality of the actual situation. 
Let's give this problem of distribution a closer look, now by assuming that the students are 
to discuss the principles that are to regulate how the grades are distributed. Despite the fact that 
multiple principles can be chosen, we can see that Nozick thinks that the equality principle doesn't 
stand much of a chance in this case. And if it turned out that the sum total of the grades did differ 
than the total that they were divided from originally, and if they decide to divide them according 
to the ability of each student, then the principle of distributing grades so as to maximize the lowest 
grades might seem like a plausible choice. But would these students agree to the historical 
principles of distribution had they been given the grades by a qualified and impartial observer? “If 
people knew the particular distribution that would be yielded by this historical principle, they 
would not necessarily agree to it” (Nozick, 1974, p. 200) for the sum total of grades might be less, 
now that the stronger students are only incentivized to get the average grade. This would return us 
to the previous phase of choosing grade distribution, and we have seen Nozick’s reason for why 
they will not choose an entitlement distribution. But if people do not know the particular 
distribution yielded by this historical principle, they cannot be led to select this principle either; 
furthermore, they cannot simply choose it because it looks fair or just, for even the original position 
does not allow such a practice. On the contrary, says Nozick: it forces each member to calculate 
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themselves whether this historical principle will maximize their interests. Maybe each person 
would try to find a way that would assign more goods to someone in a similar position, and in 
consequence, themselves. It is for this reason that it might be unlikely that each person’s 
calculations would lead to the historical-entitlement principle before any other principle based in 
personal preference. If we consider a reversed-version of the entitlement principle, in which the 
most entitled give to the least entitled (and the 2nd most to the 2nd least, etc), it seem just as likely 
to be selected as the original entitlement principle, as there is no calculation that can give priority 
to one over the other. Thus, Nozick’s retort is founded on the assumption that there is a 
disconnection between the calculating abilities of those in the original position and that which is 
to be calculated. This assumption is not wrong; for calculation requires content to be calculated, 
and the veil of ignorance has hindered our access to such content. Nozick thinks that the difficulties 
that people face when deciding upon principles of justice are sufficient enough to show that people 
in the original position will be limited to make a choice of final and fundamental (end-state) 
principles of distribution. The self-interested person evaluates every non-end-state principle based 
on the way it works out for him; these calculations consequently based on how they will end up 
under a chosen principle. It is here that an actor might consider the labor they have already sunk 
into their endeavors, and the labor that they will have to do in the future. The occupant of the 
original position will then have to calculate possibilities under a certain distribution by comparing 
it to their position under another probable distribution. For Nozick, what is important is that the 
point would remain the same even if they use some other decision or rule (of the sort discussed by 
decision theorists: it will change nothing. The only role that the principle plays in these calculations 
is that of generating a distribution of goods or a probability of such distributions; principles are 
thus compared on the basis of what alternative distributions they respectively generate. Each self-
interested person will make a choice among alternative end-state distributions, and for this reason 
principles (in general) exit the picture (Nozick, 1974, p. 202). What each of them choose cannot 
become a general and fundamental principle of justice that is valid for all. But the logic of Rawls' 
original position says something else: people either directly agree to an end-state distribution or 
they agree to a principle; and if they agree to a principle, they do it only on the basis of 
considerations about end-state distributions. So the principles that they can all converge in agreeing 
upon are fundamental and must be about an end-state. But can the original position actually allow 
for the production of such a principle? Nozick's answer is no: The original position fails to yield 
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principles of justice that would become historical in the context of a given society. The reason why 
it fails is that it does not reach unanimous convention regarding the selected principles, and instead 
allows only for the possibly of generating principles of a similar nature: the serially-ordered dual 
principle structure of Rawls' theory of justice. Neither the original position nor the veil of 
ignorance allow for questions regarding the nature of principles; due to this, they do not offer 
sufficient space to think of principles other than those that Rawls presents. The original position 
and the veil of ignorance should not be employed as elements that lead us towards the formulation 
of end-state principles: they should instead convince us that the two principle of justice are those 
ones that cannot become end-state principles.     
 
3.6 The Reasoning Leading to the Principle of Average Utility (Theory of Justice, § 27). 
 
In this section, Rawls examines the principles of classic and average utility by testing them 
as if they were chosen in an original position similar to his own. It is in the nature of contract 
theory to have distinct principles, which in some way or another coincide with the reality of our 
daily lives. Applied to the basic structure of society, classical utility requires that institutions be 
arranged to maximize the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the actors within. This sum 
is arrived at by weighting each expectation by the number of persons in the corresponding position 
and then adding them together:  and so, ceteris paribus, when the number of population doubles 
the total utility be two times greater. In the utilitarian view, expectations can be measured and 
foreseen; unlike the principles of justice, they are not indexical of primary goods. Now the 
principle of average utility directs society towards the maximization of the average amount of 
utility instead of the total amount: this model was used by Mill and Wickssell, and has served as 
the basis to modern utilitarian theories ever since. So, to apply this principle to the basic structure 
of society implies that we are to set up institutions so as to maximize the percentage-weighed sum 
of the expectations of the representative men of the society. In order to compute this, Rawls 
multiplies the expectations of representative men by the fraction of the “pie” which they represent. 
For Rawls, it is not true that, ceteris paribus, when society doubles in number, its utility will also 
double. As the population doubles, the fraction that each member represents is the same, as the 
size of the pie doubles with its number of members. So which of these principles would be favored 
in the original position, wonders Rawls? The thing is that both principles (classical and average) 
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send us in the same direction when the size of the population is constant. But when the population 
changes, Rawls claims that there is a difference. The classical principle requires that the size of 
one's family and age of marriage is weighed in relation to the total sum of utility. For the principle 
of average utility on the other hand, these factors plateau and eventually fall when the size of the 
population is too high, as increased population does not necessarily coincide with increased utility 
for the average person; a decline in per capita shares due to population increase is only remedied 
if the productive capacity of each new member is equal to or above the productivity of the average 
member. In Rawls' mind, the members inside the original position would thus favor the principle 
of average utility over that of classical utility. The two principles would be equivalent only if it is 
supposed that the average well-being always falls sufficiently fast, so that there is no serious 
conflict between both; in this sense, the combination of both principles leads to a “race to the 
bottom” in the production of wealth. But from the stand point of the people in the original position, 
it would appear more rational to agree to some sort of floor that prevents such a race to the bottom 
from occurring. “Since the parties aim to advance their own interests, they have no desire in any 
event to maximize the sum total of satisfaction” (Rawls, 1971, p. 163). It is for this reason that 
Rawls assumes that a plausible utilitarian alternative to the two principles of justice is the average 
principle instead of the classical one. 
Rawls’s interest consists in knowing how parties might arrive at such an average principle. 
For instance, he considers what would happen if the principle of average utility was presented as 
the only possible foundation for a contract. For example, imagine if we were presented a fixed 
number of societies to which we can join, depending to our preference; each of them would 
regulate their distribution equally since natural resources and talents are already equally 
distributed. Despite this, each society has different policies. It would now be easier for parties to 
decide which society to enter once they have established their ends within such a society; they will 
thus choose a society based on a maximization of such prospects. While they would not be privy 
to this information in the original position, Rawls is willing to let such a special case occur for the 
sake of the example. Let us now alter this case incrementally, so that it increasingly resembles that 
of someone in the original position. To do this, let us first suppose that the hypothetical “chooser” 
is unsure about what role her talents will play in a given society. If she assumes that her preferences 
are the same as everyone else, she may decide by trying to maximize her expected well-being. She 
computes her prospects in a given society by taking the alternative utilities of others as 
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representative of her own. She chooses the society offering the highest or the best prospect. 
However, let's now assume that the hypothetical chooser knows nothing about either her abilities 
or the place she is likely to hold in each society (it is assumed that her preferences are the same as 
the people in these societies). If we suppose that she reasons along probabilistic lines, she will 
come to the conclusion that she has an equal chance of becoming any individual in that society. In 
this case, her prospects are still identical with the average utility of each society. These 
modifications have at last brought his expected gains for each society in line with its average 
welfare. 
So far, Rawls assumes that all individuals have similar preferences whether they join the 
same society or not. But if we drop this assumption (which Rawls does for the purpose of the 
argument), we move to an initial position where nothing is known about the particular preferences 
of the members of these societies. The veil of ignorance is now complete. But one may imagine 
that there will always be at least one newcomer in the process. Once again, this newcomer's 
prospects are highest in the society with the greatest average utility. If members are to compare 
their utility and if they cannot compute all possibilities, what would happen if they chose any of 
the possible principles? It would then lead naturally to an average principle. By choosing it, the 
parties maximize their expected well-being (from this point of view); again, the principle of 
average utility is selected over the classical one. The principle of average utility is not like the 
classical one, insofar as it is not a teleological doctrine, but rather a moral theory that aspires 
towards a Good in order to make a Right, and for this reason the maximization of maximization is 
extended to contract theory. 
The concept of average utility may be chosen in the original position just as well as the two 
principles of justice; for Rawls, both types of principles seem to function under the constraints of 
the veil of ignorance. For if one does not know their own conception of the good, they might tend 
towards using average utility as a guiding principle; as no one knows of this, they are encouraged 
to employ criteria that applies to everyone equally. In this case, both average utility and the 
principles of justice possess this equality. Either way, parties head towards the principle of average 
utility, even while on their way towards the principles of justice. But this no longer happens once 
the principles of justice are chosen, for parties in the original position accept the priority of justice 
over the bargaining of social and economic benefits; since these principles distribute primary 
goods such as rights and liberties, they can no longer be bargained for in exchange for economic 
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benefits. The utilitarian principle accepts such bargaining, as these primary goods are viewed as 
means towards the end of utility maximization. 
Yet in spite of Rawls' rationalization, his theory still encounters problems which originate 
from “outside”, which consists of reality and the historical tradition in which Rawls' “encounter” 
with the former occurs in: they concern the real manifestations of a Social Contract in the rules 
and habits that have determined historical forms of social cooperation, such as labor. While Rawls' 
method of constraining the formulation and refutation of principles of justice to a procedure gives 
us the impression that his conclusions are safe from being determined by arbitrary or contingent 
matters, it is hard to determine whether the impression corresponds to reality or not. Rawls has 
criticized for this because the procedural approach ascribes a certain rationality to the choices of 
principles that it presents, but does not fully justify why one should be abiding by such a rationality 
in the first place: in other words, the rationality behind the choice of principles might effectively 
obscure the rationality of the world in which the theory will operate. For to think in the way that 
Rawls expects us to think is not a given, and in this sense, neither are the principles that are 
submitted to the procedure itself. And if this is the case, then the procedure might not be fully 
adapted to possibilities of testing other sorts of principles. For example, the maximin principle and 
lexical ordering are procedural mechanisms that are meant to test certain types of principles, 
regardless of whether the members of such a procedure will actually formulate the principles in 
that way or not. By means of negation, the priority of the principles is no longer rational, but 
arbitrary: Its imposition of a certain form of public reasoning on a given society is proof of the 
arbitrariness behind the theory's purported rationality, insofar as it cannot totally adapt to the 
contingencies that constitute the content of numerous historical forms of social contract. The 
particularities that underlie Rawlsian rationality become increasingly apparent when viewed from 
this angle, and this is because the reasons that Rawls provides for the two principles are based on 
a negation of the logic that underpins traditional conceptions of morality in justice, as he attempts 
to guarantee the most amount of freedom via the least amount of original possibilities. In other 
words, he initially limits the possible principles of justice that even be “processed” by his 
procedure, and then selects a principle by formulating it in relation to the failures of the others. 
But if the principle is erected in negation to large failures instead of more precise ones, then the 
selected principle will have a hard time corresponding to the particular realities that it will 
inevitably encounter. In consequence, Rawls' principles might never solve their respective 
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problems, as the problems themselves were never adequately formulated in the first place. Rawls 
is aware of the fact that his principles don't need to even be considered in a particular case unless 
they are have been established on a universal grounding: it is for this exact reason that Rawls 
returns to the idea of the social contract. But after what we have just seen, we must now ask whether 
his particular contract is arbitrary or not. In the end, Rawls' attempt to purge his principles of 
contingency might have had the inverse effect: his theory might now be contingent, and this is 
worsened by the fact that it cannot accurately assess whether it is or not. 
But here is a second problem that Rawls’ theory can't overcome when it comes to rooted 
habits in the making of choices. No matter how brilliantly the rules of cooperation are presented, 
there will always be some that are no longer familiar to us as “rules”, but as habits. While rules 
provide a visible constraint on the choice of principles, the effects of habits are effectively ignored 
by Rawls. For Nozick, these habits are important and in consequence, must not be ignored: if we 
do, we might ascribe the inability to choose particular principles as rule-based instead of being 
constrained by habits. In a case like this, habits might prevent the rules from determining a certain 
outcome, leading actors to assume that the impossibility of the outcome was necessary within the 
framework of their respective procedures. As well as the one sketched above, this dilemma is 
important to consider insofar as it concerns the space in which a procedure can be effectively 
construed. As this space is the original position, we can affirm that problems such as these 













4. Equal Liberty 
 
4.1 The Four-Stage Sequence 
 
For Rawls, it is important to show how the two principles of justice can be applied: the 
importance of this was underlined above, as the problem of properly applying the principles might 
send us back to re-structuring the original position itself. To demonstrate how such principles will 
be applied, Rawls will schematize them as they apply before the final formulation of just 
institutions: this entire process is undertaken in 4 stages. In the previous chapter, we saw the 
argument that underlines the choice of the two principles of justice instead of the conceptions of 
classical and average utility and also Nozick’s arguments in consisting his critique of original 
position and how it fails to produce historical end principles. Now will see through another 
Nozick’s argument that such a Rawls’ theory that is not provable and workable in micro-situations 
isn’t ether in macro-situations. Why isn’t provable Rawls theory, we will have chance to see when 
Nozick questions grounding of the reasoning for institutions in the second section of this chapter.        
At this moment, we consider that the parties inside the original position have chosen the two 
principles of justice and are well on their way to crafting institutions that represent such principles. 
Furthermore, in the second chapter we presented the distinction between both of these principles: 
while the first principle applies to individuals, the second principle applies to institutions. In these 
chapters, the underlying arguments were abstract insofar as they applied to individuals who were 
debating in a hypothetical situation; in the following chapters, we will rather be concerned with 
the application of such principles in the constitution of a basic social structure. While it is evident 
that the veil of ignorance prevents actors from knowing about anything which might determine 
their position in society, they gain knowledge of social and economic facts when they enter society 
with the goal of tailoring institutions to the principles that were agreed upon under the veil of 
ignorance. This newly-gained information is necessary for the tailoring of institutions; and even if 
such new knowledge cannot be of much assistance, it is also possible for the actors in question to 
look back to the past for wisdom that they might still serve them. When parties are agreeing on a 
contract, they must look back at the basic structure of society in order to ground the contract on 
something tangible; after this is done, the basic contract will preserve this structure as a necessary 
component in the procedure of justice. We must remember that at the current moment, we know 
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of what is just, true and right; we do not know if such things constitute a Good, as this is not yet 
up to the parties to figure out.  For instance, we might select other principles of justice based on 
this knowledge and they might turn out to be different than Rawls' two principles; what matters is 
that we can now mobilize such knowledge in the constitution of concrete institutions instead of 
abstract agreements. 
The evaluation the principles of justice and their possible outcomes takes place only later 
in Rawls' theory of justice; at the moment, parties are only considered with rightful and just 
cooperation. They do not know any more at this point. Because of this, the first thing they must 
decide is whether social and institutional policies are just. The parties can also know that their 
opinion may not always coincide with the opinion of others, since their judgments and beliefs may 
differ under certain circumstances (such as those where there interests are involved). Afterwards, 
Rawls views the political process as a machine that produces political decisions in relation to the 
content that serves as its input; in consequence, citizens can determine whether certain procedures 
for building such a machine are more just than others. The goal of the system of justice is no mere 
policy assessment, but also the selection of the ranking procedures that us know which political 
propositions can be actually enacted into laws. After this comes the third decision, which pertains 
to the selection of the procedure through which such a system of justice will be established. As 
political systems are imperfect, the parties must learn when to comply with the rules enacted by 
the majority and when to refuse them when they are no longer binding. In other words, they must 
be able to simultaneously determine the grounds and limits of political duties and obligations. A 
theory of justice that deals with these three kinds of questions must employ a multi-staged 
sequence in order to answer them. 
As we have seen, the deliberations inside the original position consist of the first stage of 
the process: once the principles are chosen in the original position, the parties must then return to 
their place in society and henceforth judge their claims based on these very principles. But if 
certain intermediate sequences are combined into a definite sequence, the latter may help us sort 
out some of the complications that we will face, as each stage represents a certain angle from which 
certain questions of justice are considered. Rawls takes the idea of a four-stage sequence from the 
United States Constitution and its corresponding history; he interprets this history along lines 
similar to those of K.J Arrow, 1951 in “Social Choice and Individual Values”. The second step in 
such a procedure is thus the move towards a constitution convention: the parties that decide upon 
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the justice of political forms and a constitution are the sole delegates and representatives of such 
an agreed convention. Under the principles of justice, the involved parties are obliged to design a 
system for the constitutional powers of the government and the basic rights of citizens. Rawls 
claims that it is at this stage where the principles of justice are weighed in contrast to the 
multiplicity of political views found in the given society. As we can see, the parties’ agreement 
upon the appropriate conception of justice signals that the veil of ignorance has been partially 
lifted. As Rawls has stated several times before, the parties in this particular position are shielded 
from particular information about individuals in society: they do not know what place each of these 
individuals take in society, the place they take in the distribution of natural attributes, or what 
constitutes their conception of the good. In this stage on the other hand, parties are now privy to 
certain facts, such as the society’s natural resources and geographic circumstances, its economic 
conditions, political culture and so on. Given that there are now known facts about their social and 
economic circumstances, the parties are to choose the most just and effective constitution which 
satisfies the principles of justice; furthermore, they must base practical considerations such as 
utilitarian calculation on these very principles. According to Rawls, a just constitution is a just 
procedure that assures a just outcome. The procedure will be a political process governed by the 
constitution, and the outcome of this process will be the establishment of legislation; afterwards, 
it is up to the coherence between procedure and principles to judge the outcomes in a just and 
effective way. But in order to pursue the ideal of a just procedure, we must first design it. A just 
procedure must incorporate the liberties of equal citizenship into its constitution and use the latter 
to protect them. According to Rawls, the included liberties must be ones like liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought, free movement and the right to political participation. The political system 
- which Rawls assumes to be some sort of the constitutional democracy - would not be just if it did 
not embody and preserve these very liberties. 
It is important to remember that a feasible procedure can still yield an unjust outcome. 
Even Rawls is well aware of the fact that there is nothing that totally guarantees such an outcome 
will not be produced; for him, it would be madness to assume otherwise. The best we can expect 
is imperfection, which is ironically what procedural justice is meant to remedy in the first place; 
while it can assure that unjust outcomes are not arrived at arbitrarily, its structure is not meant to 
protect us against every possible unjust outcome. This is because different forms of procedural 
justice employ different principles, just as principles of equality or utility. For Rawls, this is the 
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main problem with Bentham’s attempt at identifying artificial interest: a just procedure must yield 
a just outcome, and for this to be possible it must thus be based on principles of justice instead of 
utility. 
Rawls thinks that the two principles of justice are sufficient enough to lead us to a just 
constitution with an independent standard of the desired outcome. If such a standard is not arrived 
at, the question of the constitution has not been posed in proper fashion; if it were, we would be 
able to tailor the application of the principles of justice to many of the newly discovered political 
possibilities that are discovered by the actors once they leave the original position.  We are now at 
the moment where the actors transition from the first stage to the second: proposed bills are judged 
from the position of a legislator who does not know the particularities about herself and must 
consequently rely on the principles of justice as her criteria. Shifting between these stages of the 
constitutional convention in order to tailor such a constitution to the established principles is 
Rawls’ procedure for assuring that we will at least go in the direction of a just constitution. 
Now whether this legislation is just or unjust in its confrontation with various social policies is a 
matter of opinion. These options are generally based on “lieux communs” within social theory and 
political philosophy and as such, they might have the ground to assert that the legislation in 
question is just or unjust. Rawls remedies this problem by establishing the difference principle: 
because it is deduced from the principle of equality, the latter must also be invalidated if one 
wanted to dismantle the former. And since the violation of the first principle is in almost all cases 
an injustice onto itself, it is hard to find a way of dismantling such a duo simultaneously. When 
these principles are violated, the impact of such a violation can be noticed in public and be 
consequently brought to the attention of major institutions. But this case is quite rare, considering 
that economic and social arrangements are based on the difference principle itself.   
After this stage, Rawls envisions that a division of labor will take place, as particular 
questions of justice will be posed by concerned actors. For him, this division of labor is in 
accordance with the basic structure of society under the guidance of the two principles of justice. 
The first principle corresponds to the convention of the constitution and it requires that liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought be protected in order for the whole political process to become 
a just procedure. In this way, the constitution assures the common status of equal citizenship and 
in consequence realizes political justice. As we have previously noted, it is when the second 
principle comes into play that legislation itself is discussed; the questions that appear in this case 
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are different than the ones that appear in the former, thus requiring different actors to pose and 
resolve them. In this sense, the priority of the equality principle of the difference principle mirrors 
the priority of the constitutional convention (and the constitution that it produces) over the 
legislature itself; in both cases, the latter must always be justified in relation to the former. 
In the last stages, the outcomes of legislative action is then applied by judges and 
subsequently “distributed” to the citizenry. Rawls reminds us that in this stage, all facts are known 
and nothing remains under the veil of ignorance since the rules have now been accepted by the 
parties and applied in the virtue of their particular circumstances and moral characteristics. We 
must remember that the ground and limits of political duty are not set in this stage, but in the 
original position; if it wasn’t, the knowledge that one gains while exiting the veil of ignorance will 
necessary influence the establishment of such conditions. Once the trajectory underlying the choice 
of such principles has been established in the original position, the full weight of the constitution 
can be felt:  its disappearance would now be noticed, the logic of such a trajectory is the same one 
that underpins basic social institutions. The availability of knowledge in this fourth stage-sequence 
is compounded upon the facts about principles of justice that are known in the first, then the general 
social facts known in the second (such as economy, environment, etc) and finally the facts about 
particular individuals that are discovered in the third stage. In sum, limitations on knowledge are 
relaxed once principles are chosen and further elaborated. In each stage is gathered only the 
minimum amount of information required to guide actors in their particular task: any knowledge 
that is likely to give rise to biases which will hinder cooperation is immediately ruled out by Rawls. 
For him, the only admissible knowledge is that which contributes to rational choices and their 
impartial application. As we can now see, this compounding implies that the last stage is the only 
one in which actors are totally free from the epistemic constraints of the veil of ignorance.   
This four-stage sequence is only a procedure in relation to the theory that underpins it; in 
other words, it is not a procedure that the constitutional convention will follow.  Each stage deals 
with particular questions of justice and these are two parts of the basic structure. The first part 
shows how JF judges the constitution in the light of the first principle and social institutions in the 
light of the second. No matter what nature these theories possess or in what direction they lead the 
parties in question, JF must consider these four stages in order to come to a constitutional point.  
Furthermore, all of these conceptions of justice are dressed according to JF. After the arguments 
underpinning the establishment of the basic institutional structure are given, we can then clearly 
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establish a constitutional convention during the first part and a proper legislature and legislation 
in the second. Enacted laws will be part of the entire procedure of justice, and thus must come at 
the end in the form of the procedure’s outcomes. Such a result is not a defect of the theory of 
justice, but rather one of the main expectations regarding it. 
 
4.2 Nozick’s Disagreement with the Theory of Justice as Fairness: The Grounding of 
Sustainable Justice 
 
In the previous section we saw Rawls’ reasons that underlie the grounding of his principles 
of justice and their eventual establishment via the progressive transformation of social institutions 
(the four-staged sequence). In this section, we will examine Nozick’s disagreements which this 
procedure of justice as well as its fundamental principles. We can see from Nozick’s earlier 
objections that he is concerned with the possibility of even formulating entitlement principles. This 
then ties to what we saw earlier, namely the fact that Rawls’ procedure applies to the macro-
structure of society, so that counter-examples emanating from the micro-structure cannot be 
accounted for. In Nozick’s view, JF has nothing to do with justice; on the contrary, it is unfair and 
would thus be chosen by no one inside of the original position (Nozick, 1974, p. 204). There are a 
lot of counterexamples that can be used to show how defective the difference principle actually is,  
but Rawls does not claim that the principle is supposed to be applied everywhere. In reality, it is 
to be applied only to the basic structure of the society. But how can we ensure this, asks Nozick: 
how can we make it sure it doesn’t apply to anything else? Maybe we cannot focus on 
macrostructure as Rawls suggests: for Nozick, our aim is to come to the point of “reflective 
equilibrium” in the same ways as Rawls does, except that the thought experiments in which these 
principles are tested occur in micro-situations instead of macro-events. In other words, if a 
principle cannot hold in a micro-situation, then it cannot be universally applicable. As Nozick 
deems principles are correct when they are universally applicable, this will lead Nozick to 
automatically reject Rawls’ principles of justice. For Nozick, Rawls proceeds as though distinct 
principles apply in their respective macro and micro-situations, as the “basic structures” and 
political conditions of these situations require specific principles in the first place. Nozick simply 
asks: how come these principles are all meant to apply to the macro-structure, and not anything 
else? Someone might simply think that the totality of justice is what matters, while the parts that 
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constitute it do not make such a difference unless they are directly related to the logic of this 
totality. But can we reach the totality of justice if its individual parts will never all be just at the 
same time, and for the same reasons? We must remember that something cannot be expected to be 
just simply because it appeals to the macro-structure of society. It is for this reason that Nozick 
thinks “it is disadvantageous to only focus on the intuitive justice […] of complex wholes” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 205). Wholes like this are hard to be grasped in their totality; it is thus extremely 
difficult to keep track of everything that is occurring within such a whole. With this in mind, the 
goal is to point towards macro changes through these micro-situations and observe how they 
interact with the macro-side of things afterwards. If this becomes the case, then one should not 
depend upon judgments that anticipate the whole as a large pool of data that one uses to test their 
principles against. This is because Nozick thinks that the macro side can always be affected by the 
micro side, as all it takes is the outcome of a particular situation to go against the logic which 
regulates the whole. In this sense, Rawls’ exclusion of macro-situations from the constitution of 
principles is seen by Nozick as an attempt to preemptively protect his macro-oriented principles 
from their inherent weakness. 
Rawls does not accept any theory of entitlements, as he does not want to regulate relations 
on the basis of simple exchange; on the contrary, he concentrates on principles that aim for 
something that is beyond what constitutes justice between two men. For Rawls, it is thus important 
to apply principles in the basic structure of society by neglecting the possibility of certain 
contingent facts (such as the difference principle’s outcome in a society which abides by the natural 
distribution of natural talents). In other words, Rawls’ desire to see the difference principle 
maximize the plight of the worst-off forced him to neglect certain possible outcomes; for example, 
the possible outcome in a country which re-distributes organs via utilitarian calculation instead of 
a chronologically-structured waiting list. While Nozick agrees that bringing such cases to light 
may be a bit hysterical, Rawls’ neglect forces us to do so, insofar as it is very possible that one of 
these contingent situations topples the universal justification for the difference principle. We don’t 
care whether these types of situations will occur or not; we are simply concerned with Rawls’ 
reasons for rejecting such possibilities in the constitution of his principles of justice. For instance, 
what if people are to choose different principles? Or conversely, what aspects of the basic 
institutional structure determine which laws will be applied? In sum, what guarantees that this 
procedure in its entirety will actually lead to a just outcome? The possibility of a refutation of 
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Rawls’ principles which stems from the micro side of things is enough to warrant us to ask such 
questions, insofar as we must see in what way the macro-structure will take micro-based problems 
into account. 
For Nozick, this weakness stems from the lack of proper connectivity between Rawls’ 
principles of justice, for he believes that the conclusion of the first principle is wholly different 
than the conclusion of the second. The question is: how do we get from one to the other in the first 
place? How does the deduction occur? Rawls might explain how it happens in the abstract, but 
never actually gives examples to answer such questions. For Nozick, the problem is that Rawls 
does not deduce them at all; in this sense, he doesn’t explain their deductive origin either (Nozick, 
1974, p. 207). This means that the equality principle is established on arbitrary grounds and its 
subsequent principle is not as tightly connected to it as Rawls would make us believe. According 
to Rawls on the other hand, this has nothing to do with deduction and instead has everything to do 
with the ordering of such principles, which is not the same. Rawls has a scale for which P is true, 
and in this scale, any possible outcome is P. For Nozick, this scale will always give a different 
result, as the outcome of P can only be produced by P itself; in this sense, not all the possible 
outcomes are P, which then allow for different results to be produced. Nozick believes that Rawls 
was aware of this, and “it is mainly for that reason that the [latter] turned to contract theory,” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 208) as he knew it would be the only way to save his own theory. For Nozick, 
the only thing that props up the difference principle is the contract itself; if it weren’t for the 
contract, its lack of connection to the equality principle would force us to abandon it in search of 
something else. Nozick believes that utilitarianism also suffered from this problem, as it could not 
properly distinguish between its principles and the ends of the state. The problem is that the both 
theories do not apply principles for the sake of the principles themselves; in other words, instead 
of applying principles because they are ends-in-themselves, they applied principles that will serve 
these ends. Nozick asks if these principles could serve themselves without stepping over 
themselves at the same time: he concludes that they cannot, as they are not end-principles. 
The difference principle simultaneously acts “as an organic and patterned end-principle at 
the same time;” (Nozick, 1974, p. 209) this is a flaw, as Nozick doesn’t believe that there are 
patterned end-state principles in the first place. It is organic because it tries to distribute something 
that will improve the lives of the worse-off. But it cannot become an end-state principle, as its aim 
is to simply keep distributing without having anything to do with the ends of the worse-off. To 
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better understand, Nozick asks us to imagine that this principle will distribute things in the same 
way even if certain members within society are removed as it is operating. It will continue to do 
the same job; it will distribute shares similarly to those that no longer exist. But wouldn’t this 
distribution pattern change if some of the more well-off members are removed from society? The 
fact that Rawls provides no answer to this worries Nozick, as it implies that the distribution pattern 
will not actually benefit the least well off when the overall population pattern is modified. 
 
4.3 The Concept of Liberty (Theory of Justice, § 32). 
 
In this section, Rawls clarifies the conception of liberty that he employs in the formulation 
of his theory of justice by comparing it to established conceptions of liberty, such as the commonly-
held negative and positive variations of the concept. Rawls will not try to define liberty, as 
definitions such as these are the result of different systems of values, which will necessary collide 
when a de facto definition is considered. The conception of freedom that Rawls is thinking of is 
abstract in nature. When Rawls thinks of liberty, he imagines that liberty includes four other “parts” 
that remain unseparated; these parts serve as micro-conceptions of liberty. The first micro-
conception is equal liberty of the liberties, such as freedom of thought, liberty of conscience and 
equal citizenship. All of these parts must constitute liberty in the end, as it cannot operate without 
it; in other words, this is how Rawls avoids having to define liberty in too precise of a manner. 
Therefore, Rawls believes that liberty can be explained by referencing three factors: the agents 
who are free, the limitations which they are free from, and what they are free to do. Every theory 
of justice treats these liberties in its own distinct manner, in the sense that they each have different 
ways of ordering them; this does not prevent them from having to eventually provide a definition 
Because of this, we are in no hurry to define liberty and all of its features in the beginning, as the 
definitions will naturally flow from the particular problems that the concept of liberty is confronted 
with. The general description of liberty, then, has the following form: this or that person is free or 
not free from this or that constraint or set of constraints. Associations as well as persons may be 
free or not, and the constraints to which they are subject may range from the laws, public opinion, 
social pressure, etc. We must remember that Rawls is mainly concerned with the legal/juridical 
constraints to liberty. Under such a concern, liberty is conceptualized as a certain institutional 
structure whose constraints are defined by a certain system of public rights and duties. As there 
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are different associations, persons, and states, their rights and duties are to be defined under certain 
conditions of constraint which then make up the apparatus which will regulate particular rights 
and duties. This is why it is important for Rawls to distinguish between certain liberties; 
furthermore, Rawls believes that these distinctions can be made without having to introduce new 
conceptions of liberty into the equation. Because of this, people are given rights that others might 
not possess, and vice-versa: at the end of the day, what matters is that this imbalance of rights and 
duties allows for individuals to achieve their goals with the least amount of interference possible. 
For instance, as liberty of conscience is defined by law,  all persons are thus free to pursue their 
moral, philosophical or religious interests without legal constrictions which require them to either 
go against such pursuits or the pursuits of others. Because men must be free from particular 
constraints in regard to their respective aims, the government has the duty to not interfere with 
such aims. 
Rawls insists that these liberties and rights must be assessed as a whole; in this sense, we 
cannot regard them as distinct liberties and instead must see them as a relatively coherent system. 
Each particular type of liberty will necessarily “spill over” other types of liberty, so liberty itself 
must be treated as a whole when it comes time to establishing it via the second principle. When 
liberty is treated in this way, it will achieve more liberty in general than if it was seen as a collection 
of distinct concepts. For Rawls, if these liberties are not restricted systematically, they will 
eventually collide and collapse into each other. For instance, if there were not rules for proper 
inquiry or debate, the right of free speech would lose its value. For the sake of this example, it is 
important for Rawls to distinguish between rules of order and the rules restricting the content of 
speech: while rules of order would constrain us from our freedom of speech since we cannot speak 
whenever we please, they are required to gain the benefits of this liberty. Because of this, the 
delegates in the constitutional convention (or the members of legislature) must decide how various 
liberties are to be specified so as to yield the best (total) system of equal liberty. They must also 
balance these liberties against each other; for the best arrangement of these several types of liberty 
depends on the totality of limitations to which they are subject, followed then by how they are 
ordered in their defining scheme. Restrictions on equality may happen says Rawls only within the 
confines of the equality principle itself, and in consequence, what follows it in the lexical ordering 
of principles. For Rawls, liberty is unequal whenever there is a class that has greater liberty than 
others, or whenever liberty is generally less extensive than it should be. This is the condition in 
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which all liberties can (and must) be equal for each person. However, there are liberties which are 
more extensive and whose extension can be measured: if its extension is measurable, then it can 
be compared with other liberties as well. This is why liberties must adjust themselves in relation 
to other liberties; they can only do this if they are part of a system which guarantees the coherence 
of such an adjustment. If the first principle states that everyone must have equal liberty, then any 
other liberty that follows must be adjusted to that very principle. In other words, constraints on 
other liberties are possible as long as they do not violate the first principle of the equal liberty. All 
other liberties must be seen from the stand point of the equal citizen. So now the questions that 
arise are rather from the perspective of the constitutional convention or the legislative stage, which 
then ask themselves what system it would be rational for the parties to prefer. The inability to take 
advantage of one’s rights because of poverty and ignorance is one of liberty’s core constraints. 
These two things somehow affect the worth of liberty, or the value of first principles. With this 
understanding of liberty and equality, the moments that constitute the basic structure (finding the 
principles and establishing them) are now reconciled into a coherent process. Thus liberty and its 
value are distinguished as follows: liberty is represented by the complete system of equal 
citizenship, while its value is proportional to the capacity of free individuals to advance their ends 
within the framework that the system defines. Freedom as equal liberty must the same for all, 
which means that the question of lesser-than-equal liberty never arises. We must remember that 
the value of liberty is not the same for everyone, especially for those who have greater means to 
achieve their goals. However, the lesser valued liberty of the poor is compensated by the difference 
principle, which assures that the members in society who’s liberty has the less value is 
compensated for this very inequality. Rawls reminds us not to equate such compensation with an 
acceptance of unequal liberty: in the end, both the most and least privileged member of society 
enters with the same political rights and the assurance that regardless of their position in society, 
they will always benefit from inequality and the depreciation of the value of one’s liberty that 
accompanies it. 
This conception of freedom is completely abstract. But Rawls insists to explain it in this 
way, as he wants the concept of equal liberty to be indeterminate enough to allow for other 
principles to have “room to move” when adjusting themselves to it. Liberty of conscience, freedom 
of thought, political liberty and the liberty of the person as protected by the rule of law are the only 
liberties that will further explain and clarify equal liberty as the principle of Rawls’ theory. In other 
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words, we get a better idea of the first principle once these aspects of liberty have properly adjusted 
themselves to it. 
 
4.4 Liberty of Conscience (Theory of Justice, § 33). 
 
Liberty of conscience is limited by the principle of equality, as Rawls constructs the 
former's entire process of argumentation with recognition and acknowledgment of the latter. In the 
original position, parties cannot assume anything more for the opposite parties than they can for 
persons possessing a difference conscience. Each person is aware of her conscience since it guides 
them according to their own aspirations and interests. 
Parties in the original position have sufficient knowledge to understand that cannot always 
expect other persons or parties to share the same interests that would lead them to choose the same 
principles, as they may be possess different or maybe completely opposite opinions than them. 
Persons are conscientious that as long as they share common values with those who are of the same 
beliefs and opinions, there are others who do not share such values or opinions. For this reason, 
any religious, philosophical or moral conscience is not sufficient enough to determine and follow 
principles, even if this type of conscience is shared by the vast majority of people. Parties would 
never choose the principle of which they have the least amount of knowledge, and for this reason 
cannot guarantee that they will accept the principles that are correct in the eyes of others. This is 
because liberty of conscience makes parties understand and respect the right of one moral person 
to behave on behalf of their conceptions and beliefs. In the original position we do not know what 
those people may endorse and we do not know the value of such an endorsement, so we must then 
respect these things as if they were our own. As the value of the principles of justice (and as a 
consequence, their very ordering) are determined within the confines of one’s conscience, 
individual rationality thus becomes the main mechanism through which these different values and 
orderings are computed. This computation can occur because parties are then guaranteed that they 
cannot lose anything in the procedure of justice, as even if they end up less well-off due to it, they 
will be compensated by the benefits that flow from increased inequality. And thus, by the 
acceptance of liberty of conscience parties will be free to follow their rational conception of the 
good and gain knowledge on behalf of their individual aims and ends, all while respecting the right 
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of others to do so as well.  All individuals are moral persons and must be regarded and respected 
as equal persons with equal freedom to pursue their ends. 
The role of justice is to assure moral persons that their (equal) freedom will be protected 
while they pursue their rational good, as no conception of the good can be even determined before 
the right to equal freedom has been established. Indeed, this is what justice shall maintain in order 
to let people enjoy the right to their freedom and the subsequent making of their own choices 
within the scheme of equality. The parties are free and rational enough to be expected to agree 
upon general principles that apply to all. Rawls now wonders why we would then be afraid that 
the parties will reject the first principle, when it has been established from the viewpoint of an 
impartial observer that is represented by the rationality that is shared by each party.  When the veil 
of ignorance is finally lifted, parties will feel secure in their choice of such a principle, as lifting 
the veil will have no effect over it: in this sense, they are just as secure as when the veil of ignorance 
was in effect.  Because of this, the choice of the first principle is fully rational, insofar as it allows 
for lifting of the veil of ignorance without changing the balance of liberties within the first 
principle; afterwards, the second principle can be applied with the full reassurance that the first 
principle is here to stay. It is only in this way that we can say that the problem of the first principle 
of justice is now settled. 
The second argument that leads parties to the choice of the first principle after they have 
acquired relevant information about social and cultural heritage is the just regulation of the 
relations between generations. Since the role of justice extends between generations, the parties 
must consider two limitations before agreeing upon principles. Make no mistake: it is perfectly 
rational for the parties to accept these limitations, and we are about to see why. The first limitation 
states that parties cannot choose principles for shaping the choice of the future generations that 
they would not accept for themselves. As the standpoint from which principles are derived is that 
of an impartial observer, it is only natural that these principles must be chosen by both parties, 
even if they are separated by time itself. The second limitation states that the parties cannot choose 
any principle that would otherwise determine the choice of principles for future generations, as 
this determination would lessen the liberty of the next generation; as we have seen, this liberty is 
non-negotiable. Since we cannot choose the principles for generations to come in the same way 
that we choose principles for ourselves, the only rational thing for parties to do is to choose a 
principle that will guarantee that no matter what choices will be made, liberty will always remain 
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the basis for equality. While this choice might seem paternalistic for the generations to come (they 
cannot re-select their first principle), the values on which this principle is grounded must be taught 
to these future generations as something that is chosen for their good and that will be adjudicated 
and protected by the list of the primary goods. 
The third argument of liberty of conscience that leads to the first principle is a distinction 
from the choice made in the utilitarian conception of justice: in the original position, it would be 
unacceptable for parties to choose a principle that disadvantages the few in order to bring better 
advantages to all. 
Rawls combines these arguments in order to show the rationale behind privileging equal 
liberty as the first principle in his theory of justice. Doing this allows us to recognize that we have 
more confidence in the principle of equal liberty than the premises from which a perfectionist or 
utilitarian view would be derived. The grounds for this confidence, according to the contract view, 
is that equal liberties have a different basis altogether. They are not a way of maximizing the sum 
or achieving the greatest net balance of satisfaction, as the notion of maximizing a sum of values 
by adjusting the rights of individuals cannot possibly arise. Instead, these rights are assigned to 
fulfill the principles of cooperation that citizens would acknowledge when each is fairly 
represented as a moral person. Thus, the conception defined by these principles is not that of 
maximizing anything, except in the vacuous sense of meeting the requirements of justice to the 
best of our abilities. 
 
4.5 The Constitution   
 
So far, Rawls has explained the journey towards the realization of the last step of the 
process of justice: the constitution. After both principles of justice are commonly understood 
between parties (as Rawls says they will), the principle of equality will then enable the parties to 
take a step further in the matter of applied justice. These principles will create a sufficient basis 
for the basic structure of society. The first part of the basic structure would enable a constitution 
that would uphold both principles, and the second part will allow us to enact legislature in 
accordance with them. This transition between the original position and a legislative structure is 
only possible if each member of society makes this transition on equal grounds. 
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The principle of equal participation comes as the result of the first principle, as it guarantees 
the right to participate equally in public affairs. This right must be understood as one that enables 
the equal participation of its members, despite their different social and cultural backgrounds. 
From different experiences that occur in democratic societies, it is quite evident that democracy is 
the best-suited system for the maintenance of such rights. Democratic systems have all the 
necessary mechanisms to secure a direct representation of its citizens, who require it in order to 
ensure that the constitution is upheld. As everyone has an equal right to participate, they will 
consequently have an equal right for self-representation. Number of those who will represent 
directly those that have equal rights to participate would make a corps which enacts the legislature 
of the state in accordance with the rules. They will be elected by free votes on the principle of rules 
for the rules. The role of this judiciary corps is to represent equally all members of the society. To 
put in different words, every member represents a vote and an electorate which means that each 
person counts. Those that are elected will make sure that rules and laws are amended in accordance 
with constitution. The role of this legislative body is empowered by an authority though its role is 
not to make checks and balances for executives, neither to organize plebiscites and vote of trust 
for governments nor to return the bills, but is to make parliamentary bases. 
Equal participation is inherently comprised of freedom of speech and assembly, and the 
liberty to create political associations. For democratic societies, is important to create 
circumstances for the application and acceptance of the principle of loyal opposition: this form of 
unanimity only enriches the diversity of human life. Political order is important, but it is not all 
that counts for Rawls. The possibility of unanimity that democratic societies can provide has its 
origin in the principle of equality. The principle of equal participation as such is not to be 
eliminated, but instead must be grounded in the political sphere of democratic societies. 
In regard to equal liberty as defined by the principle of participation, three points must be 
discussed: its meaning, its extent and the measures that enhance its value. Equality in this case is 
represented by the right of each member to vote and become elected, as well the fact that each vote 
is of the same value as any other. The system of representation must be organized in a way that 
allows it to avoid things like gerrymandering, in which a minority can artificially overtake the 
power of the majority for no other reason than geographical location. In this context, Rawls does 
not have any other solution but to admit majority rule; he simply doesn't see anything wrong with 
it in general. What is more concerning to Rawls is creation of a system in which majority rule does 
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not suppress equal liberty. This is possible if is also assured that the first principle gets applied and 
with that, other liberties which guarantee equality for each member regardless to the majority’s 
political stance. 
Another thing that Rawls wants to change is the financing and support of political parties. 
Instead of political interference with industry in order to amass funds, Rawls suggests that a certain 
amount of government funds are allocated to each political party. As every adult member of society 
possesses the equal right to be elected, it would be erroneous to assume that this equality will be 
properly represented under the current financing rules, which allows for industry to have 
significant influence in the funding of political parties. This is because the right to be elected is 
infringed by industry's right to select representatives that suit their interests, as anyone who does 
not support such interests is refused funding as a consequence. 
Social justice does not only insist on safeguarding the freedom of minorities in democratic 
societies that are subject to majority rule, but also tends to regulate the type of economic influence 
and power that has been historically associated with families who possessed enough of it to restrict 
the freedoms of those who were a threat to their interests. As a solution to this phenomenon, Rawls 
suggest that opportunity and public offices be open to all, as it would not let social and economic 
background determine people’s life prospects and the freedom that these prospects require. 
In sum, the principle of equal participation has no other intention than to make a distinction 
between two liberties: the right of the citizen to represent herself and participate equally, and the 
right of representative to represent their constituents. These rights cannot otherwise be guaranteed 
and maintained unless they are understood as the rights expressed through a conception of JF for 
equality. It only reminds us of the equal weight that parties have in regard to the constitution and 
its institutions. 
 
4.6 Limitations on the Principle of Participation 
 
In the previous heading, we could see the importance of the principle of participation, as it 
guarantees equal weight in the formulation of a constitution. On the other hand, we also caught a 
short glimpse of how such equal participation could fall to the domination of majority rule.  If the 
previous case showed us how the principle of participation allowed for a better constitution to be 
formulated, we will now examine a case in which equal participation can lead to a majority rule 
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that constitutes itself via the suppression of the political freedoms of minorities. In this section, we 
will see how Rawls determines whether it is necessary or not to limit equal participation in order 
to thwart this; the answer to this will allow us to determine whether it is possible to preserve equal 
participation all while eliminating the possibility of the domination of the majority. To give it away 
early: Rawls believes that the principle of participation must be limited by the constitution, as the 
constitution is what would prevent any majority from impeding on the freedoms of minorities that 
do not share their vision. While equal participation is necessary for the creation of a just 
constitution, it is also blind to certain inequalities that stem from the seemingly organic constitution 
of political majorities. It is for this reason that the constitution's imposed limits on the unchecked 
extension of political freedoms is meant to simultaneously keep majority rule under control and 
assure the freedoms of minorities. While this might limit freedom in general, it assures that the 
outcome of this limitation will result in the protection of freedoms that might elude our collective 
eye. 
Another reason for limiting the principle of political participation is that its maximization 
might unbalance the equal value of each vote. For instance, Mill himself might have been a liberal, 
but he stated that each vote should not necessarily hold the same value: for him, the vote of an 
intelligent person is worth twice that of an average citizen. Rawls' does not necessarily criticize 
the principles behind this argument, insofar as Mill was trying to ensure that the minority of 
intelligent people wouldn't be totally subjected to the whims of the unintelligent majority. 
However, Rawls does not believe that the freedom of minorities can be secured by expanding their 
freedom to the point of infringing on the freedom and equality of others, especially if this leads to 
the prioritization of political freedom over other forms of liberty. On the contrary; for JF, what 
counts is that when it deals with freedoms it considers all as equal, limitations to liberty are not 
argued from the standpoint of equal citizenship, but from the standpoint of the most vulnerable 
freedoms. In other words, the goal of limiting political freedom is not to level everyone's political 
rights, but to ensure that the maximization of those rights do not overshadow other forms of 
freedom. To limit freedoms equally in favor of the vulnerable few is based on the idea of limiting 
freedom in order for everyone to pursue their ends without being restricted. For JF, it is important 
that its two principles be applied in conformity to the full exercise of freedom first and political 
rights second. Rawls considers that the prioritization of political freedoms as a means of attaining 
other types of freedoms is not in accordance with justice as fairness, as we have seen that the 
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fundamental freedom that is secured prior to political freedom is the equality of liberty represented 
by the first principle. To go back to Mill's example, the right of intelligent people to have two votes 
is not in accordance with the principle of equal opportunity. Of course, political rights are valued 
by Mill as much as by Rawls; the key difference is that Mill aimed to establish these rights from 
the basis of political will while Rawls aimed to base them on a constitution. By basing rights on 
political will, the highest freedom is to maximize one's participation in politics; the constitution on 
the other hand allows us to see how this can be detrimental to others in general, as it is based on a 
general conception of liberty, or one that isn't constrained to the political sphere. In this well-
ordered society, the people who will think of the principles of justice must ensure that political will 
is mobilized to secure such principles; once this is assured, only then is it possible to determine if 
it can be given further scope and extension.  As we have seen, the principles of justice are meant 
to secure primary goods, political participation being one of them: if we were to base the principles 
of political will, it would be the only guaranteed form of freedom insofar as it does not guarantee 
the securing of primary goods. In sum, we should not give the political will any more rights than 
it needs to accomplish its task; politics isn't an end in itself, and Rawls believes that it shouldn't be 
treated as one either. 
 
4.7 The Rule of Law 
 
In this section, Rawls considers the rights of the person that are protected by the principle 
of the rule of law. As Rawls has stated so far, his intention is not only to relate to the principles of 
justice but also to elucidate the meaning of the priority of liberties. In the second chapter of this 
work, we have seen how Rawls explains how formal justice (the regular and impartial 
administration of public rules) may become the rule of law when it is applied through a legal 
system. If judges and others in positions of authority fail to apply or interpret appropriate rules, we 
are now dealing with the conditions of unjust action. Cases of injustice are not represented by 
things like bribery and corruption, but also of racial discrimination and the propagation of hatred 
and intolerance. A regular and impartial administration is defined by Rawls as “justice as 
regularity” instead of “formal justice”. With this in mind, we can see that the rule of law is closely 
related to liberty, especially when we consider the intimate connection between a legal system and 
the regularity of justice. 
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A legal system is a coercive order addressed to rational persons in order to regulate their conduct 
and provide a framework for social cooperation. Rawls claims that when these rules are just, they 
establish grounds for legitimate expectations by which persons can rely on each other and also 
rightly object when their expectation are not fulfilled. So if the base of these claims is unsure, so 
must be the boundaries of men’s liberty. In order to better understand these boundaries, it is best 
to think of these rules as ones that are meant to assure the proper functioning of a certain game; 
this is not far-fetched, as most institutions and associations relate to their rules and regulations in 
a similar manner. “Given that these rules are fair or just, then once men have entered into these 
arrangements and accepted the benefits that result, the obligations which thereby arise constitute 
a basis for legitimate expectations” (Rawls, 1971, p. 236). The legal system distinguishes between 
its comprehensive scope and the regulative powers that it has over other associations: the 
constitutional agencies defined by the legal system work in a coercive manner, at least in 
comparison to private associations. Legal systems exercise a final authority over certain territories 
limited by their borders; moreover, this geographical factor reinforces the image that laws and 
principles define the basic structure within which the pursuit of all other activities takes place. 
Precepts of justice can be associated with the rule of law as they are given as legal orders, 
to be accepted by all rational men. These precepts are those that Rawls claims would be followed 
by a system of rules which perfectly embody the idea of a legal system: ceteris paribus, the best 
legal order is the one that best fulfills the precepts of the rule of law. It will provide a more secure 
basis for liberty and a more effective means to provide a cooperative scheme. Yet the precepts 
guarantee only the impartial and regular administration of rules; because of this, they still might 
be unjust. Those that are in charge of enacting the laws and rules must keep in mind that laws 
ought to be based on the expectations of reasonable members of society, who can decide 
unanimously on what should be restricted in general. For Rawls, it is reasonable to expect that 
parties will reject precepts that do not coincide with their rational cooperation before even having 
to “test” them by creating principles and enacting laws that derive from them. This is the principle 
of good faith, which is fundamental in assuring that we do not commit injustice while attempting 
to discover if certain precepts are unjust or not; this is because the “ought” that the percepts imply 
are based on what is reasonable for parties to agree upon. In this sense, it is not a matter of “faith”, 
but one of rational expectations. As a consequence of this, it will be expected that once they are 
accepted and publicly recognized, they are ready to executed: none of the parties then have right 
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to neglect them in the name of an inability to perform, as they are precepts that are meant to be 
applied by the average member of society. On the contrary, says Rawls: freedom is in danger when 
such an inability to perform becomes the main reason for refusing to apply such principles. 
Another precept that Rawls brings to light is that similar cases be treated according to 
similar laws and rules. The aim of such a precept is to minimize the discretion of judges in the 
“regular” enacting of justice, as it would then require judges to justify distinctions between persons 
by reference to relevant legal rules and principles. Though if rules are complicated, it calls for an 
interpretation which then makes it easier for judges to justify a possibly arbitrary decision on shaky 
grounds. But the more that such cases increase, it becomes increasingly difficult to rely on such 
methods to cover up the arbitrary character of a particular judgement. For the legal system to be 
consistent, we must consequently focus on interpretative tools that apply to all cases and prevent 
arbitrary judgements from garnering themselves with a rationalistic coating; in other words, legal 
interpretation must be critical of the interpretation itself. This precept also suggests that in cases 
of equity, an exception must be made if the established rules face certain ambiguity: this is because 
there are no clear interpretations of the limits of equality, which means that any difference in 
interpretation will make for a difference in the realization of justice. If so, then the principle of 
authoritative decision applies; for Rawls, this is sufficient enough. 
For Rawls, the precept that there is no offense without law is derived from the ideal of the 
legal system. There are a few things that follow from this: laws must be accepted by everyone, 
there is no discrimination nor bill of attainder that is exercised over any member or association, 
and finally that the penal laws should not be retroactive to the disadvantage of those to whom they 
apply. These concepts are implicit in any legal system which regulates behavior via public rules: 
if people do not know of these public rules, then they do not know how to conduct their behavior 
since what they can or cannot do is unclear unless there is a bill of attainder that would enforce 
such conduct. Moreover, this may not happen unless there is a tyrant who institutes terror through 
laws and punishments; but even if this was the case, tyrants tend to forget about using the same 
punishments for sets of offenses insofar as it is a testament of their power to produce different 
punishments for each particular offense. However, this rarely results in a legal system insofar as 
there is no ground for social cooperation that resides outside the scope of the tyrant's power; as no 
legitimate expectations can arise out of this, the citizenry have to interest in participating in the 
maintenance of such a legal system. Finally, there are precepts that the notion of the legal system 
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considers as natural law. If laws are addressed to rational people, then courts must guarantee that 
laws are respected, as well as try to make sure that each offense will be followed by the appropriate 
consequence. This then implies that the legal system must organize a juridical process based on 
inquiry, which is then exercised by impartial and independent judges. Trials must then be fair and 
not prejudiced by public clamor. In sum, what the legal system considers to be natural is the 
regularity and objectivity of the legal process; this isn't hard to accept, insofar as regularity and 
objectivity are nature's most significant attributes. With this, Rawls is trying to make a clear 
connection between the liberty and the rule of law, as the rule of law determines the duties and 
rights of citizens; it establishes the confines of their very freedoms in a regular and impartial 
fashion. The limits of freedom are indeterminate; for Rawls, the only thing that restricts our 
personal freedom is fear. It is for this reason that liberty is defended by specific rights and 
freedoms, which then allow us to pursue our ends in accordance with our freedoms, as well as 
protect them from the intrusion of others. The rule of law must thus be maintained in order to 
reduce the fear that individuals might experience when thinking about the possibility indeterminate 
outcomes of their aims. 
But Rawls can also arrive at the same conclusion through different means. It is unavoidable 
that the government must exert coercive power through the form of penalties in order to maintain 
the rule of law. Even if people share a common sense of justice, there is no guarantee that others 
will conform their duties and obligations to this sense of justice: the negative consequence of this 
is the fact that others might not feel the need to do their part if they feel as if others are not either. 
Because of this, rules may break down in certain circumstances. The suspicion that others are not 
honoring their duties and obligations in the absence of an authoritative interpretation and 
enforcement of the rules is the very condition under which the meaning of these rules deteriorate. 
For instance, Rawls says that it is impossible to think of taxes being paid on a voluntary basis, 
insofar as taxpayers will see themselves as being exploited when they see non-taxpayers 
benefitting from the re-distribution of taxpayer revenue. By enforcing taxes through the use of 
coercively-granted penalties on behalf of an authoritative government, this problem can be 
avoided. It is for this reason that a sovereign coercive power must exist in order to insure that its 
rules respected, even if Rawls thinks that the underlying rationality that governs the behavior of 
members of a well-ordered society doesn't require such a form of coercion. This penal machinery 
is rather meant to assure an underlying sense of security when individuals are in the presence of 
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each other; while this was meant to quell fear in the previous example, it also ensures that 
individuals see fellow citizens are moral beings who are subject to the same legal scrutiny as them. 
Now in setting up such a coercive machinery, people must weigh the disadvantages. According to 
Rawls, they are two: the first one has to do with the taxes that people have to pay if they want their 
freedoms to be assured, and the second is the possible damage done to freedoms if these taxes are 
not paid. Rawls would pick the first outcome over the second, insofar as he deems it to be more 
rational to establish a coercive agency than have the value of one's freedoms fluctuate at an 
unstable rate. Taking these two disadvantages into account, the best outcome would be to minimize 
both of them: we pay the least amount of taxes in order to maintain our freedoms in the most stable 
way possible. All other things equal, the dangers to liberties would be lessened if the law is 
impartially and regularly administered in full accordance with the principle of legality; once this 
occurs, citizens can have a better of idea of how to plan their endeavors in accordance to the 
boundaries set by the liberty of others. 
In order to proceed in this matter, society requires a penal code which allows for the limits 
of liberty to be fully “legible” to the general population; liberty must thus be “explainable” via 
such a penal code. Despite thus, we must remember that Rawls sees liberty as a concept which is 
based on responsibility and not penalization. The public character of these rules is meant to 
promote responsibility, instead of merely defining freedom negatively through the means of 
penalties. On the contrary, the legal system that Rawls schematizes rather has the aim of instituting 
liberties, and not penalties. To be explained this,  Rawls uses the example of armed religious 
groups: if they arm themselves for protection and government enacts a law against weapons 
possession in order to ensure certain liberties, then all such possessions must be penalized even if 
they within the confines of the group's private property. While there are many cases in which it is 
hard to stop all injustices, the least that can be done is to limit those injustices in the most just way 
possible. We must remember that it is unjust to tip the balance towards the greater good of the few 
at the expense of the good of others, as well as trading liberty for socio-economic benefits. For this 
to be possible, we need a penal code in order to fully clarify the contours of liberty and the greater 






4.8 The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness 
 
Rawls' relation to Kant is not a discovery, nor an innovative interpretation; it is rather 
affirmed by Rawls himself in his Theory of Justice. Despite the fact that Rawls account of the 
concept of equality and the priority of rights is derived from the Kantian conception of autonomy, 
he does not limit himself to this: Rawls believes that these are not the only two significant notions 
in regard to the application of ethics. It is for this reason that Rawls thinks that staying within such 
confines is trivial. 
For Kant, moral principles find their origin in rational choice. Kant believed that this 
rationality constitutes moral law, which will then conduct men in an ethical commonwealth. These 
moral principles are considered as legislation for a kingdom of ends and must consequently be 
accepted by all in a public setting. To this moral legislation is meant to be agreed upon under 
conditions which reinforce our status as moral and rational beings; Rawls original position is meant 
to serve as an explicit formulation of such conditions. This is perfectly normal, as Rawls' comes 
from the same contractual tradition as Kant: in other words, both aim to establish the conditions in 
which a just contract can be erected and subsequently agreed upon. For Kant, action is autonomous 
when men choose principles as free, equal and rational beings. In order for this to be possible, the 
opinions which shape such an agreement cannot derive from someone's social position; if this were 
the case, the principles would be heterogeneous and in consequence, incommensurable. Rawls veil 
of ignorance aims to solve this problem by only allowing for the appearance attributes that are 
homogenous to the population, such as rationality; because of this, the principles are erected 
homogeneously and can thus be accepted by the entirety of the actors in the original position. 
Rawls and Kant both agree on the aim of such homogenous principles: the establishment of a basic 
social structure: in this sense, Kant and Rawls share a similar rationale, insofar as they accord 
relatively similar means for the accomplishment of similar ends. 
Under Kantian ethics, these principles that the form of hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives: principles are categorical imperatives when they must be applied to the conduct of a 
person in virtue of their nature as free, equal rational beings, and they are hypothetical when they 
relate to the aims of individuals that have nothing to do with morality. In this sense, Rawls ties the 
two principles of justice with the categorical imperative and the list of primary goods. Categorical 
imperatives are privileged over hypothetical ones, as the incommensurability between variations 
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of the latter does not permit for their principles to be spread to the rest of the population via rational 
means. This is why Rawls believes that acting upon the principles of justice is the equivalent to 
responding to the categorical imperative, insofar as the latter applies regardless of our individual 
aims. 
Kant's categorical imperatives and Rawls principles of justice are meant to limit freedom 
within the boundaries of autonomy. Kant feared the mutual disinterest of parties involved in 
deliberation and for this reason did not rely on their benevolence; due to his recognition of their 
autonomy in relation to expectations of such benevolence, he then had to rely on their duty in the 
form of the categorical imperative. As we have seen, this is the only way to assure that autonomous 
parties will respond accordingly to the requirements of justice. In this sense, for Kant and Rawls 
freedom is right and meaningful only when it is in accordance with such requirements: no matter 
how the parties conceive of their good, they have complete autonomy to follow it as long as the 
categorical imperative/principles of justice are responded to as priorities, and not afterthoughts. As 
it follows parties, have full autonomy in the contractual sense: they are free to pursue their aims, 
as long as their aims can be legible within the context of such categorical imperatives/principles 
of justice. 
However, Rawls considers that there is a difficulty (noticed by Sidgwick) which must be 
clarified. Sidgwick remarked that nothing in Kant’s ethics is more striking than the idea that a man 
realizes his true self when he acts from the standpoint of moral law, whereas if he permits his 
actions to be determined by sensuous desires or contingent aims, he becomes subject to the laws 
of nature. According to Sidgwick, Kant believes that the lives of the saint and the scoundrel are 
both the outcome of free choice and causal laws. Rawls agrees with this problematization of Kant, 
as the latter never explained why the Saint's life is the outcome of free choice while the scoundrel's 
is contingent upon natural law. Sidgwick’s objection  seems to be very decisive, since he remarked 
that for Kant free choice is based solely on principles that come from the “transcendental” self or 
“rational being”; in consequence,  any other choice stemming from hypothetical imperatives is 
not. Rawls will defend Kant here, as he states that Kant believed that it wasn't possible to develop 
homogenous principles in any other way. In sum, if someone wants to reveal his true self via his 
actions, he will have to act in accordance with rational principles, insofar as they are the ground 
from which one can reveal oneself to others: conversely, other types of principles might not be 
legible to the rest of the population. The reason Rawls brings this up is because he believes that 
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Kant was missing a key argument: the latter didn't bring up the fact that such homogenous 
principles/categorical imperatives are meant to allow for common legibility in regard to the self 
that is revealed through moral action. 
Rawls sees his original position as a corrective to Sidgwick's objection: parties in the 
original position can construct and agree upon such rational and homogenous principles. As 
members in the original position have the freedom to choose between such rational principles, it 
is expected that the results of such a free choice will be in closest conformity to the requirements 
of justice; this is the inherent rationality that ensures that homogenous principles will be produced. 
This is possible because members in the original position will choose principles on the basis of 
how their rationality is in accordance to the rationality of everyday life; these principles will thus 
be necessary in ensuring the regularity of justice that we have examined above. As such a choice 
is called for by the requirements of justice themselves, actors grant themselves the autonomy to 
choose such principles; in sum, this is how we move from self-granted autonomy to the formulation 
of homogenous principles instead of heterogeneous ones. It is for this reason that Rawls accuses 
Kant interpreters of erring when the conceive the latter's moral philosophy as being one based on 
law and guilt; acting unjustly is not the result of some intrinsic guilt, but the failure to act as the 
rational beings that we are beneath the surface of our appearances. To act immorally is to act in 
disrespect to oneself, as the self that is revealed is one that is fully subjected to the contingency of 
natural laws; it is disrespect insofar as we act as if we weren't free and thus deny the rational basis 
of our very autonomy. As much as liberty was important for contractarians like Rousseau and Kant, 
their aim was to show that liberty consists of acting in accordance with the law that we give to 
ourselves in rational manner.   
Just like the inherent rationality of the Kantian subject, the rationality of Rawls' procedure 
is what allows for this theory of justice to be consistent, in the sense that its rationality will always 
produce a similar outcome. In consequence, we can affirm that Rawls' theory is a totalizing one, 
insofar as it employs the constraints of reason to block out different outcomes that might possibly 
arise. In other words, it seems as if his theory of justice does not allow for other philosophical 
conceptions to enter into dialogue with it, and this is to the fact that they are imprinted with the 
substantive forms of rationality that clash with Rawls proceduralism. With this in mind, we can 
better understand why Rawls is bound to procedural rationality: it is the only non-doctrinal form 
of rationality that can, under the same circumstances, produce the same outcome. Again, this is 
96 
 
possible because of the theory's Kantian heritage: it is consistent because the rationality at play 
limits itself before actually producing anything. As this self-limiting must occur prior to any of 
reason's activity, it is for this reason that Rawls chooses the original position as the starting point 
of his procedure: it is the space in which this very act of self-limitation takes place.  After this has 
occurred, Rawls' procedure is guaranteed to always reach the same outcome: the formulation of 
the equality and difference principles.   
While this might be the case in theory, it is not the case in reality: actual situations produce 
different outcomes, and it is precisely these types of outcomes that Rawls theory needs to take into 
account. For instance, what if one doesn’t comprehend the theory of justice as Rawls does; would 
he or she be less rational, or maybe even irrational? Rawls' would not disagree, insofar as he 
understands that it is still possible to bring irrational principles to their logical conclusion, 
especially when thought experiments are employed. Nozick, on the other hand, believes that the 
need to ensure the same outcome is what will force Rawls to impose certain types of precepts, as 
well as a certain type of rationality on the actors in the original position; according to the former, 
such an imposition is proof of the relative arbitrariness of what is imposed. In other words, if 
Rawls' principles were truly universal, we would not need to constrain the actors in regards to the 
modalities with which they will discover the principles' very universality. 
For Rawls, the modalities themselves are constrained because they are the only ones that 
can allow for the proper formulation of principles of justice: without the 4 stage sequence, we 
cannot guarantee that the resulting principles will be in conformity with the precepts of justice. 
Despite this, we must remember that the resulting discussion regarding the four stages, contract, 
constitution and toleration only establish the pillars on which Rawls theory of justice and its truth 
will be established. Nozick wouldn't have anything against this method if it were not for the fact 
that the framework in which it occurs is not fully credible. And this lack of credibility is betrayed 
by the method itself, as the four stage sequence is meant to incorporate anything that was 
unintentionally left behind by the theory's incapacity to incorporate and comprehend the small 
details that define problems of justice. In other words, Rawls method is meant to integrate all that 
remains from the theory's confrontation with reality: if aspects of reality resist theorization, the 
method will then subsume them into the theory via the 4 stage sequence. In order to evade the risks 
of the typical ambiguities that accompany conceptions of justice, Rawls wants to assure a 
procedure which, in case of the failure of the parties to keep up with the further development of 
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the principles of justice, remains intact insofar as it can be revisited in order to understand in what 
context the principles were accepted. In consequence, while Nozick's criticism of the groundwork 
of Rawls' procedure diminishes the relevance of the 4 staged sequence, we must remember that it 
is still a necessary condition for a consistent theory of justice. 
But Rawls' theory of justice is more than merely consistent: it is totalizing insofar as it 
constrains public discourse and deliberation in a transcendental manner. It does this by positing 
the limits of actors’ knowledge, then erecting a 4-staged sequence that functions in conformity to 
these limitations. Because of this, justice cannot possess a meaning, as meaning itself is not 
permitted within the epistemic limits of the original position: if this is the case, then we can safely 
say that Rawls' theory of justice doesn't aim for anything outside of its very procedure. In other 
words, it must do what reason suggests within the confines of procedure, but cannot allow for 
reason itself to provide anything substantial in the formulation of principles of justice. This is why 
Rawls' reasoning can allow for the sacrifice of certain types of liberties in the name of justice, as 
these liberties contain nothing substantial in the context of the procedure itself; while they might 
have something substantial outside of the procedure, in the sense that they are considered 
meaningful by the actors in question, this has no bearing on their status within the epistemic 
confines of the procedure. In the end, they can only be chosen if they conform to the principles of 
justice; if not, they can be easily discarded. In the following section, we will see how the principles 
of justice respond to the demands of social cooperation after they have been formulated within the 
original position; in other words, it is time to see how they are adapted right before they are meant 
to be applied in reality. 











5. Distributive Shares (Second Principle) 
 
5.1 Justice in Political Economy 
 
In the previous four chapters, we have exposed the arguments for the procedure with which 
we can formulate the first principle of justice: the equality principle. In this section, we will expose 
Rawls' arguments for the establishment of the second principle of justice: the difference principle. 
The second principle belongs to the sphere of political economy and its task is to lay the foundation 
for a regulatory apparatus which is meant to balance the dynamics of cooperation within that 
sphere. But this question and the way how Rawls approaches to it, for Nozik doesn’t seem to be 
enlightening, considering Nozik’s arguments that is impossible to regulate transactions between 
cooperative and noncooperative agents by a set of principles for distributive justice. We will have 
the chance also in essence to reveal Nozick’s conception that duty of justice is to rend at least an 
exchange just between those who cooperate and not as Rawls made question once whether 
noncooperatives must include in distributive justice. So we will see that both Nozick and Rawls 
question cooperation, but with different questions.   
As we now understand the scope of the first principle of justice, it is apparent that this is 
unavoidable: a second principle must complete the first. As the state of the national economy is 
not implied within the original position, we will have to formulate the second principle in order to 
lay down a rational foundation for how the economy works at its most basic level.  For this reason, 
the outcome of Rawls' Theory of Justice is a reply to the utilitarianism, as it remains the most basic 
rational structure in which the economy is made intelligible. Rawls' goal is to take utilitarianism 
as far as possible in the attempt to fulfill both principles of justice; the point of this is to then 
formulate a second principle of justice that takes utilitarianism's flaws into account. 
To do this, Rawls will first turn to the problem of inter-generational justice. Besides treating 
this issue in A Theory of Justice, (Rawls, 1971) Rawls presents an alternative conception of the 
same problem in Political Liberalism (Rawls, 1996). Despite the temporal gap between both 
books, his alternative in Political Liberalism still retains the basic structure that it does in  A Theory 




We must first understand that Rawls' conception of the economy is a contractual one, 
insofar as it can only be established after its founding principles have been agreed upon in the 
original position: the economy must thus be structured around the two principles of justice. These 
two principles of justice imply a list of primary goods, which then determines the scope and the 
limits of justice within the contract. At first glance, this might seem too idealistic: but Rawls 
accepts this because it allows us to get a better idea of the nature of the contract itself. Because of 
this,  Rawls political conception of the economy is closer to perfectionism than utilitarianism, in 
the sense that the motives for cooperation do not arise from a general condition (the constitution 
of average utility, for example): instead, they are based on the ideal constitution of mutual 
cooperation that is present in the social contract itself. If it wasn't based on such an ideal, it would 
have a hard time preserving and maintaining the contract, as general social conditions (which 
average utility reflects) are subject to historical change. In other words, an ideal conception of the 
economy ensures that we do not deviate from the precepts and principles of the social contract: 
there is no arrangement of the economy that can be accepted by Rawls unless it is based on such a 
contract. As we have seen, Rawls' contract does not concern the meaning of the good life, but the 
rules through which different interpretations of the good life interact. This is not to say that Rawls 
thinks that the contract doesn't allude to a particular conception of the good; it does, but it goes no 
farther than being an allusion, thus preventing itself from becoming an outright endorsement. In 
other words, the contract cannot determine any particular conception of the good, but it can allow 
us to see that some come closer to the principles of the contract than others. This differs from 
utilitarianism because the latter does endorse a particular conception of the good: it is a contingent 
one, insofar as it is based on what is considered to be the “current” maximization of society's utility. 
In order to counter such contingency, Rawls aims to establish the ideal conditions in which any 
particular conception of the good can find its meaning. It is the system of rules that will shape the 
conduct of people within society; people will follow these rules because they have already agreed 
to their underlying principles in the original position.  Rawls' contract will thus differ from 
utilitarianism because it cannot go against such principles in exchange for economic benefits, no 
matter how productive or efficient they are. This is because these principles are based on the 
agreement for the distribution of primary goods that are prior to entering society. In this case, they 
are thus prior to utilitarian calculation itself; as utilitarian calculation only has meaning once these 
primary goods have been fulfilled, it would be paradoxical to trade them on the basis of 
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maximizing one's utility.  For utilitarianism, the priority of freedoms and liberties are conceived 
as choice while for Rawls, they are given and thus non-negotiable; in other words, they are 
conditions in which our choices can arise and consequently make sense to us. Utilitarianism doesn't 
see these as conditions, as it derives utility from the viewpoint of the impartial spectator; as the 
spectator resides “outside” such conditions, they have the same value as any other goods that can 
be exchanged. Thinkers like Hume and Mill characterize this impartial spectator by abstracting 
from society and positing the most general “end” of such an abstraction.  For Rawls, the idea of 
such a spectator is nothing but a standard assumption that can be found in many moral theories; as 
matter of the fact, it can still be found in most moral philosophy today. Interestingly, it is just a 
variation of the original position: the only difference is that Rawls wants multiple individuals to 
take the role of the impartial spectator, in order to see what they will agree upon in deliberation. 
In this sense, Rawls' “impartial spectator” is a dialectician, while that of utilitarianism is didactic. 
In Rawls case it is completely understandable that two opposite parties will agree when it comes 
to the idea that the freedom to pursue one's individual ends in accordance with their life prospects 
is the basic foundation for a just society. While they might disagree on the meaning of such ends, 
it does not change the fact that they recognize one's right to abide by their own interpretation of 
the Good life. For Rawls, there is no reason to argue about the meaning of certain ends in the 
original position, as we do not know which ones we are to eventually adopt as our own; once the 
two principles of justice have been established, there is no longer a need to privilege one 
conception of the good life over another, as we have already secured the individual's freedom to 
choose a particular one as if it were the “best”. 
 
5.2 Economic Systems 
 
Rawls is not concerned with the theories that are meant to describe complete economic 
systems; at this point, he is still employing the tools of basic economic reasoning. This is one of 
the reasons why he admits that he is not concerned with the economy per se, but rather with how 
economic arrangements relate to morality and justice. In this sense, he limits himself to questions 
such as savings, taxation and minimum wages: the goal here is to formulate the most just economic 
arrangement instead of the most efficient one. Because he is considering justice first, he cannot 
praise any of the current economic systems, insofar as their organization (be it in the Soviet Union 
101 
 
or the United States) is based on efficiency first. This does not mean that Rawls proposes a new 
economic system, as he has not given himself the tools to do so: instead, he is simply trying to find 
a bearing for justice inside of a given economic system. 
In order to avoid further misunderstandings, Rawls starts by making a few remarks 
regarding the system in the context of political economy: he is not only concerned with markets, 
but of the social institutions that are meant to regulate them. First, he will explain what an 
economic system actually is: an apparatus which regulates the means and ends of production, as 
well as the overall distribution and re-distribution of what is produced.  Rawls’ goal is to see how 
far these arrangements can satisfy the two principle of justice; but first, he must see if it is possible 
to satisfy them in the first place. 
Rawls is not concerned with the differences between capitalism and socialism, but instead 
between two aspects of public sector. The first aspect has to do with the ownership of the means 
of production: the difference is that in socialism the public sector is much larger, whereas in 
capitalism the number of publicly owned firms is much smaller. The second aspect of the public 
sector is the proportion of total social resources devoted to public goods, as there are goods that 
may be required more by certain people, yet still must be divided equally in order for all to benefit 
from them: since they are not private goods, they cannot be produced only for the few who can 
afford them. An example of such a good is the army. While a private army might be able to protect 
the few who need it most for an appropriate price, its efficiency is not taken into account because 
of the fact that protection is a public good that all citizens are equally entitled to. However, this 
reveals a problem with public goods: the problem of assurance. While public goods can be 
distributed fairly via the means of public services, it is not guaranteed that all citizens will 
participate equally in the maintaining of such services. The problem is that whether participation 
increases or decreases, the good that is provided must be distributed in a stable and regular manner. 
For Rawls, this participation must thus be enforced via the means of legal obligation, as this will 
ensure that the same quality of public services are provided to the largest amount of citizens, all in 
a fair and equal manner. The reasoning behind this is simple: while equally-participating citizens 
might reap the benefits of such services in an unequal manner, this inequality in service tends to 
dissipate as time goes by. An example of this would be the privatization of vaccinations against 
contagious diseases. If it were privatized, consumers could benefit from the vaccinations while 
non-paying citizens won't; but if this disease spreads amongst the latter group, the repercussions 
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will eventually reach the vaccinated consumers if the contagion is not countered in its totality. The 
answer to this problem is to render vaccinations public in order to ensure that the disease doesn't 
spread enough to be consider a threat to society as a whole. Another example would be the 
externalities associated with the harming of the environment: while private entities are free to deal 
with their property as they wish, these actions can lead to the degradation of the environment as a 
whole: as markets have a hard time dealing with such externalities, it is imperative to at least ensure 
that they can be dealt with before they do irreversible damage. The inability of the market to deal 
with such externalities is part of its inherent character; as there is a difference between public and 
private “accounting” when it comes to these matters, Rawls accepts that we cannot leave 
everything up to the accounting of the latter. 
The very indivisibility of the public sector is what gives it its “public” character: the goal 
of the state is to regulate the outcomes that can only arise in such an un-divided sphere. It is in the 
interest of everyone to participate in the indivisibility of public goods, as a lack of participation is 
only eroding the public sector's indivisible character. The basis of any collective agreement 
pertaining to public goods must be found in the fact that whoever participates will be guaranteed 
their fair share: without this, no one would have the incentive to participate in the first place. This 
can be represented quite accurately by the prisoner's dilemma and thus, cannot allude to a preferred 
solution as one must expect the actors inside the solution to behave in a way that we cannot 
guarantee. In order to let the market function in its own way, we must thus establish a minimal 
form of assurance. In the context of game theory and the prisoner's dilemma, this means that the 
game itself must at least ensure that the least viable outcome isn't a threat to the basic structure of 
society. If this policy of assurance is to be established, citizens will be encouraged to participate 
equally in the distribution of public goods and thus ensure that the individual efforts towards such 
a distribution are not in vain. The only way that this can be possible is if the government erects a 
system of incentives and punishments that ensure that a minimal form of behavior will be ensured, 
even in the worst of all cases. Once this assurance is established, citizens can feel comfortable in 
their role, as they are participating in the very process that guarantees their shared equality (Rawls, 
1971, pp. 220-40).  
Whether the means of production are privately or publically owned does not concern 
Rawls, and this is for two reasons. The first reason is that trade is something that “passes through” 
different societies and involves more isolated societies under different forms of government. The 
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second reason is that the government can contract from both the private and public sectors: this is 
possible because there will still be a market structure, as it is in conformity with the two principles 
of justice. The reason that the market will persist under either socialism or capitalism is because it 
is a minimal condition for free cooperation within the economic sphere; in this sense, Rawls cannot 
know whether labor power will be purchased by the government or the private sector, but instead 
rest on the assurance that there will be some sort of labor market in place. Markets fulfill the 
requirements of justice because they allow for free competition to regulate prices, as well as an 
efficient distribution of the goods that are produced within it. In order to ensure that the efficiency 
principle doesn’t overtake the principles of justice, the relationship between labor and the owners 
of the means of production is determined on the basis of equality instead. While the government 
cannot fix the interdependence between these two classes, they can ensure that the least privileged 
are also able to compete on equal footing. As we have seen, this can only be established by 
institutions which are modelled upon the two principles of justice: there needs to be an 
actualization of the difference principle for this to be possible. 
Nozick finds this form of economic regulation unsustainable. To demonstrate the weakness 
of the difference principle in relation to the economic sphere, Nozick employs the example of two 
individuals who do not cooperate, but still engage in exchange: if this is the case, then it means 
that the economic sphere is independent from the totality of cooperation, and thus does not require 
the principles of justice to regulate it in total fashion. For Nozick, such regulation will needlessly 
complicate and subsequently worse the cooperation that does occur within the economic sphere: 
his answer to this is to make social cooperation the last object of state intervention, in order to 
minimize the waste of resources that he foresees. This is a waste insofar as it requires a certain 
amount of resources to turn this regulatory apparatus into one that can account for all social 
cooperation: as all social cooperation doesn’t necessarily need to be watched over by such an 
apparatus, Nozick sees this as inefficient.  Furthermore, he sees no urgency in establishing such a 
total form of regulation, as cooperation does not need to be regulated in its totality in the first place. 
Let us go back to the example of the non-cooperating individuals: if they were to cooperate, they 
might benefit from a higher sum total of produced value, but are then mired by the problem of 
determining how to justly distribute it to the rest of the population. Nozick conceives of this 
problem in two different ways: according to him, we must ask either ourselves how the total sum 
is to be allocated, or how the benefits of social cooperation are to be allocated. While it might not 
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seem like it at first, these two question concern themselves with different things: in the first 
question, we are concerned with the just distribution of the totality of productive output, while in 
the second we are concerned with whether those who cooperated will get their fair share. In other 
words, the first question is concerned with distributing goods to non-cooperative members, while 
the second one is concerned with what the cooperative members gain in exchange for their 
cooperation. For the non-cooperative individual, neither of these types of distribution would be 
fair. For Rawls, the concern of the first question is a fair one insofar as it takes the least-well off 
citizens into account: even if they don’t cooperate, they will still receive a minimum of support. 
On the other hand, by excluding non-cooperative members, the concern of the second question is 
not fair in the eyes of equality. Nozick’s problem with Rawls is that the latter seems to be only 
interested in the first concern, while the second one is omitted in order to better suit his theory. 
While one might claim that the enormous amount of benefits being divvied in the first question 
will negate the concern of the second due to the small size of non-cooperative shares in relation to 
cooperative ones, it does not lay an appropriate foundation for entering cooperation in the first 
place: people are expecting to be rewarded for their share in cooperation, instead of being rewarded 
on the basis of how the totality of goods is distributed. 
This problem leads to Nozick’s main question: why does social cooperation require 
distributive justice in the first place? If everyone was rewarded on the basis of their own efforts, 
would they even need justice in the first place? If we suppose (as Rawls seems to do in Nozick’s 
mind) that this situation does not raise questions of distributive justice, then in virtue of what facts 
about social cooperation do these questions of justice emerge? “What is it about social cooperation 
itself that gives rise to issues of justice? It cannot be said that conflicting claims will exist only in 
the context of social cooperation: they also exist in the spheres where individuals produce on their 
own and fend for themselves” (Nozick, 1974, p. 185). If there were ten Robinson Crusoes and if 
each of them lived separately in his own island for two years, after which they were given radios 
to communicate, wouldn’t it be possible for them to try to think of justice in this new context? 
Wouldn’t the poorest one make a claim in regard to a just distribution of goods on the ground of 
being the least well-off? Furthermore, he might go on and say that different individual 
noncooperative shares stem from differential natural endowments which are not deserved; after 
this, it would be possible for him to make a case for the re-distribution of what was produced on 
the different islands.  Had the situation lacked social cooperation and no one made such claims, 
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the claim to distributive justice would then seem to be without much merit. But why? We must 
remember that in instances of non-cooperation, individuals were given the share that they earned 
on their own instead of having it re-distributed through juridical means, as no one could claim to 
merit what another person has produced for themselves. For Nozick, the question of who deserves 
what is quite clear in this situation: the inhabitants of the islands deserve what they have made for 
themselves on their respective plot of land. For this reason, Nozick concludes that social 
cooperation introduces a muddying of the waters that makes unclear who is entitled to what 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 186). Rather than saying that no theory of justice applies to this noncooperative 
case (but what if one steals from someone in noncooperative situation), Nozick aims to replace it 
by his own theory of justice: entitlement theory. This leads to a problem: how does social 
cooperation make it so the principles of entitlements that apply to noncooperative cases are 
inappropriate to cooperatives ones? According to Rawls, everyone is equal and has a right to equal 
claims, and this is how joint products must be divided. But for Nozick “the problem is based on 
the question of how we distribute the totality of shares when they both come from cooperative and 
noncooperative spheres” (Nozick, 1974, p. 186). This is indeed the problem that defines the 
entirety of distributive justice. 
According to Nozick, there is cooperation between people even when they produce things 
individually. For instance, let us imagine that there are social classes that produce specific goods, 
and that they want to exchange these goods with other classes. Each product will be recognized by 
its own producer, who will engage in a variety of services like producing, packing and transporting 
until it reaches the consumer. People cooperate in making things but each of them work separately; 
they would need only a marketplace where their holdings will be dependent on the price that has 
been determined by the exchange itself. So what would be the role of justice in such a system of 
social cooperation? Would it be to set criteria for “fair prices”? This isn’t an issue for Nozick, as 
he believes that the context of exchange will allow for fair prices to be set, insofar as exchange 
cannot happen unless both parties agree on pricing. If this mutual agreement is a voluntary one, 
why should justice intervene in the first place? Why is the result of such a voluntary exchange 
potentially unjust when both its members have agreed on its very modalities, as well as the result? 
To answer this question, Nozick asks us to think of people who produce things via cooperation 
instead of simply exchanging individually-produced goods. “However the question here is not 
whether a jointly-produced good underwent a fair and just distribution, but rather whether such a 
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joint product is recognized by any theory of just distribution in the first place” (Nozick, 1974, p. 
187). For Nozick, Rawls’ theory does not recognize that such a marginal product is a problem at 
all. As far as we know, people who cooperate do so on a mutual basis. For instance, even when 
there are joint products, there are mutual relations that serve as the context in which they are 
produced: for example, the relation between owners and executives, or the relationship between 
managers and employees. Because of this, the benefits that stem from a product are distributed via 
voluntary interaction between these specific actors. If the parties do not recognize the notion of a 
marginal product, then the resulting distribution would not be patterned in accordance with 
marginal productivity. But Nozick counters this: someone who viewed marginal productivity as a 
patterned theory of justice might think that such situations of joint production and indeterminate 
marginal product provided an opportunity for some theory of justice to make its entrance and 
determine appropriate exchange ratios; contrary to this, an entitlement theorist would accept 
whatever comes from voluntary exchanges. The workability of marginal productivity theory is an 
intricate question, as everyone enters its context on the basis of the different things that they are 
capable of doing. Because producers and workers encounter each other on an arbitrary basis, they 
must consequently establish a fixed price that is non-arbitrary. 
Nozick’s problem with Rawls is that the latter wants to distribute the results of this marginal 
productivity to an isolated few. He even goes further by accepting inequalities as long as they 
benefit that few. “These ''serviceable inequalities'' (as Nozick labeled them) stem from the idea of 
inequalities as incentives to perform various activities and fill roles that not everyone can do 
equally as well. So Rawls does not imagine that these inequalities are exactly what is needed to 
fill positions that everyone can do equally well” (Nozick, 1974, p. 188). But if this is the case, who 
is actually being incentivized here? When do we know whether those who are more in need of the 
balancing of the difference principle are the better-off, or the worse-off? Yet there is no part of the 
joint product whose contribution is undetermined. If the joint product was all what they could 
produce, then they could not know whether the additional products produced by these motivated 
people is greater than expenditure to them in incentives. So as a consequence of this, it could not 
be known whether the incentives were efficient or not. However, Rawls perception of justifiable 
inequalities presupposes that these things can be known. This is a problem for Nozick, as he 
believes that Rawls' conclusion causes more problems of social cooperation than it solves in the 
context of distributive justice. As we have seen above, this is because it allocates the benefits of 
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marginal productivity to groups that don't possess the same the marginal criteria in the first place: 
as the worse and better off have different conceptions of marginality, all that Rawls is doing is 
blurring the lines between such criteria. 
 
5.3 Background Institutions for Distributive Justice 
 
The problem of distributive justice in JF is to try and find the best possible arrangement for 
a unified scheme of institutions so that a fair, efficient and productive system of social cooperation 
can be maintained over time, from one generation to the next. The aim of distributive justice is to 
make sure that these institutions fit a large variety of the needs, desires and demands of the 
individuals that are known in general the society, but who did not cooperate and contribute in the 
production of those commodities. But this presents a problem of allocative justice. Perhaps the 
easiest way to resolve this is through an arrangement that would allocate commodities so as to 
achieve the greatest satisfaction of the individuals from the present into the future. But this is not 
what Rawls wants, as he has already rejected utilitarian principles in his theory of justice. Citizens 
will accept to cooperate in regard to the social resources which they have claims on. Rawls says 
that in a well-ordered society, the distribution of income and wealth illustrates what is called the 
“pure background” procedural justice. The basic structure is only arranged when people follow the 
rules that are publicly recognized and honor the claims that these rules specify; because of this, 
the distributions of the resulting goods are accepted as just, regardless of what this distributions 
turns out to be. The justice of the claims permitted by institutions will be weighed in this basic 
structure, for if they didn’t, people who behave as they pleased. An issue of distribution cannot be 
judged apart from the claims of individuals, which are earned by their efforts within a fair system 
of cooperation from which those distributions result. In contrast to utilitarianism, the concept of 
allocative justice has no application. There is no criterion for just distribution apart from 
background institutions. 
Rawls continues by explaining that even the term “background” implies that certain rules 
must be included in maintaining fair cooperation in society. To better explain this, Rawls uses the 
example of the basketball draft: at the end of the season, the winning team will be placed last on 
the list. In this system, new teams are placed at the top of the list, and can then change their ranking 
based on their performance. The goal of respecting these rules is to ensure that the least well-off 
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teams are still able to properly compete, as they can draft promising players before the richer teams 
have a chance at buying them. As we can see, background institutions require all the rules that are 
needed to fulfill the two principles of justice. Their duty is to keep property and wealth evenly 
shared and maintained over generations, which comes after preserving the fair value of liberties, 
as well as equality of opportunity. It can be ensured by laws that regulate bequest and inheritance 
of property, and others such as taxes to prevent excessive concentrations of private wealth and 
power. Since the difference principle applies to the institutions as rules, their requirements are 
foreseeable.  Citizens who share different values will thus be able to adjust their life plans 
according to the differences that they share with others, as the principles of justice and institutions 
clearly denote the means with which they can achieve this. Moreover, the difference principle 
respects legitimate expectations based on publicly recognized rules. The rules that the two 
principles of justice require are meant to ensure social cooperation over time. The background 
institutions that they constitute are meant to protect equal political liberties and equal opportunity, 
and to ensure that economic and social inequalities contribute to the general good as well as the 
least advantaged members of the society. As in the basketball example, these rules are meant to 
strengthen fair play in social cooperation: even if they reside in the background, they are meant to 
render public the procedures of justice. 
Despite the fact that Rawls predicted the safe function of the difference principle in social 
distribution, Nozick remains unconvinced: we know the reasons for this, as we have seen them in 
the previous chapters. Rawls explains that parties in an initial situation will be able to choose 
principles of justice that would find consent of the both parties. As far as we can recall, the choice 
is done in complete freedom because the choosers are under the veil of ignorance. For Rawls, 
people cannot choose better principles than the ones chosen in the original position: the argument 
for this relies on the minimax principle and lexical ordering, which are both methods which appeal 
to the rational choice. The outcome of this process will yield two principles of justice: the equality 
principle and the difference principle. Nozick sees the determinacy of the two principles as unfair, 
as Rawls ensures that no other principles will be selected other than them. Furthermore, he does 
not accept that the original position privileges groups over individuals. To counter this, Nozick 
invites us to think of the original position from the standpoint of the individual: if we do, Nozick 
is convinced that the process which takes place in the original position would immediately cease. 
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For if they thought of the principles of justice in relation to their individual rights, they probably 
would.   
As we have seen, Rawls’ theory of justice is an attempt to synthesize freedom and equality 
by connecting the second principle of justice to the first. Nozick refuses this, because it is always 
possible to shift the goalposts in relation to what is considered as “worse-off”: for example, being 
below the point D on a graph might be considered worse off, right until point F is traced below 
point D. In other words, those that fall under certain state of being better off or worse off will 
change their view when confronted with an opposite state; while they might not change it 
completely, they will adjust it to a certain degree. What Nozick is trying to advance is the idea that 
one can only determine one’s position in relation to others: as no one possesses a bird’s eye view 
of society, they will never be able to accurately determine if they are worse-off or not. 
But there is another argument that can be mobilized: someone who is better off did not 
necessarily get in that position by making someone worse-off. As a consequence of this argument 
Nozick states that it would improve my life in various ways if one were to choose to become my 
devoted slave, supposing I could get over the initial discomfort. Is this the cause of our present 
state? “Obviously not. Furthermore, enslaving ourselves to a poorer person would improve his lot 
and worsen ours: does this mean that the poor person is badly off because we are as well off, or is 
it the opposite?” (Nozick, 1974, p. 191). 
This leads to Nozick’s critique of the difference principle: as a measure of equality, it is 
quite conflictual when it comes to actually determining justice. No doubt, the difference principle 
presents itself as the ground in which the least well-off will be incentivized to cooperate. But is 
this a fair agreement?  When looking at social cooperation, the distribution of gains seems to 
already be symmetrical for Nozick: according to him, the better endowed gain by cooperating with 
the worse endowed, and the worse endowed gain by cooperating with the better endowed. The 
problem with the difference principle is that it isn’t neutral, as it forces the well-off to cooperate 
with the worse-off in cases where cooperation might not happen organically. This is because the 
symmetry gets disturbed when we measure how much we would gain from social cooperation in 
comparison to no cooperation:  benefits would be greater if exchange occurs between all groups 
instead of a single group, be it the worse-off or best-off. The members of both groups gain from 
the internal cooperation within their respective groups and have larger shares than they would if 
there were no social cooperation at all. In consequence, benefits would be greater for someone 
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who stands in between the cooperation of the better off and the worse off than it would be within 
limited intra-groups. Cooperation will be better for a group if the mean gain that was achieved is 
higher in that group than in the other: while this signals inequality, Nozick asks in what direction 
the inequality is pointing toward if the better-endowed group includes those who can accomplish 
something of great economic and social value that would benefit the less-endowed as well. 
Because of this, Nozick cannot avoid concluding that the less endowed gain more than the better 
endowed do from the scheme of general cooperation. So what may be the conclusion to this? While 
Nozick does not believe that the better-off should benefit any more than they already do, he does 
not think that we should punish them by giving more to the worse-off, who benefit more when you 
consider that they spend less resources in the cooperative endeavor than the best-off. 
For Nozick, Rawls seems to only think of the case in which the worse-off can approach the 
better-off and make claims related to the maximization of their benefits in the scheme of 
cooperation: when they make their demands, they will force the better-off to give them as much as 
possible (in the sense that if they are given any more, the total sum of benefits will decrease) or 
else they will not cooperate. But as we have seen, Nozick thinks that the better-off can formulate 
claims to be made against the worse-off in the same way, insofar as the worse-off seem to benefit 
more in the scheme of cooperation. In this sense, if the demands of one camp are unreasonable, 
then so are the demands of the other. Because of this, Nozick then asks if this is the type of demand 
that the worse-off should even be making in the first place. This is what leads to the conclusion of 
Nozick’s entire argument: Nozick believes that Rawls “devotes too much time to the explanation 
of why the less-favored should not complain at receiving less in the scheme of cooperation” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 195). 
Rawls’ explanation is that it is in the advantage of the least favored to make this demand, 
since they will receive more through this inequality than they would do in a context of equality. In 
this sense, the worse-off have the right to grievance until they reach a point of inequality that 
actually benefits them in the long-run. But is this fair for the better-off? For Nozick, the fact that 
the better-off have to accept such demands is not fair, as it forces them to adapt their endeavors to 
the claims of a group that employs an abstract form of privilege to coerce them into cooperating 
on abstract terms. For this reason, Nozick then wonders how the difference principle can lead to a 
fair conclusion if it finds it origins in an unfair agreement: it is unfair precisely because it only 
treats the concept of fairness from the standpoint of the worse-off, and not the standpoint of those 
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who are not in that position. As we have seen, Nozick believes that the standpoint of the better–
off is misrepresented precisely because they have no right to present the worse-off with their own 
list of demands. 
 
5.4 The Problem of Justice between Generations 
 
Rawls relates the problem of justice between generations to the problem of the minimum 
of savings that a generation must make it order to prepare for the next one. We could see in previous 
chapter how the well-ordered society would be structured if it had background institutions to 
secure a fair scheme of cooperation between generations. JF must not only ensure fairness in a 
present society, but also to the generations that follow; when doing this, it must also be conform 
to the just distribution of goods in the present. Taking into consideration what Rawls has already 
said about procedural justice, we could all agree that for justice to prevail over time, it is up to the 
maintenance of procedural justice in order to have a just outcome in regard to distributive justice. 
Rawls knows that many societies do not share the abundance of wealth and well-ordered 
institutions that allow for distribution to be both just and efficient: in these cases, it is not efficiency 
that ensures justice but procedural justice that ensures fair cooperation over time. It might happen 
that some societies are going to so poor that the scarcity of their resources entails that any just 
distribution of goods will be inefficient; despite this, what is important is that these goods have 
been distributed in a just matter first, as matters of efficiency can only be solved once the problem 
of equality has been dealt with. Moreover, efficiency will pay off if it is the result of procedural 
justice, as it provides the framework in which the limits of efficiency can be established: in other 
words, it pays off because it doesn’t sacrifice justice in its pursuit of rationalization. But for the 
moment, there is no potential risk that parties would determine any principle of savings that is in 
contradiction with the precepts of the original position: as we are speaking of any society as if it 
were a future society, we are still in it. They cannot formulate a principle of savings because they 
lack the empirical data that exists outside the veil of ignorance. Furthermore, parties do not have 
a clear and unanimous concept of the general good; it is for this reason that they cannot rely on the 
principle of savings unless they aim for a fair and just procedure of distribution, as any other 
conception of savings requires knowledge of empirical data and the difference conceptions of the 
good that are present in society. Because of this, actors within the original position must conceive 
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of the rate of savings on the basis of procedural justice and its principles: the result of this is that 
the principles and their derivatives will have to apply to everybody, regardless of generation. 
As we have seen the principle of savings must apply to all generations equally, it must thus 
be based on a neutral principle: unfortunately, the fact that a particular generation must establish 
this principle is problematic, as it might be formulated in relation to contingencies that other 
generations might not face. Because of this, Rawls states that the first step towards such a principle 
is to ensure a minimum amount of savings that each generation will make, regardless of 
circumstances. This minimum must be sufficient enough to benefit the poorest members of society. 
But this leads to a significant problem, since the level of poverty differs from one society to 
another; furthermore, the situation of the worse-off might decline considerably for contingent 
reasons, and then throw the rate of savings into an un-balanced state. So this suggestion currently 
falls short. Rawls then suggests that the principle of saving can be taken as the minimum limit of 
the expectations of the poorest members of society. But as we have seen with Nozick, the 
expectations of the poor are contingent upon the expectations of the rich; as a result, the 
expectations of the poorest will fluctuate in tandem with those of the rich and thus invalidate the 
possibility of creating a generationally-neutral rate of savings. Because of this, Rawls finally 
concedes that it is impossible to derive a just rate of inter-generational savings from the difference 
principle. 
In order to be efficient, the procedure of savings must be based on taxes that are especially 
collected for this purpose: if these specific taxes start to rise to the point of rivalling other tax rates, 
then it is possible that many citizens will reject such a rate over time. Even if such a principle is 
motivated by a utilitarian ideal, it will hardly be understood by the parties, as we have seen in a 
previous chapter how they do not possess enough information to engage in utilitarian calculation 
and subsequently apply the latter’s derived principles. As utilitarian calculation cannot justify 
inter-generational savings, citizens in the original position can use a reduced form of utilitarian 
calculation (one which is possible to use individually within the original position, but not 
substantive enough to be transformed into a principle of justice) to come to the conclusion that it 
is not worth sacrificing resources to secure the rights of the poorest minority of a future society. 
As it is tailored to work with democratic constitutions, the principle of intergenerational savings 
is not accepted by democracy or the actors in the original position unless it is determinate, and thus 
non-arbitrary. This is because constitutional democracy establishes an interconnection between 
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inter-generational savings and freedom of choice: new generations have more choices to make if 
they have been given a certain “pool” of resources that can then be used as a social safety-net. This 
is perfectly understandable, as the institutional framework for a constitution is developed within 
the original position, which has been constructed in order to expel the influence of arbitrary factors 
from the process of formulating a system of justice. As the original position does not allow them 
to know about arbitrary factors such as the rise or fall of poverty within the scope of multiple 
generations, they cannot formulate a principle for inter-generational savings. To make matters 
more complicated, the actors inside the original position are not even given a guarantee that future 
generations will follow and apply such a principle; this can only discourage them from attempting 
to formulate one, let alone establish it. Quoting Herzen, Rawls replies that such a chronological 
form of unfairness is normal to the development of human civilization, as new generations always 
tend to benefit from the products of past generations, without ever having to “give back” on a 
social scale. More importantly, the capital that is transmitted from generation to generation is not 
only material, but cultural, scientific, institutional, legal, etc. In this sense, every generation has a 
duty to pass these goods to the next one, regardless of expectations. Expectations don’t matter 
because the previous generation didn’t use mixed expectations as a reason to prevent the transfer 
of these forms of capital to the current one: if this is the case, why should the current one wait until 
it is ensured that the following generations will conform to the rate of savings? For Rawls, this is 
the beginning of the solution to the problem of intergenerational justice. 
Rawls is looking for a principle that represents the human motive to provide for future 
generations, as it is our nature to do so. From the standpoint of the original position, we know that 
parties will not set a rule for themselves while others will disobey that same rule: in this sense, 
parties are justified in mistrusting rules that must apply inter-generationally, as they have no 
guarantee that the other generation will respect them in the same way they did. So the question is: 
if we cannot know what future generations will be like, we should we care about providing for 
them via sacrifices that are made in our generation. But Rawls then asks: what if the previous 
generation saved something for us? The goal of saving is not to make a generation wealthier every 
time savings are passed, but is instead based on the duty to pass on our culture to future 
generations; as we already have a system of taxation in place, we can then use it to ensure that 
capital is passed on in a similar way, without having to worry about ensuring that the next 
generations will be wealthier or not. We have a duty to provide for the next generation, just as the 
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previous generation acted upon their duty to provide for us: this duty, represented by a lack of 
expectation in regard to reimbursement, is the same type of duty we have towards our children in 
this generation. If this is the case, we must think of future generations just like we think of the 
children of ours, as they are the most vulnerable members of society insofar as they cannot provide 
for themselves. In other words, we must treat future generations as if they were part of our own. 
The question we must now ask is: what is the appropriate tax rate for determining how much will 
be given to the next generation? As we have seen, it is contingent upon the current allocation of 
natural and social resources, and thus cannot be formulated precisely in the original position: but 
this is not a problem, insofar as we have secured intergenerational savings as a duty instead. To 
put it differently, we have secured the ground for intergenerational savings: the rest is up to the 
actors to decide outside of the original position. But groundwork always leads to a certain 
conclusion, and in this case, Rawls provides a hint: the rate of saving can be measured by looking 
at the savings that the poorest member of society makes for their children. In other words, it is the 
bare minimum: this is normal, as it is the minimal expectation of what we think we will be able to 
save, regardless of the contingencies that determine the exact amount of capital that is produced 
and accumulated. 
In spite of Rawls claims that his theory doesn't offer any substantive conception of justice 
(in the sense that his conception of justice is not contingent upon a particular conception of the 
Good), we can see that the institutions that are created in conformity to the second principle do 
possess a certain meaning in the context of justice. By trying to find room for the application of 
the second principle of justice in reality, Rawls must necessarily ascribe a certain meaning behind 
the institutions that operate in its name: it is precisely this ''meaning'' that constitutes the 
substantive conception of the Good that Rawls sneaks into his theory. These institutions must 
possess an overarching meaning because it is the only way to ensure that they function in tandem, 
in the sense of consistently being able to respond to the imperatives of the surrounding institutions. 
Nozick's critique anticipates this, and it is why he states that it is impossible to let a single principle 
regulate the entirety of social cooperation no matter how good or true it actually is: because the 
entire system of distributive shares is what determines whether someone will be better or worse 
off, it is unrealistic to think that they will interact in conformity to a single, unified meaning. Taking 
this problem into account, Nozick suggests that we stop analyzing social cooperation through such 
a principle and instead, through calculating the increases in value that derive from exchange: in 
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other words, instead of asking whether someone should be better or worse off, we must ask what 
we can do to make both parties better-off in the context of exchange. For Nozick, this is the proper 
way of ensuring the neutrality of proceduralism, insofar as the calculations behind maximizing 





























The aim of this work is to compare the forms of rationality employed by Rawls and Nozick 
in the formulation of their respective theories of justice. Its main problem is to determine whether 
Rawls and Nozick employ the same form of rationality, for if they do, it means that it is very 
possible to engage in a procedure of justice within a liberal context and still arrive at different 
outcomes. Through our analysis, it is possible to see how the form of rationality employed by 
Rawls is unsustainable in the liberal context of justice, while Nozick's is. But how come? By 
leaving the right to natural entitlements untouched, Nozick can then engage in the same type of 
reasoning as Rawls, without having to suffer the inevitable clash between principles such as 
equality and difference: while Rawls' principles increasingly contradict each other as the actors 
move away from the epistemic constraints of the original position, Nozick's choice to accept the 
actor's knowledge of natural entitlements ensures that the deliberations will found the principles 
of justice with that reality taken into account. As the reality of natural entitlements is incontestable, 
Nozick's conception of justice is meant to adapt itself to reality instead of trying to shape the latter 
in its image. In other words, it is meant to adapt itself to a form of freedom that we already possess: 
the freedom to benefit from what was granted to us by nature. 
As both theories are competing within a liberal context, it is exactly at the concept of 
freedom where the two pairs of principles prove themselves to a purely rational “jury”; as a 
consequence of this, the principles of justice that will be selected must be in accordance with the 
reality of freedom instead of its idealization. It is at this point in the ''procedure'' that Nozick's 
arguments come to presence, as they defend the reality of freedom from the Rawlsian principle of 
justice: by doing this, they ensure that a liberal conception of justice must harmonize itself with 
the reality of freedom, instead of the opposite. As Rawls justifies the sacrifice of this reality in 
exchange for a greater good that operates covertly in his theory, we can say that much more is at 
risk here, namely because that which freedom is being sacrificed for is ill-defined in comparison 
to the very freedoms that will be lost. Nozick, on the other hand, is very lucid when it comes to 
defining exactly what will be lost, and in consequence, what can be gained in exchange: he can 
know this because the freedoms that are discarded set the limits for the freedoms that one can 
benefit from in Rawls' theory. 
117 
 
After Nozick's critique, Rawls understood that the classic line of argumentation that underpins A 
Theory of Justice could no longer be consolidated within the context of liberal theory. In essence, 
the attempt to ground local manifestations of justice via a universal form of contract implies the 
imposition of a certain form of deliberative rationality on cultures that possess their distinct 
deliberative and conceptual traditions. As such, Rawls' attempt remains local because his contract 
is always meant to apply locally; it is this contradiction in the nature of the contract that will push 
Rawls to develop a global form of contract in his later works. Yet a global contract is not a universal 
one, as Rawls has simply given on the original pretension of JF, which was to provide its procedure 
with a universal conclusion. For this reason Rawls abandons JF as the “only” rational procedure 
for formulating principles of justice, and thus transforms his theory of justice into a form of 
political liberalism. The difference between the new political form of his theory and its predecessor 
is also where we can locate the difference between a global and universal theory: while a universal 
theory implies that its precise conclusions must be accepted globally, a global theory allows for 
more practical divergence in the formulation of those very conclusions. In other words, political 
liberalism treats the modalities of the original position as the fictions that they actually are, instead 
of allowing their epistemic strictures to be treated as if they were real conditions of knowledge. 
By doing this, it is possible to modify them for practical purposes tied to the contingency of the 
reality in which the theory will be applied: a universal theory cannot do this, as its imperative to 
produce universal truth forces it to act as if its epistemic strictures already correlated with the way 
in which we experience reality. As we experience reality in different ways, a global theory must 
take these differences into account when enticing actors to formulate locally-applicable principles 
of justice. 
Be that as it may, Rawls theory still suffers from a problem when it is applied in a liberal 
context: as it remains a form of social contract, it will necessarily infringe on the types of freedoms 
that exist prior to the contract but cannot be integrated into its infrastructure. Rawls answer to this 
problem is to provide a list of primary goods and ensure that the procedure respects them as 
necessities; in this way, nothing necessary will be constrained by his theory. However, any 
functional principle of justice must be workable on a larger scale: because of this, another society's 
list of primary goods might not coincide with the measures taken to preserve those that Rawls has 
enumerated himself. For Nozick, the right to benefit from the fruits of nature is one that is inherent 
to all people: it is the only ''universal'' primary good, yet is ironically barred from global application 
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in Rawls theory. This is why Nozick claimed that Rawls theory was only partial, despite its 
universal ambitions: it doesn't tell the whole story, as there is a part of the story that requires us to 
take natural entitlements into account. And as economic cooperation has such a place in this 
particular ''part of the story'', then Rawls' theory has failed to account for the reality that it so 
desperately wants to transform. 
As we can see, the problem of natural entitlements constitutes the multi-polar character of 
liberalism: while liberal theory aims to compromise between the poles of distributive justice and 
libertarianism, we must effectively pick a side when it comes to the problem of natural 
entitlements. But all is not lost, as these poles tend to complement each other when liberal theory 
is applied in reality. For example, when having to regulate an irregularity, liberalism employs the 
form of rationality inherent to distributive justice in order to establish a self-replicating pattern in 
its place; yet if this irregularity is a natural one, then libertarian rationality is employed in order to 
preserve our free disposition towards such an irregularity. In essence, these two poles follow a 
similar logic, and it is only their grounds that make them differ substantially: while libertarianism 
responds to the demands of nature, distributive justice responds to the demands of history. As 
ideologies such as fascism aim to respond to the demands of one via the logic of the other (by 
responding to historical demands via biological solutions), we can safely affirm that liberalism's 
strength is found in the fact that the demands of both are restricted to being answered within the 
confines of their respective poles. Because of this, deliberation is always necessary as the rationales 
behind both poles must be reconstructed in tandem if they are both to be taken into account by a 
particular set of actors. This ''need for deliberation'' is much more suited for our contemporary 
context, as the only universal principle that political discourse still relies on is the plurality of 
actors in the public sphere: in this sense, questions of toleration take precedence over questions of 
truth. While this makes it possible to criticize liberalism for refusing to articulate a conception of 
the good that rests on a substantive conception of reason and truth, it makes it noticeably harder to 
criticize in the domain of freedom insofar as it allows actors to freely experience their particular 
conceptions of the truth. But according to Nozick, all of this is put into jeopardy by Rawls' 
difference principle: by limiting our knowledge of natural endowments and then forcing a 
universal outcome based on this arbitrary limitation, it simply presents itself as another particular 
form of truth with Universalist aspirations. 
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Ironically, accepting the very finitude of Rawls' theory also makes it harder to criticize. If 
we see it as a product of its time, it is easier to both understand why Rawls ideas made more sense 
''back in the day'', and why some of Nozick's objections didn't apply as well as they do now. This 
is because Rawls constructed his theory in a political context that was wholly different than today: 
liberal ideas and practices were under threat from communist, fascist and nationalist regimes, 
which is why some sort of substantive rationality was necessary to counter the substantive 
character of the ideologies mentioned above. In this sense, he required a theory of justice that could 
reconcile the liberal commitment to freedom with the illiberal commitment to social cohesion: the 
strength of such a defense is found in the fact that it provides an explanatory context for the clashes 
in Rawls theory. As we have seen, these clashes increase as Rawls' theory approaches reality, and 
we now know why: they represent the actual clashes in the political reality of his time. As solution 
to this problem, Rawls came up with an idea of social contract; by this, he meant an agreement 
that is tied to a constitution whose foundation is based on rational deliberation. Basing a 
constitution rational deliberation might sound like it is taken directly from the social contract 
tradition, but in reality is based on something much more concrete: the need to ensure that the core 
functions of an institution still function even when the application of social policies fail. As the 
constitution is the framework in which such deliberation can take place, the contract is meant to 
ensure that this space is preserved in the eventuality that its corresponding rationality will be 
required in the formulation of new social policies. 
While this work aimed to determine which form of ''rationality'' better suits its liberal 
context, its partisan aspirations end here. The rest of the work's merit resides in what has been 
discovered during exposition of both theorists' arguments. By exposing the way in which both of 
liberalism's poles interact in regard to common issues of justice, we can better understand political 
debates as they occur in western societies; this is because these debates mostly take place within 
the confines of liberalism itself. So instead of viewing liberalism as a monolith, it is much more 
fruitful to see political debates as operating with the intersections of these two poles.  For instance, 
such arguments might explain phenomena such as the recent American presidential elections, in 
which the conservative candidate was able to appeal to his fiscally-conservative base despite the 
fact that he subscribed to protectionist ideology: to understand the debates within the Republican 
Party in that context is to turn to the tension between the poles that were described above. But 
these insights not only pertain to inter-party debates; on the contrary, they also pertain to the 
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negotiations that occur between political parties. Remaining within the recent American context, 
it would be fruitful to examine the ways in which political negotiations can tend towards conditions 
akin to those in the original position. In this sense, the social contract can inform and even 
substantiate competing interpretations of primary goods, as well as the arguments employed to 
promote or preserve them.  While some might believe that the idea of a social contract is a 
necessary infringement on individual liberties, it is still possible to use it as an interpretative tool, 
in the sense that many of our current political practices echo those that occur within the framework 
of such a contract. And this interpretative stance is one that informs a genuinely plural form of 
political deliberation, insofar as most interpretative frameworks presuppose a plurality of 
interpretations. And if this is the case, we can better understand the necessity of plurality in liberal 
politics due to the fact that the very act of deliberation requires it as a condition of possibility. To 
cement such a necessity would be to create institutional frameworks that negate the possibility of 
bringing illiberal attitudes such as racism, sexism and homophobia into the confines of political 
debate. As we have seen, these types of attitudes are immediately proscribed by both Rawls and 
Nozick's methods which is proof that despite liberalism's multi-polar character, there are some 
issues that provoke an almost unanimous response. 
But this does not limit our concerns to western political debate, nor does it limit us to 
speaking solely of situations in which there already exists a stable set of social institutions in which 
the debate can take place. The current war in Syria is an example: on what grounds is it morally 
feasible to deny the liberties of civilians in the preservation of social institutions? To what extent 
can violence be used to protect institutions that were meant to render such political violence 
obsolete? And finally, how does one recompose such social institutions after their attempted rescue 
has led to their near destruction? While rational deliberation does not currently seem like a possible 
course of action, it will necessarily become one when it is time to recompose such institutions. 
And as we have seen, the question of whether such a contract can respect individual liberties in a 
plural context is one that has yet to be answered coherently by liberal theory: the tension that we 
have exposed must thus serve as the starting point to any debates regarding the implementation of 
contract-based institutions and practices. While theoretical debates such as these seem far removed 
from real politics, it is real politics that ends up calling for them out of necessity; thus, it is not a 
question of ''if'' we are to engage in such a debate in the first place, but a question of ''when''. 
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The inevitability of these types of debates is not a burden on liberal theory, but is instead 
its saving grace. While this work conceptualized liberalism in general as a moderate attempt to 
settle oppositions that arise  between political positions based on incommensurable conceptions of 
the Good, Rawls' proclamation of the difference principle has, per Nozick's critique, contributed 
to the erasure of the distinction between liberalism and other substantive political theories. As we 
have seen, this is because Rawlsian liberalism preserves a particular conception of the Good in the 
form of a substantive rationality that effectively hides behind proceduralism. In other words, 
liberalism is now plagued by the tendency to move towards one-dimensionality as a defense 
mechanism: if there is a certain aspect of reality that contradicts the theory, all the theory needs to 
do is banish that aspect of reality to the noumenal realm via the absolutization of particular 
epistemic strictures. The reality which was banished by Rawls was that of natural entitlements; as 
Nozick has presented the inevitable contribution of natural entitlements to the content of one's 
freedom, this is a topic that must be deliberated upon instead of being cast-out from the outset. For 
if we don't, we are not taking the reality of freedom seriously: if this is to be the case, then we 
cannot expect our selected principles to apply anywhere else than the original position. While 
Rawls purports to save liberal theory from the one-dimensional character of utilitarianism, he is 
actually putting the tradition's dynamism into question by limiting pluralistic conceptions of 
property, rights and personhood from the outset. It is precisely this dynamism that must be regained 
through the means of rational deliberation, an example of which this work has attempted to expose: 
despite the current poverty of deliberation in politics, the necessities of political reality itself 
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